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ABSTRACT
Since the late 1980s, hundreds of U.S. Navy ships have been decommissioned.
Although ship decommissionings were postponed immediately after the September 11th
attack, today the Navy is again engaged in "rightsizing" its force. Depending on the type
of ship and its age, a ship faces different fates after the decommissioning process has
been completed. Except on the rare occasion when a ship is turned into a museum, most
decommissioned ships are disposed of in one of three ways. Some ships are sold to
foreign navies to recoup some costs. Other ships are reassigned to the Military Sealift
Command (MSC) to continue serving the fleet, albeit in a quasi-civilian capacity. The
last option for a decommissioned ship is to be placed in an inactive status or “mothballs”
and eventually sunk.
The impact of the decommissioning process on the crew is a major concern. The
day the decommissioning ship completes its last operational assignment, the “mission” of
the ship changes significantly: The crew must prepare its ship for a kind of death. Those
in authority who may have recently mastered the art of leading sailors into hostile
environments now must motivate their sailors and themselves to excel in the absence of
danger. Consequently, the leaders on the ship are faced with a difficult challenge: to
maintain morale and to keep the crew on task even though the mission and tasks have
changed dramatically. If a naval leader cannot successfully adapt his/her leadership style
to the environment created by the decommissioning, the crew morale may be adversely
affected and retention may plummet.
The purpose of this research was to begin to explore leadership challenges in
naval vessels that were scheduled for decommissioning. The study identified the
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perceptions of nine naval leaders from three decommissioning ships regarding the
decommissioning process. These perceptions were organized into 13 major themes that
provide valuable information and insight about naval leadership during the
decommissioning process. This information should be useful to prospective naval leaders
who encounter decommissioning situations during their tours of duty.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Prologue
A t the Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, WA on 23 March 2003 at 1423 the ship I
helped lead took her last breath. We had already held the “wake” and “memorial
service” in the form o f a decommissioning ceremony two weeks earlier in San Diego,
CA; but now it was official: the USS JOHN ADAMS1 was dead.
About an hour earlier I had passed the Officer o f the Deck, a Petty Officer who
wondered out loud why any watchstanders were still required, especially since he was
now the only sailor left on duty. He thought, “What am I guarding?” His comment was
indicative o f the underlying attitude o f the crew. This attitude was something that the
senior leadership onboard had attempted to curtail fo r months. Motivating the crew had
become increasingly more difficult as we approached this day, but the struggle would be
over soon.
As I entered the ship, the deafening silence immediately struck me. This was very
wrong; a ship is never supposed to be silent. Even when she loses power there is always
some sound. People scrambling though the passageways lit by strategically placed
emergency lighting, fo r instance. And because the unplanned loss o f shore power in port
may be related to a terrorist attack to the base, the standard practice is fo r sailors on the
security detail to blow a whistle as they traverse the dimly lit passageways to the armory
where they are issued various weapons fo r securing and protecting the ship. Even when
power fails at sea, one can usually hear the waves slapping against the hull and the
cursing o f engineers making their way to the Central Control Station where other

1
The names o f the three main ships used in this dissertation are pseudonyms in an attempt to maintain a
level of confidentiality for those who were stationed onboard the ships and participated in this study.
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generators will be brought to life. But now there was only the muffled sound o f my
footsteps.
I continued through the dark passageways to the wardroom. As I entered the
room the open port window illuminated the wardroom tables, the barren bulkheads, and
the standard issue Navy coffee machine. I longed fo r one more cup o f good, strong
coffee, the lifeblood o f the Navy. It had sustained me through many late nights and cold
sea details. I was aware that this machine had already produced its last pot days ago,
but I instinctively reached fo r the black spigot. I held my hand under the spigot as a few
drops o f the cold, dark “blood” ran down my finger and pooled in my palm.
On my way to the bridge, I passed the empty officer staterooms. Each was hollow
without the carpet and mattresses; the only items remaining were the mustard colored
lockers and desks with some drawers left ajar. I could almost see the young officers
seated at their desks producing the constant stream o f naval messages and
correspondence that are always a part o f a living ship.
I continued to the bridge where I met the Captain. From the inside o f the ship we
unshackled the chain holding the port bridge wing door shut. All but one o f the 15
exterior doors and hatches had been secured this way. The last one would be secured
from the outside after we left. When we emerged onto the bridge wing, we gravitated to
our familiar spots and I produced a ceremonial cigar saved fo r this moment. The
Captain smiled as he lit his usual cigarette. We began reminiscing about the many
underway replenishments and moorings we had overseen from this spot. We were pretty
2
The term “Captain” refers to the Commanding Officer or CO of a ship (i.e. the senior member and
the top decision maker on each ship). A Captain is also the Navy rank above a Commander and below
Admiral. In the Navy, the captain o f a ship can be a Lieutenant, a Lieutenant Commander, a Commander,
or a Captain depending upon the type o f ship that is being discussed. In this case the ship’s Captain is a
Commander.
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certain that we would never again have a tour o f duty with as much influence and
autonomy—this moment was the epilogue o f the best tour o f my career.
As we conversed, an elderly, civilian shipyard worker joined us from inside the
ship. He lit his own cigarette as he approached and interrupted our reunion. Decades o f
seafaring life shown on his leathered face and could be heard in his graveled voice. We
soon learned that he had retired from the Navy several years before and was now, as a
civilian, responsible fo r preparing the newly decommissioned ships fo r their stay in the
“Bone Yard. ” I immediately dubbed him “The Mortician. ” I didn’t like his intrusion,
preferring to spend my last moments on the ship differently, i.e., with those with whom I
had served. However, the Captain didn’t seem to mind, so I left them talking about the
latest sports scores and retreated to my stateroom. Although I had traversed the path to
my stateroom hundreds o f times, the darkness and overwhelming silence was now very
disquieting.
I sat at the desk in my stateroom and put my feet up watching the cigar smoke curl
around the room. I contemplated removing the two brass plaques on my door. One read
“LCDR Darren J. McGlynn, Executive Officer, ” and the other read “Knock then Enter. ”
I decided against removing them after fantasizing that a recreational SCUBA diver would
pry them o ff in a hundred years after this ship had been sunk and become a reef.
After taking a last look at my old stateroom, I returned to the bridge to finish my
cigar. The Captain had since wondered o ff so I sat in my bridge chair, propped up my
feet, and looked through the windows at the other decommissioned ships. The ship that
had preceded our decommissioning by two weeks, the EX USS VALDES, was moored at
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4
the next pier, and it had already started looking like the other residents o f the Bone Yard:
faded, rusted, and forgotten.
My contemplative moment was shattered by the sound o f the Mortician’s voice
behind me. I envisioned this moment to be somber and quiet, dedicated to remembering
the exploits o f this fine warship. His presence seemed to preclude this. I wanted to tell
him to go away, but instead I tried to ignore him. Maybe he had a job to do up here on
the bridge, and he would complete it and move to another part o f the ship allowing me to
mourn in peace. This was not to be; in fact, it seemed he had nothing to do but talk to
me. The Mortician rattled on in painstaking detail about his days serving on the EX USS
IDAHO; a nuclear cruiser moored three piers down, whose superstructure had been
completely removed. The man lamented, “She doesn ’t even look like a ship anymore. ”
A t this point I realized that he was mourning too. He was trying to connect with me;
perhaps he was trying to prepare me fo r the feelings that he was all too familiar with. He
was an expert about such feelings; working here, he saw the crews deliver their terminal
ships on a regular basis. As I listened to this sad man, I decided that I did not want to be
like him, trapped in this dead world. I was sympathetic (I guess even empathetic), but
now I needed to move on, something he had evidently not yet done.
The Captain rejoined us and we made our way to the Quarterdeck to depart the
ship. I directed the Officer o f the Deck to make the final deck log entry and turn over his
watch to the civilian shipyard worker. The Captain and I walked o ff the ship, and neither
o f us ever looked back.
Crewmembers had been leaving the ship fo r months in small groups but after the
last o f us left the ship all o f the remaining crewmen boarded buses headed to the airport.
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This decommissioning and subsequent exodus occurred during the Gulf war in 2003 that
necessitated the establishment o f vehicle checkpoints at airport entrances. A security
guard at the security checkpoint mistakenly assumed our bus was fu ll o f men headed off
to war and wished us luck and safety in our upcoming combat assignment. Either
because there wasn’t enough time during the brief stop or because we were all too
embarrassed, no one corrected her. At that moment, when our situation was illuminated
in stark contrast to those leaving fo r war, the crew’s morale hit bottom.
Background to the Study
Since the late 1980s hundreds of U.S. Navy ships have been decommissioned.
Although ship decommissionings were postponed immediately after the September 11th
attack, today the Navy is again engaged in "rightsizing" its force.3 During the 2003
fiscal year, in fact, 20 ships were decommissioned (Crawley 2003a, p. A l). In addition,
during a recent visit to Bath Naval Shipyard, I observed several new warships under
construction that the Navy will soon add to its ranks. As new ships are commissioned,
older ships will almost certainly be decommissioned.
Depending on the type of ship and its age, a ship faces different fates after the
decommissioning process has been completed. Except on the rare occasion when a ship
is turned into a museum, most decommissioned ships are disposed of in one of three
ways. Some ships are sold to foreign navies to recoup some costs, and more importantly,
to bolster our ties with other countries. Other ships, mostly support ships, such as oilers,
are reassigned to the Military Sealift Command (MSC) to continue serving the fleet,
albeit in a quasi-civilian capacity. The last option for a decommissioned ship is to be

3
Despite the recent war in the Arabian Gulf, the process is still ongoing. Currently, the optimal
size for the fleet seems to be slightly less than 250 ships.
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placed in an inactive status or “mothballs”; most mothballed ships are eventually sunk in
a similar fashion as the ship depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1. The sinking of a decommissioned ship (U.S. Navy released).
One recently decommissioned ship, the USS CONSTELLATION, was slated for
mothballing. During its decommissioning process the Commanding Officer said of the
decommissioning process: "It's an enormous undertaking. Anyone who's moved
understands the challenges" (Crawley, 2003b, p. A l). Before the sailors leave for new
assignments, they must complete a variety of tasks including taking inventory, packing,
and removing hundreds of thousands of parts from the ship. These ships are
preserved-for a time, at least-for the unlikely event that the country should enter a multi
theater war that requires reactivation of additional naval assets. Eventually even the
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7
mothballed ships are sold for scrap or sunk as part of a targeting exercises for newer ships
and aircraft.
During the decommissioning process, the impact on the crew is always a concern.
Each person must be reassigned to another comparable command to serve out his or her
remaining time at sea. Before sailors move on to their new assignments, however, work
must be done: The crew must prepare its ship for a kind of death. The day the
decommissioning ship completes its last operational assignment, in other words, the
“mission” of the ship changes significantly. Those in authority who may have recently
mastered the art of leading sailors into hostile environments now must motivate their
sailors and themselves to excel in the absence of danger.
It is not difficult to instill the mindset of being the best-maintained, sharpest, and
cleanest warship afloat when there is a tangible, operational commitment for which to
prepare. The situation for the crew of a decommissioning ship, however, is radically
different. Consequently, the leaders on the ship are faced with a difficult challenge: to
maintain morale and to keep the crew on task even though the mission and tasks have
changed dramatically. Jim Crawley, a San Diego Union Tribune Staff Writer, in his
article on the decommissioning of the USS CONSTELLATION, quotes a sailor whose
comments speak to the challenge of those who must lead a decommissioning process.
The sailor said: “We can’t understand why we are going through all of this work when
we’re letting the ship die” (Crawley, 2003b, p. A l).
Statement o f the Problem
If a naval leader cannot successfully adapt his/her leadership style to the
environment created by the decommissioning process, the crew morale may be adversely
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affected. Unfortunately, decommissioning is a topic so unique to the Navy that literature
about it is extremely limited and what does exist in naval archives does not address the
leadership aspects of the decommissioning process. The only literature on the
decommissioning process is in the form of the “Lessons Learned” messages. The
information for these messages is compiled by the crew of a decommissioning ship
during the final months of the ship’s “life,” and these messages are usually the last ones
sent by a ship prior to the crew disbanding. These messages are written in standard naval
message format and address logistical issues that the particular ship faced during the
decommissioning process. As exemplified in Appendix A, the messages do not address
any leadership challenges encountered nor do they address any morale issues, and they
are not in anyway systematic, empirical research studies.
There is some relevant, systematic research in the civilian sector regarding
mergers and downsizing, processes that are at least somewhat analogous to the
decommissioning process. The lessons learned from studying these events may be at
least somewhat applicable in the Navy; however, in an article entitled Corporate
Downsizing and its Effect on the Organization, Choy (2003) said, “Morale suffers which
equates to lower productivity and profits for the organization” (p. 2). Choy went on to
reference Mabert & Schemenner (1997) who discuss “how managers complained of the
morale-sapping character of most downsizing and described how low morale created
anxiety and paralysis within their companies to the subsequent detriment of productivity”
(Choy, 2003, p. 2). Anecdotal accounts suggest something similar occurs in a naval
setting when a ship decommissions.
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However, mergers and downsizing are not really exact equivalents of a
decommissioning process. One difference involves the fact that the Navy wants to retain
sailors involved in a decommissioning process and have them accept other assignments
within the Navy. Admiral Vem Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations, has said
concerning our sailors: “We've got to offer to them a chance to make a difference. They
want us to give them a chance to show what they can contribute. They want a chance to
grow and develop” (Kennedy, 2000, p. 1). If the men and women serving on
decommissioning ships perceive that there is no relevant mission, retention could be
adversely affected and the Navy could lose its most valuable asset, the sailor.
Because the ship-decommissioning program is back on track, naval leaders
assigned to decommissioning ships will continue to face the unique challenges presented
by this process. Consequently, there is a need to better understand how leaders can best
respond to this unique leadership challenge so that the adverse effects of dealing with it
inappropriately are avoided. This study will attempt to respond to the need articulated in
this section, and it will attempt to begin to fill the literature void that exists regarding
leadership during the decommissioning process.
Purpose o f the Study
The purpose of this research is to begin to explore leadership challenges in naval
vessels that are scheduled for decommissioning. The study will attempt to identify the
perceptions of naval leaders regarding the decommissioning process. More specifically,
the study will focus on the leadership techniques that naval leaders indicate they used
during the decommissioning process.
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Research Questions
The study will be guided by the following questions:
(1)

What perceptions do naval ships’ leaders have regarding the
decommissioning process and the leadership challenges during this time?

(2)

What motivational techniques do naval leaders say they use to positively
impact crew morale during the decommissioning process?
Limitations o f the Study

The decommissioning schedule is defined by Congress and the list of prospective
ships to be decommissioned is updated semi-annually in a classified naval message. The
schedule is subject to change, as is the disposition of each ship after decommissioning.
Because of the way the ships are designated for decommissioning, the pool of perspective
respondents was limited to those stationed on certain types of ship (i.e., the ships
designated for decommissioning are usually older ships). Additionally, the number of
ships decommissioned per year is relatively small compared to the rest of the fleet. This
limited the sample pool during my available time for research and study.
Although ships are being decommissioned on both coasts of the U.S., for
convenience sake, only those decommissioned in San Diego, CA were used in the study.
This understandably limits the study to one geographic area, but it is my opinion that the
leadership challenges are similar no matter where the decommissioning takes place.
Nevertheless, during the transcription/coding process I did not note any issues regarding
geographic location in the data analysis.
The interviews of each of the respondents took place at various times during the
decommissioning process. The proximity to the actual decommissioning date or other
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significant milestone in the decommissioning process, could have affected the way the
respondents answered questions during the interview. The approximate time that a
particular interview took place on the decommissioning timeline will be discussed for
each respondent.
One of the shortfalls of this study will be the absence of data that would enable
triangulation of the triad’s perceptions. Ideally, a short survey given to a sample of
sailors on each triad’s ship could be used to determine if those being led shared the same
perceptions as those leading them through the decommissioning process. Due to
limitations posed by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) and Navy regulations this will
not be possible and only the perceptions of the naval leaders will be analyzed.
Because some information for this study was obtained from my own command, it
may be what Glesne refers to as "backyard research" (Glesne, 1999, p. 26). Although
backyard research can be very valuable there are numerous potential problems associated
with it. Since I was an Executive Officer4 on a decommissioning ship and participated in
the study, I bring with me preconceived leadership ideas, specifically, how to lead
through the decommissioning process. These ideas may be different from those of other
respondents and may taint my perceptions of the data. Two of Glesne's additional
warnings are to "go away from home to do your research,” and “to conduct your research
where you are not so emotionally close to your subjects that it distorts your design”
(Glesne, 1999, p. 27). Despite the sound advice from noted scholars like Glesne, the
importance of this study is such that conducting “backyard research” is worth the risk for
the opportunity to glean the rich lessons about leadership in the challenging environment
4
The Executive Officer (XO) is second in command o f a Navy ship and is primarily responsible to the
Commanding Officer (CO) for the organization, performance o f duty, and the good order and discipline o f the
command (OPNAVINST 3120.32,1994).
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created by the decommissioning process. To mitigate the effects of backyard research I
will attempt to view my journal data from an outsider’s perspective and will be mindful
of the source when searching for emerging themes.
Significance o f the Study
Naval leaders assigned to decommissioning ships will continue to face the unique
challenges presented by this decommissioning process. This study should be useful to
perspective naval leaders who may encounter decommissioning situations during their
tours of duty. When referring to the particularistic aspect of research Hoaglin states, “It
can suggest to readers what to do or not to do in similar situations” (Merriam, 1998, p.
30). This study promises to yield valuable information about naval leadership during the
decommissioning process and may contribute to naval leaders improving their ability to
lead during a challenging time. An informed and equipped leader can have a significant,
positive impact on the ship including improving poor morale that may suffer during the
tumultuous decommissioning process.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Based on my review using the Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC)
and Navy-specific documents, such as Lessons Learned messages and Navy Marine
Corps Internet resources, I concluded that there is currently no formal literature available
that specifically addresses the problem of how to prepare naval leaders for the leadership
challenges created when their ships decommission. As noted previously, there are some
Lessons Learned naval messages written at the end of the decommission process, and I
was able to retrieve these, albeit not through the Navy’s Lessons Learned website (Navy
Warfare Development Command, 2004). The site had no Lessons Learned messages
posted on the decommissioning process. Rather, I had to contact the organization to
which the ships that were decommissioned formally belonged. (This organization is
referred to as the Immediate Senior In the chain of command or ISIC.)
Lessons Learned Naval Messages
I will begin with a review of a sample decommissioning Lessons Learned naval
message since this is the only formal literature that even addresses the decommissioning
process. (For an example of these messages, see Appendix A.) These messages are
written in all capital letters and use a formatting style unique to naval messages. These
are not e-mail messages but rather are an outgrowth of Teletype messages transmitted
using standardized radio equipment that is installed on all Navy ships. This form of
communication has existed for decades and is still considered the formal medium of
reporting and tasking in the Navy. The typical Lessons Learned message is divided into
three or four sections corresponding to the number of major departments on the ship (i.e.,
Engineering, Operations, Supply, and Combat Systems). The information provided in
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each of these sections addresses issues and challenges that were encountered by
individuals who worked in those specific areas. Additionally, these messages list the
recommended courses of action to either avoid or rectify the difficult situations that are
part of the decommissioning process. An excerpt from the USS VALDES’ Lessons
Learned message is cited below. This example records a challenge encountered by the
Engineering Department (the text was intentionally left in the original naval message
format to allow the reader to visualize the differences in writing style between the Navy
and the civilian sector):
ITEM: BATTLE LANTERNS
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: BECAUSE THE SPACE CLOSEOUT
INSPECTOR NEEDS TO VERIFY THAT ALL BATTLE LANTERN
BATTERIES ARE REMOVED, THIS CAN BE A PROCESS THAT TAKES A
LONG TIME AS LANTERN BULB PLATES ARE UNSCREWED TO
INSPECT THE LANTERN'S INTERIOR CAVITY.
C. RECOMMENDATION: THE INSPECTION PROCESS IS EASIER IF
WHEN THE BATTERIES ARE REMOVED, THE LANTERN FACEPLATE IS
REATTACHED OFF TO THE SIDE LEAVING THE LANTERN CAVITY
OPEN FOR THE INSPECTOR TO PERFORM A QUICK VISUAL CHECK.
THIS AVOIDS REOPENING EACH CLOSED OUT BATTLE LANTERN.
ONCE THE BATTERIES ARE REMOVED, TRANSFER THEM TO
ANOTHER SHIP OR TURN IN AS HAZMAT. IF TURNED IN AS HAZMAT,
THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE TERMINALS MUST BE REMOVED TO
PREVENT ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE AND A FIRE. FOR
RECHARGEABLE BATTERIES, CUT THE WIRES AS CLOSE TO THE
BATTERY AS POSSIBLE AFTER REMOVAL.
Each of the Lessons Learned messages consists of numerous entries that have
essentially two parts, the background/discussion section and the recommendation section.
These entries usually address one of the following topics: (a) safety issues, (b)
administrative matters, and (c) ideas that will expedite the decommissioning process.
Although these messages provide valuable advice about managing schedules and
implementing procedures, they do not address how to deal with leadership challenges.
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The leadership challenges I am referring to evolve from the interactions with
subordinates and superiors within the naval hierarchy during the decommissioning
process. In other words, the Lessons Learned messages do not address how to lead
people. In fact, these messages rarely address personnel issues at all other than to convey
a procedure for administrative processing or personnel safety. The following excerpt
from a safety Lessons Learned message (Navy Safety Center, n.d.) exemplifies how
personnel issues are recorded and it illustrates the previous point:
J. PERSONNEL CONSIDERATIONS - AS THE DECOM DATE
APPROACHES, IT IS TYPICAL THAT THE CREW SIZE WILL DRAW
DOWN. THIS HAS THE POTENTIAL TO CREATE KNOWLEDGE GAPS
WITH REGARDS TO SHIPS SYSTEMS AND DAMAGE CONTROL
EXPERTISE. SHIPS MUST CAREFULLY PLAN CREW DRAWDOWNS TO
ACCOUNT FOR CONCEIVABLE EMERGENCIES.
K. PERSONNEL CONSIDERATIONS - DECOM PREPARATIONS INVOLVE
MOVING THE ENTIRE CREW OFF THE SHIP, TYPICALLY TO A
BERTHING BARGE. SHIPS SHOULD HAVE EGRESS TRAINING FOR
BARGE LIVING/WORKING SPACES EARLY IN THE MOVE-OFF TO
ENSURE PERSONNEL ARE ABLE TO QUICKLY AND SAFELY
EVACUATE IF REQUIRED.
L. PERSONNEL CONSIDERATIONS - AS SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT
ARE REMOVED, PERSONNEL MAY BE TEMPTED TO USE IMPROPER
TOOLS AND/OR PPE TO ACCOMPLISH REQUIRED WORK.
SUPERVISORS AT ALL LEVELS MUST REMAIN VIGILANT TO THIS
TEMPTATION AND CONTINUOUSLY REMIND THEIR PERSONNEL TO
USE THE PROPER EQUIPMENT. PLANNING FOR THE PHASED
REMOVAL OF PPE CONSISTENT WITH THE ANTICIPATED WORK
REQUIREMENTS WILL HELP TO ENSURE THE PROPER EQUIPMENT IS
AVAILABLE AS LONG AS IT IS NEEDED.
Although the Lessons Learned messages can be useful to naval leaders when
preparing for a decommissioning, the leadership challenges encountered during the
decommissioning process need to be addressed and guidance needs to be provided to
naval leaders.
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Comparing and Contrasting Downsizing and Mergers
Literature about corporate downsizing and mergers, although not an exact fit with
the decommissioning process, can be useful in this study. A company that is scheduled
to undergo a merger or is scheduled to downsize might encounter experiences that at least
somewhat resemble the circumstances associated with a ship decommissioning. Of
course, there are differences as well as similarities between mergers and downsizing in
the corporate world, on the one hand, and a ship decommissioning in the Navy on the
other. Therefore, these differences, as well as the apparent similarities between
decommissioning and downsizing, are discussed below.
Choden (2000) lists common mistakes that employers make during and after an
organization’s merger and subsequent downsizing:
•

Failing to plan how the company will operate after downsizing.

•

Failing to involve the human resource department in the planning stages.

•

Failing to keep employees informed about the merger and the impact it will have
upon their jobs.

•

Promising employees that "This will never happen again."

•

Holding closed-door sessions immediately after the layoff.
These mistakes made in civilian contexts are somewhat analogous to a naval

setting. Specifically, the first three points directly relate to a naval context. Failing to
plan how the organization will operate during the decommissioning (which also involves
a steady downsizing until the entire crew has detached) can create a plethora of problems
that a ship might not be able to recover from. Failing to involve the human resources
department would be like trying to accomplish a decommissioning without the Command
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Master Chief5 and the administrative department handling the individual sailor’s next set
of orders. The third analogous failure involves communication, which is arguably the
major challenge in the decommissioning process. During a decommissioning, naval
leaders need to decipher the many pieces of information and pass on what they think are
the most reliable ones to the crew. The leaders need to distil the raw (sometimes
contradictory) information down to the essentials: the time of the decommissioning,
where it will take place, and what type of decommissioning it will be (i.e., hot swap6 or
mothballs). Ironically, these pieces of information are exactly what the leaders on
decommissioning ship’s have difficulty obtaining.
Organizations that go through downsizing and mergers change at an accelerated
pace, and the leaders involved will no doubt make mistakes during this process.
Members of those organizations will react to the changes and the subsequent mistakes
(these mistakes may be actual or perceived). Howard (n.d.) cites six major reactions to
downsizing from the book Healing the Wounds (Noer, 1993). These reactions are
somewhat analogous to those of sailors on Navy ships during the decommissioning
process. These negative reactions, listed below, can significantly impact the
organization:
•

Reduced risk-taking. This usually takes the form of reluctance to take on new
challenges or introduce new products or ideas, and fear of proposing changes.

•

Lowered productivity. Survivors tend to become consumed by seeking
information and reassurance rather than productivity.

5
The Command Master C h iefs (CMC) role on a ship may resemble that o f someone assigned to Human
Resources in a civilian company.
6
A hot swap is when a decommissioning ship has been purchased by a foreign country and the current crew
hands the operating ship over to that new crew. This involves some overlap time when both crews reside on board
simultaneously.
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•

Thirst fo r information. Noer describes an unquenchable need for any type of
information, whether formal communications or through the company grapevine.

•

Blaming others, usually management. Everyone is looking for someone else to
blame. It is the opposite reaction from a sense of empowerment, i.e., someone
else is in control, and someone else is to blame. Typically, everyone looks "up"
in the organization for faultfinding.

•

Justifying the need fo r a layoff. In order to live with themselves, typically a group
of survivors tries to justify the layoff decision. These are generally the people
who took part in the decision-making process-managers and human resource
people.

•

Denial. A common response is to deny the feelings of layoff survivors. It is
particularly common among upper managers to deny the feelings of fear,
insecurity, sadness, frustration, etc. typical of the survivor syndrome.
If the change itself does not illicit negative reactions from sailors, mistakes

probably will. If sailors perceive the decommissioning process is not going well (i.e.,
they perceive that mistakes are being made by their chain of command and that their best
interests are not being served) they may become divisive and can undermine the
decommissioning efforts of the command. Coyne (2004) describes personality types that
he has encountered during his naval service that would be very difficult to deal with
during the dynamic decommissioning environment:
Complainer. Nothing is good enough for the Complainer. Things would be
different if he were in charge. He criticizes everything and everyone up and down
the chain of command and actively seeks others who share his outlook. This
personality is incredibly destructive to unit morale, and if he finds a receptive
audience, his attitude can multiply quickly, (p. 69)
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The changes that are inherent with the decommissioning process are likely to
bring out the complainers in the ranks. The leaders on the ship will have to effectively
deal with each of them.
Stress in a Naval Context
One rather obvious similarity between a Navy ship decommissioning and civilian
downsizing is the stress that is engendered by any significant change strategy. Although
during both processes a degree of stress exists, there is a major difference between
civilian and naval contexts. For instance, the stress during a merger or downsizing can be
caused by not knowing if you are going to lose your job. On a decommissioning ship the
entire crew will get another assignment; the stress resides on where the next assignment
will be and the subsequent geographic move for the sailor and his/her family. At an
organizational level, the Navy’s problem is almost the reverse of some of the problems
that corporate America must solve at merger or downsizing times (i.e., granting
severance pay or helping employees who are being let go find new jobs). In the Navy,
failing to retain Sailors is the problem, and if the men and women serving on
decommissioning ships perceive that there is no relevant mission, retention could be
adversely affected and the Navy could lose its most valuable asset, the sailor. Natter
(2000) emphasizes this point and highlights the charge to those in authority on Navy
ships to retain quality people:
We have been blessed as a nation and are privileged to have the greatest Navy in
the world. But it will not remain great without a Navy-wide commitment to
retaining our best and brightest, one sailor and one officer at a time, through good,
old-fashioned leadership. And it will not last without a national commitment to
continue our nation's influence in the world and to improve the size and readiness
of our naval forces, (p. 3)

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

20
The civilian sector must deal with downsizing in much the same way. Orman
(2002, p. 1) describes the possible consequences if those in authority do not handle a
downsizing correctly: “When change is not handled well, additional loss of jobs can
occur. In addition, demoralization of the work force; increased worker turnover;
decreased cooperation and teamwork; and increased levels of stress, anxiety,
absenteeism, illness, and mistakes can follow.” With the exception of the loss of
additional jobs and increased worker turnover, the rest of the consequences described are
identical to a naval context. Orman continues to expound on these consequences:
One of the worst things you can do.. .is to pretend everything is "just fine." Even
if you agree intellectually that the changes are necessary, emotionally you still
may have some painful, negative reactions to deal with. Unfortunately, today's
business culture has little regard for honest human emotions. Expressing or even
acknowledging negative feelings is considered "inappropriate." Workers are
expected to be upbeat, positive, and "team players" all the time. While this is a
laudable goal, there should also be room for people to express heart-felt negativity
as well. Truly enlightened business leaders know this. During times of significant
change, they actively solicit negative feelings from their workers. They know that
denying these feelings or trying to suppress their expression will only make things
worse, (p. 2)
Notification: Communicating the Coming Change
One facet of mergers and downsizing that must also be accomplished in the case
of ship decommissioning is the notification of those that will be affected. Regarding
civilian organizations, Hunter (2004, p. 2) points out that, “Advanced notice of layoffs
had a positive effect on performance.” There are both similarities and differences
between the civilian and naval settings regarding the notification of an organizational
change (i.e., decommissioning in the naval setting and downsizing and mergers in the
civilian sector). One of the similarities is the existence of rumors, which have always
been present on Navy ships; the decommissioning process seems to amplify this
phenomenon. When enough information is not provided (which is the normal state of
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affairs during a decommissioning), rumors inevitably ensue. The decommissioning
process provides a perfect environment for yet another of Coyne’s (2004) personality
types: the Conspiracy Theorist.
The Conspiracy Theorist believes his lack of success is a result of a flaw in the
system or some personal vendetta held by someone further up the chain. A
frustrated individual who spreads rumors of injustice or prejudice may affect all
who are struggling. Regardless of rank, this usually occurs when the member
does not have a clear understanding of the expectations that come with his
assignment, (p. 70)
The existence of at least a few Conspiracy Theorists on the study ships is likely
based on the number of rumors that are reported in the interviews detailed later in this
study.
When comparing and contrasting communication practices in civilian and naval
settings within a rapidly changing environment it is constructive to look at Bacal’s (2001)
comments on tumultuous periods in an organization. Bacal’s ideas somewhat apply to
the decommissioning experience: “During drastic change times, employees will expect
effective and sensible planning, confident and effective decision-making, and regular,
complete communication that is timely” (p. 1). The problem Bacal has observed in a
civilian context is, if anything, amplified when sailors, who are trained to operate in
accordance with scripted routines and familiar schedules find themselves in an
unfamiliar, dynamic environment.
Regarding workplace communication, Marks (2004, p. 3) took note of a CEO of
an association that had experienced three restructurings in two years who took time to
speak with employees-both formally and in large group settings, and informally, in ways
like dropping in on work groups to acknowledge the difficulties of what they had been
through. Similar sorts of extraordinary efforts to communicate also appear to be
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important in naval contexts where rumors can become rampant. After the September 11th
attacks, rumors spread that two of the ships in this study would not be decommissioned
for another ten years. This timeline changed weekly, almost until the last month prior to
decommissioning. It would be useful for the reader to understand how people in the
Navy communicate and gather information about the decommissioning process so a
comparison between the naval and civilian contexts can be made.
On Navy ships the sailors can obtain information about the decommissioning
from a variety of sources, each has a different degree of effectiveness and credibility but
all can contribute to constructing the complete picture of the ship’s fate, and by
association, the individual sailor’s fate. The Plan of the Day (POD) and the 1MC
(shipboard announcing system) are two mechanisms used to convey information to the
crew. The former is a written daily document edited and promulgated by the XO. It
contains the daily shipboard schedule, and items of interest to the crew. The following
quote is from the last POD written on JOHN ADAMS and it shows how the POD is used
to convey decommissioning information (e.g., schedule changes, congratulations, and
thanks to the crew:
XO NOTE: You guys did it again! You completed a week’s worth of work in a
day! This has become commonplace for you guys. It looks as though all of your
hard work has paid off-we will probably be able to get everyone out of here today
and tomorrow. Please contact the Admin Officer for your records and to get
specific times and flight info. The flight this evening will depart at 1958 so the
bus will have to travel during rush hour-right now the guess would be-be ready
around 1530 to leave the base (muster at central billeting/resource center-the
place you got your room key). This will allow the bus to arrive at the airport the
required two hours prior to flight departure.
The rest of the folks are scheduled to leave tomorrow but, as with
everything, this is subject to change. We will put out more info on Thursday
morning for the rest of the people.
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One last thing-this will be the last POD for JOHN ADAMS and I just
wanted to personally thank each of you for the outstanding job you have done. It
was an honor to serve with each of you and I wish you the very best in the future.
V/rXO
Shipboard leaders use the 1MC less frequently than the POD, but it can be used to
update the crew on any emergent issues, including the decommissioning. In Chapter 5 I
discuss how the Commanding Officer of JOHN ADAMS used the 1MC to dispel a rumor
about the fate of the ship after the decommissioning.
Some COs invite their bosses to address the crew about the decommissioning
process. This allows the sailors to hear about their fate from an off-ship entity,7 which
usually carries more weight than hearing the news from anyone on the ship including the
most senior person, the Commanding Officer.
Use o f Ceremony in Civilian and Naval Contexts
Ceremonies are used to mitigate stress during the decommissioning process and
also during the downsizing and merger processes. Concerning a relatively successful
downsizing effort in a civilian context, Marks (2004) writes, “Ceremonies and other
symbolic events were offered to employees to bring the message home on an emotional
level” (p. 3). The commissioning and decommissioning ceremonies of a Navy ship are
foundational events and can help the reader understand the significance of ceremony in
the naval context. The following quote (Ship Commissioning, n.d.) highlights the
meaning of a ship commissioning:
The commissioning of a Navy warship.. .is an impressive ceremony and marks
the beginning of the history of the ship. Commissioning is a formal ceremony,
steeped in tradition, during which the crew officially “mans” (boards) the ship to
“bring the ship to life” and begin her service as a United States Ship. (p. 1)

The CO’s boss is the Immediate Superior In the chain o f command (ISIC). In the case o f each of
the ships in the study the ISIC was a Commodore holding the Navy rank o f Captain.

7
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A decommissioning ceremony is modeled from the commissioning ceremony
only in the reverse. Whereas during the commissioning ceremony the radars and gun
systems were rotated and elevated after the crew manned the ship, during the
decommissioning ceremony these systems are stopped and lowered as the crew de-mans
the ship. Likewise, where the crew had run onto the ship at its commissioning, they walk
off the ship during the decommissioning ceremony.
After the decommissioning ceremony, I was invited to a party held by the family
of the ship’s namesake. This party was an informal extension of the ceremony, and it
reminded me of an Irish wake where people would make many toasts to the deceased
remembering the exploits and the good times. This event was primarily attended by
civilians who had some connection with the ship. There were a few former Commanding
Officers and Executive Officers, but the military representation was much less than the
non-military. This quasi-ceremony created an interesting dynamic: namely, civilians
mourning the passing of a military vessel.
Trust: The Key to Creating a Good Organizational Climate
The final area that will be explored is the subordinate’s level of trust in a leader’s
ability to lead prior to, and during, a downsizing process. Bacal (2004, p. 1) writes: “In
organizations characterized by poor leadership, employees expect nothing positive. In a
climate of distrust, employees learn that leaders will act in indecipherable ways that do
not seem to be in anyone’s best interests.” Bacal goes on to illustrate that this poor
leadership can impact the effectiveness of the organization as a whole. “Poor leadership
means the absence of hope, which if allowed to go on for too long, results in an
organization becoming non functioning.” The significance of Bacal’s thinking for naval
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contexts in general and the decommissioning process in particular is especially
noteworthy in light of the following comment by Tangredi (2001, p. 38) that reveals the
sentiments of naval officers and enlisted personnel: “Leadership is either out of touch or
uninformed, or just does not care enough to address the plight of our people in
meaningful ways." This alarming statement is contained in the Navy Inspector General’s
Report on Aviation Readiness (Brown, 2000). Even if the leaders on decommissioning
ships are fortunate enough to have all highly motivated, self-starting officers and sailors
assigned to their commands, they are still at a disadvantage because of the de-motivating
circumstances surrounding their next, and final, mission. The following statement by
Natter (2000) provides a glimpse of the responsibilities of command at sea, and describes
some of the team effort involved in developing a good organizational climate:
The commanding officer sets the command climate. The work center supervisors,
leading petty officers, chiefs, and wardroom officers take their cue from his or her
lead, and most certainly influence a sailor's and his family's decision to stay or go.
If the CO is a jerk and treats his people like spare parts, even a great retention
team and career counselor won't be able to help. Conversely, a good CO needs a
committed and hardworking team to help work the problem, (p. 1)
Natter points out that ultimately the CO is responsible for cultivating a good
command climate. He or she needs to actively seek out the assistance of subordinates,
especially the XO and CMC, to ensure the command is a healthy place for sailors to
thrive. A former commodore commented on this issue (Quinn, p. 18) saying: "I think it's
important to have a command climate in our ships where people are treated with dignity
and respect." When a ship is at sea, junior sailors live in extremely confined quarters and
privacy is very difficult to find. The ship is the sailor’s entire world; it contains the
sailor’s workplace, cafeteria, gymnasium, library, store, and place of worship. If the
crew is not kept engaged, they can begin to focus on the less than adequate living
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conditions and motivation to perform well can decline rapidly and morale can plummet.
To prevent this, the chain of command needs to stay focused on the mission, project a
positive image, and strongly resist the desire to gripe about the rigors of being at sea.
White (2003) highlights this concept in the following quote:
A leader lacking personal motivation and belief in the mission will be transparent
to junior members. In the course of long deployments, the temptation is great for a
leader to join the inevitable chorus of complaints about the utility of the mission,
schedule changes, and the like. This temptation must be avoided. A leader who
does not believe in the mission cannot inspire or lead others to tolerate the
sacrifices of sea duty. (p. 66)
Summary
As indicated in the beginning of this chapter, there is very little formal literature
on the decommissioning process and none on how to lead during this time.

In the

previous discussions I have attempted to use similar examples from the civilian sector
and examples from shipboard Navy life (not during the decommissioning process) to
allow the reader to better understand the issues experienced on a decommissioning ship.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
This study will use input from Commanding Officers (COs), Executive Officers
(XOs), and Command Master Chief Petty Officers (CMCs)8 from three decommissioning
ships. The CO, XO, and CMC make up what is commonly referred to as the Triad. The
ranks of these individuals are depicted in Figure 2. On a well-balanced ship, the Triad is
a close-knit group that usually communicates frequently making command-wide
decisions together, after receiving recommendations from others and discussing all
aspects of an issue at length. The Triad is the final decision making body of the ship.
The study will explore Triad members’ perceptions about the decommissioning process
and the leadership methods and techniques they say they use to remain motivated and to
motivate the other officers and crew.

Commander (CO)

Lieutenant Commander (XO)

Master Chief
Petty Officer (CMC)

Figure 2. The collar devices indicating the rank of each Triad member (U.S. Navy
released).
Respondents
The first group of respondents, the COs, is comprised of United States naval
officers holding the rank of commander who were in the process of decommissioning or

8
The Command Master Chief is the senior enlisted member onboard the ship. He or she usually
holds the rank o f Master Chief Petty Officer but may be a Senior Chief Petty Officer or even a Chief Petty
Officer. When this is the case the title reflects the lower rank (e.g., Command Senior Chief Petty Officer).
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had just decommissioned the ship they commanded. As mentioned in the earlier
footnote, the CO is the senior person and the top decision maker on each ship. He or she
alone has earned the privilege of command at sea. The role of CO is in some respects
similar to a civilian CEO but there are many significant differences as well. The
following excerpt entitled “Command at Sea” by Joseph Conrad (n.d.) best describes the
unique position of the Commanding Officer:
Only a seaman realizes to what great extent an entire ship reflects the personality
and ability of one individual, her Commanding Officer. To a landsman this is not
understandable and sometimes it is even difficult for us to comprehend, but it is
so! A ship at sea is a different world in herself and in consideration of the
protracted and distant operations of the fleet units the Navy must place great
power, responsibility, and trust in the hands of those leaders chosen for command.
In each ship there is one man who, in the hour of emergency or peril at sea can
turn to no other man. There is one who alone is ultimately responsible for the
safe navigation, engineering performance, accurate gunfire and morale of his ship.
He is the Commanding Officer. He is the ship! This is the most difficult and
demanding assignment in the Navy. There is not an instant during his tour as
Commanding Officer that he can escape the grasp of command responsibility.
His privileges in view of his obligations are almost ludicrously small;
nevertheless this is the spur, which has given the Navy its great leaders. It is a
duty which most richly deserves the highest, time-honored title of the seafaring
words...CAPTAIN, (p. 1)
The second group of respondents is made up of Executive Officers who hold the
rank of Lieutenant Commander. The XO has been compared to the vice president in a
civilian organization but, as with the CO and CEO comparison, there are significant
differences. The XO is responsible for all administrative matters of the ship and enforces
the cleanliness standard. Given their different role, XOs presumably might have slightly
different perspectives than their CO has on matters related to the decommissioning
process.
The third set of respondents is made up of the Command Master Chief Petty
Officers on each of these ships. The CMC acts as the CO’s advisor and confidant in all
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matters pertaining to the crew and is the primary advocate for the enlisted sailors on a
Navy ship. The CMC’s role also provides a somewhat unique vantage point on the
decommissioning process.
I served as the Executive Officer of a ship that recently was decommissioned and
will be used as one of the three ships focused on in this study. I will act as a
participant/observer in the study examining my own leadership techniques using journal
notes that I recorded during the decommissioning process.
Access
Because of the fixed decommissioning schedule and limited availability of
decommissioning ships in my geographic area, data collected for a preliminary study that
focused on one Triad, and one ship, have been included in the current study. The
University of San Diego’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval for data collection
was obtained for up to three ships in the spring of 2003; data collection took place in the
spring and summer of 2003.
Permission to conduct the study with each of the approved Triads was obtained
from the Commanding Officer of that respective ship. When soliciting prospective
interviewees’ participation, the sampling process was constructed to move from the
lowest ranking person among the potential interviewees on a ship to the highest. This
was designed to meet IRB approval ensuring that those of a lower rank would not feel
pressured to participate. Such pressure might have been felt if higher-ranking officers
had already agreed to be part of the study sample.
The specific procedures were as follows: When first making contact with the
respondents, I asked the lowest ranking individual on the prospective ship (the CMC) via
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e-mail or telephone, if he9 would participate in the research. After the CMC consented to
participate in the research, the XO was then asked to participate, and after he agreed to
participate, the CO was invited to join the study. All three triad members had to agree to
participate in order to have a particular triad become part of the study.10
Respondents were asked to review and sign a consent form (Appendix B) prior to
the interview and were given a copy of the signed consent form for their records. I
described the research in detail via e-mail and/or telephone prior to requesting verbal
consent from potential participants. (This was done following the ascending order in
terms of rank, described above. As suggested above, if a potential interviewee at a lower
rank decided not to participate, those above him would not have been contacted and
another decommissioning ship would have been selected for study.) The sample
questions and a copy of the consent form were e-mailed to each participant at least a
week before the actual interview. Once the potential participant had reviewed the
material and had consented to the interview, a mutually agreeable time and location for
the interview was set. Six interviews took place on the respondents’ ship, or the adjacent
barge; one interview was conducted over the phone; and one interview was conducted at
my home.
Researcher’s Role
I acted as the interviewer and transcribed most of the interviews myself. Due to
time constraints, I hired someone to transcribe data from the last Triad. Additionally, in
my analysis, I drew from professional journal notes written while I was XO during the

All interviewees were male; therefore, only masculine pronouns are used when referring to them.
10
This is not the case with my Triad where the CSC was interviewed after the decommissioning
process, thus making him no longer in my chain o f command.
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decommissioning process. In this way I played the part of active participant in a
participant observation process.
Data Collection Methods
Interviews lasting less than an hour were the primary data collection method for
this qualitative study. In an effort to gain insight into respondents' perspectives on the
decommissioning process, I asked the following sample questions, in the order written,
about the effects of the decommissioning:
1. Describe the decommissioning process from when you were first made aware that
your ship was being decommissioned until the present. Mark significant events
on a timeline and tell me about them.
2. Describe how the decommissioning process has affected you.
3. How has the decommissioning process affected your ability to lead your crew?
4. Right now, what do you believe motivates the crew?
5. How is this motivation different from a year ago?
6. Describe how the decommissioning process has affected your view of the Navy’s
core values: Honor, Courage, and Commitment.
I took field notes during the interviews to augment the transcriptions and to
possibly highlight issues that may eventually emerge as themes for study. Opportunity
for follow-up interviews was limited because respondents transferred to locations around
the globe. Nevertheless, forwarding e-mail addresses and contact information was
obtained at the time of the interviews in case respondents needed to be contacted again.
Data Analysis
The data from the individual interviews were transcribed and coded for emerging
themes. The interview questions were used to develop the initial codes. The coded
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material went through a series of sorting processes using several matrices to place the
data in some sort of logical order. The codes initially were sorted into either negative or
positive responses to the interview questions. After examining the results of the
negative/positive sorting, inductive codes were created and a second matrix was
developed allowing further division of the data and subsequent analysis. During the
process of coding and matrix development, I established links between the pieces of
coded data and the themes that emerged. These themes were used to determine what the
perceptions of the naval leaders were regarding the decommissioning process, and if
there were techniques and methods used by the leaders to accomplish the mission of
decommissioning. Additionally, the methods that the leaders used to maintain their own
motivation during the decommissioning process were explored.
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CHAPTER FOUR: USS VALDES
History and Background
The USS VALDES was a smaller ship compared with other ships in the Cruiser
Destroyer or “CRUDES” Navy.11 Unlike most other CRUDES ships, this ship had an all
male crew and was a part of the Naval Reserve Force (NRF). As a member of the NRF,
the ship was tasked with an additional mission: the training and readiness of part time
personnel called Selected Reservists. This mission was completed in conjunction with
the regular commitments of a naval ship, such as six-month deployments to the Persian
Gulf, and other parts of the world. This training of Selected Reservist was mostly
accomplished during the monthly reserve weekends and the annual two-week active duty
drill periods.
Sixty percent of VALDES’ crew was made up of active duty or “full time”
personnel and forty percent of the crew was made up of Selected Reservists. The average
full time crew size for this class of ship is approximately 200-230, but VALDES’ active
duty compliment was approximately 170-185 personnel. Having been stationed on two
NRF ships, I know that, rather than gripe about their lot, many of the active duty
members of an NRF ship are often proud of the fact that they have to do more with less.
The USS VALDES had a distinguished history that the Triad members who were
interviewed were very proud of. In 1988, for example, while deployed to the Arabian
Gulf, VALDES completed a record 32 safe transits of the Strait of Hormuz while

11
The US Navy has several “subspecialties within its ranks (i.e., Surface, Submarine, Aviation,
Special Forces, etc.) Within each o f these there are additional subspecialties. For example, the Surface
Navy is made up o f Amphibious ships or AMPHIBs; the Cruiser-Destroyer (CRUDES); the Combat
Logistics Force (CLF); and the Mine Counter Measures (MCM) ships. The AMPHIB Navy is comprised
o f amphibious ships whose mission is to support an amphibious assault. The Cruiser Destroyer Navy is
made up o f what I call the traditional naval ships: cruisers, destroyers and frigates.
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escorting oil tankers in and out of the volatile Gulf region. The ship also participated in
combat operations as part of Operation Praying Mantis, the U.S. retaliation in response to
the Iranian mining of USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS. In 2002, VALDES participated in
the war on terrorism, conducting maritime operations during her last deployment.
Also, in 2002, VALDES led a combined U.S.-Australian task group in defense of
strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. In an ironic twist, one of VALDES’ last
operational assignments was participating in a SINKEX.12 During this exercise,
VALDES launched a missile at a decommissioned Adams-class destroyer. The ex
destroyer sank soon after VALDES’ missile impacted. This accomplishment is usually a
time for revelry and “high-fives” on a Navy ship, but many on VALDES may have been
wondering if their ship would soon be the target in a future SINKEX. They may have
envisioned sailors on another, more modem ship congratulating themselves for
successfully sinking their ship.
A decommissioning ceremony, on February 15, 2003, marked the end of
VALDES’ naval career. Shortly afterwards, she entered the Inactive Reserve Fleet at
Bremerton, WA. The USS VALDES was 21 years old and during the majority of service
she was part of the largest class of ships ever built.
Since this ship was in the same squadron as the ship I was stationed on, I had
knowledge of the perceptions of other officer’s regarding VALDES’ leadership during
this decommissioning process. The CO of VALDES was rumored to have had a difficult
time accepting the fact that his ship was being decommissioned. Consequently, it was
reported that many of the decommissioning steps were delayed or modified by the
12
A reminder from Chapter 1: a Sink Exercise or SINKEX is when ships and aircraft use a
decommissioned ship for target practice. The object o f this live fire exercise is to train the crews resulting
in the sinking o f the hulk.
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leadership to allow rapid restoration to full capability should the order to decommission
be rescinded.
There also were rumors from credible sources that both VALDES and JOHN
ADAMS would have their lives extended for another seven years. Because the job of
Commanding Officer is the pinnacle of a naval officer’s career, it would be very easy for
a CO to take seriously the rumors that supported extending the life of the ship and having
her play an active role in the upcoming war. Being prepared for that possibility could be
viewed as a prudent precaution by the CO. Surely, if VALDES was ordered to deploy
and she were not prepared, the CO could suffer negative consequences.
On the other hand, a CO needs to ensure his ship is ready for any contingency and
going to war was not outside the realm of possibilities for VALDES. At any rate, these
rumors served as hypotheses as I embarked on interviewing the three members of the
Triad. I did not, however, ask about these matters directly for two reasons: (a) A direct
question would not necessarily have netted an honest response; (b) Such questioning
would almost certainly have been seen as inappropriate in a Navy context.
Description o f Interview Contexts
USS VALDES Commanding Officer Interview
The interview with VALDES’ CO took place in his cabin. The CO’s cabin is the
largest living quarters on board (the room was about 15 ft wide and 15 ft long) with many
accommodations that are not found in the other staterooms. The CO’s cabin, for
instance, has its own bathroom or head, it has a small circular window or port light, and it
has a nightstand with a sound powered phone and a regular phone mounted on the
bulkhead near the bed. During the interview, the barren hooks that used to hold pictures
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protraded from three of the four bulkheads. The bed was the fold-up type that turned into
a sofa when not in use; it was in its sofa form when the interview took place. Along the
overhead or ceiling, above the CO’s desk, were several navigational instruments that
were visible to anyone seated at the desk or from the bed. These allowed the CO to
instantly know the direction and speed of the ship from his living quarters. This
knowledge is important since the CO is ultimately responsible for the safe navigation of
the ship regardless of his location on the ship. The usual Navy procedure if a ship
collides with another ship or runs aground, in fact, is to relieve the CO of his command.
During the interview, I sat on a blue L-shaped couch in one comer and the CO sat in his
desk swivel chair, which he had turned to face me.
USS VALDES Executive Officer Interview
The interview with VALDES’ XO took place in his stateroom. His room had
many of the same accommodations that the CO’s cabin had but was about half the size
(7 ft wide by 12 ft long). The room no longer had any pictures on the bulkheads and the
desk was relatively bare. The XO was just finishing up some work on his computer when
he turned down the volume of the 1MC (the shipboard announcing system) and posted a
sign that read “Meeting in Progress” on the outside of his door to mitigate interruptions.
Before the interview began, the XO and I compared notes on our common roles as
second in command on decommissioning ships. He seemed just as busy as I was
organizing the administrative matters that accompany a decommissioning. The two most
time consuming administrative requirements are evaluations and awards. Every person
onboard needs to be evaluated in writing in the form of a fitness report or evaluation.
Also, those who deserve to be rewarded for their service onboard should receive the
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appropriate recognition; recognition usually takes the form of a Letter of Commendation
or a medal with an accompanying citation. The XO is the final reviewer of all of this
correspondence. As we spoke, our voices echoed slightly in the somewhat empty room.
USS VALDES Command Master Chief Interview
Unfortunately VALDES’ CMC was not available at the time the CO and XO were
interviewed. Whereas the CO and XO were interviewed onboard the ship a week before
the ship decommissioned, the CMC was interviewed a month and a half after the
decommissioning via telephone.
Discussion o f Major Themes
Nine major themes emerged from the analysis of the interview data gathered from
the VALDES’ triad. Each theme is discussed below with an accompanying table that
lists exemplary quotes from members of the Triad about the particular theme. In each of
the tables, the word or words that signify the theme are printed in italics.
VALDES Theme 1: Operational vs. Non-Operational
One of the most basic themes that emerged involved the Navy’s concept of a ship
being operational. This term refers to a ship having a real, tangible purpose or mission
that is aligned with the Navy’s central mission. The most significant mission or purposes
are combat related. For example, a ship patrolling the Persian Gulf is considered highly
operational. A ship that was helping another ship prepare for combat by serving as an
opposition force (OPFOR) in the training exercises would be considered somewhat
operational. A ship is not considered operational when it is in a shipyard period for
repair and during the decommissioning process.
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Regarding the process of decommissioning, the VALDES XO said: “It’s not the
exciting operational doing-your-mission kind of work.” Implicit in this comment is the
challenge that the Triad faced. The decommissioning process is not exciting. There
would be no more exotic ports-of-call. There would be no more real purpose for the ship;
still, the Triad would need to somehow motivate the crew to continue maintaining and
operating the ship until the last day of the ship’s service life.
In short, the reason that the operational vs. non-operational category is significant
in this study is that a ship’s status impacts the motivation and morale of its crew. It is
easier to motivate a crew during operational periods of a ship’s life because the crew is
doing what it has been training to do for its entire time onboard. Additionally, there are
very real dangers facing a Navy ship that this training is designed to counter, such as the
recent examples of ships that encountered mines, suicide bombers, or anti-surface
missiles-stark reminders to the crew that they need to be alert, engaged, and attentive
during the training phase and the actual deployment phase. These historic scenarios can
be used to reinforce the importance of the ship’s operational mission. A Navy training
adage presents this concept well: “The better we train in peace, the less we bleed in war.”
Table 1. Major theme of operational vs. non-operational as used bv USS VALDES’ triad
Theme
Operational vs.
Non-Operational

CO
“We really didn't have to
deal overtly with the
issue of decommissioning
because of how we are
being decommissioned
again as an intact ship
without too much stuff
really leaving the ship
and without much
diminished effort. So we
were able to remain
operational and keep that
in the forefront of the

XO
“The last operational
commitment for us
was.. .a couple of weeks
ago at Seal Beach. Prior
to that we did some
opposition force
underway periods for
Battle Group Operations
in the October
timeframe. During those
underway periods we
had already been
notified that the ship

CMC
“The January
before that we
were getting ready
to go on
deployment and
getting everybody
to focus on the
various missions
that we were going
to be tasked with
while we were on
deployment.. .you
know the areas we
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Table 1. (cont’d)
Theme
Operational vs.
Non-Operational

CO
crew's mind from a
leadership perspective
literally up until the end
of our decomm
availability.”

XO
was going to be
decommissioned so you
know your mentality is to
try to get as much
training as you can out of
those periods knowing
that when we pull in the
ship is pretty much going
to be pier side for long
periods of time. To keep
the crew proficient at fire
fighting skills and combat
system skills and ship
driving you kind of need
to maximize that
underway time due to the
impending large amount
of in port time we are
going to have.”

CMC
were training to
and that is, of
course, how you
motivated
people... hey,
you need to
“Although we got back in
know this
July we were not
because this is
where we are
deployed; we were still
busy doing other things,
going and these
not necessarily the
are the threats
decomm.... Even though
that we are
going to
we didn't have deployed
operations.. .we had all
encounter.
Whereas coming
the training, which we
Navy people understand,
back and getting
is to prepare for a
ready for the
deployment. You just
decomm
process, you still
change the focus of the
effort and the way you
need to know a
motivate the crew to how “And decommissioning is certain amount
you're contributing to the not one of the exciting
of professional
expertise when
operational deployments things of the Navy; it's
you go to your
of other activities of other not shooting weapons or
fleet units. Specifically
going out and doing some next ship.”
we were preparing battle operations or flying
groups for deployment,
helicopter. It's a lot of
we were preparing air
hard administrative work
wings for deployment.”
like evaluations, awards,
getting all the paperwork
“Our mission is to deliver for people to transfer, and
an immaculate, intact
move, moving the
ship to the inactive
equipment off the ship
reserve fleet.”
and redistributing it. So
the work is different
work. It's not the exciting
operational, doing-yourmission kind of work and
[in] that case, it can kind
of wear on you and it has
worn on me to an extent.”
“It is important for their
country and in our case
on the 28th of February
their [the crew’s] mission
now is to bring the ship
safely to Bremerton and
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Table 1. (cont’d)
Theme
Operational vs.
Non-Operational

CO

XO
to turn over the ship to the
inactive fleet. And I think it
is important that they have
that message conveyed to
them so that they realize that
they still have a mission, they
still have a goal, there's still a
focus that they need to
obtain.”

CMC

“There's a lot of folks
including myself who feel
this [deployment in time of
war] is what I've trained for
and would like to be on one of
the ships that are deploying
to actually execute the
mission that we train every
year, day in and day out, for.”
Not surprisingly, it is more difficult to motivate a crew if their ship is not
deploying, but merely helping other ships deploy to combat zones. The CO of VALDES,
for instance, took note of this fact when he described his efforts to motivate his crew
during the period prior to the decommissioning period. The VALDES’ mission was
shifted from preparing for deployment and actually deploying to training other ships that
were in the process of preparing for their own deployments. The VALDES, in other
words, was assigned the task of playing an opposing force (OPFOR) that the deploying
ships might encounter during the ships six-month + deployment. The CO indicated that
he used the OPFOR mission to motivate his crew by harkening back to their own
deployment preparations and how that training helped them when they were performing
their missions. He appealed to his crew to assist their fellow sailors on other ships to get
them ready for their upcoming deployment.
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Of course, the most difficult period in terms of motivating the crew comes when
the ship is in a non-operational phase, and the most difficult of non-operational phases is
the decommissioning process. After the OPFOR assignments it was becoming clear to
most that VALDES was not going to deploy again. When members of the Triad
verbalized this fact, as far as the crew was concerned, it was official: VALDES was
going away. With this shift in mission, the triad had to again adjust the focus of the crew
on a new goal to motivate them. All three of the Triad members took note of the special
things they had to do to motivate crewmembers during this phase, and their tactics are
summarized in the quotes in Table 1.
The CO, for example, focused on the possibility that the ship might, some day, be
taken out of mothballs and once again become operational. For him, the mission was “to
deliver an immaculate, intact ship to the inactive reserve fleet.” This task, as one of the
quotes on the table indicates, allowed the ship to “remain operational,” at least in the
CO’s mind. He also acknowledged the need to prepare the sailors for their future on
other ships but did not emphasize this point as much as the CMC did. As will be noted
below, this line of thinking was central to the CMC’s efforts to keep the crew motivated.
The XO also emphasized the same mission that the CO did: “to bring the ship
safely to Bremerton and to turn over the ship to the inactive fleet.” He also focused on
the need to be “upbeat” every day and make sure folks are focused on what they need to
do each day. He added: “I think the key thing is-and what I try to do every moming-is to
keep a very positive outlook.”
As the quoted material from the CMC in Table 1 indicates, he also recognized the
need for an extra effort to motivate the crew during a non-operational period and,
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especially, during the decommissioning process. As noted above, however, this
individual emphasized a different strategy than the major strategies endorsed by the
ship’s CO and the XO. The CMC emphasized looking ahead to a time when
crewmembers would, once again, be on another ship functioning at the operational level.
His focus, in short, was on the individuals on the ship, while the other two members of
the Triad tended to focus on the ship itself. There will be more on this in discussions of
subsequent themes.
VALDES Theme 2: Focus
The most frequently mentioned theme that emerged from the interviews of
VALDES’ Triad was focus. It is also a very prevalent theme mentioned by the other two
Triads in the study. Focus, here, is defined as the unified direction that an organization
proceeds toward in an effort to achieve certain goals and/or the process of moving toward
that goal. The term, in other words, can be both a noun and a verb. The theme of focus
is a kind of corollary to the operational theme that was discussed above. The following
quote from the CMC best encapsulates the focus theme: “Keeping everyone focused on
the deployment was our number one priority.” Table 2 includes exemplary quotes related
to the theme of focus from each of the members of the Triad. These quotes emphasize
that a number of foci came into play, everything from the possibility that the ship might
be brought back into service in a time of war to the need to attend to the crew’s individual
careers and next move in their careers. Though the focal points varied from person to
person and from time to time, it is obvious that establishing some sort of clear focus was
a key component that each of the these Triad members used to keep the crew motivated.
Table 2. Major theme of focus as used by USS VALDES’ triad
Theme

CO

XO
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Focus

“When we began making that
change from being an
operational unit to starting to
focus the crew towards the
activity o f decommissioningI’d say a 50 to 60 day
period— there was some pretty
significant leadership
challenges that we had to get
crew buy-in to.”
“Our mission is to deliver an
immaculate, intact ship to the
inactive reserve fleet and that's
how we did it. And then
everything that was
accomplished along the way,
whether it be personal
achievement like warfare
qualifications which we have
in the Navy, or unit accolades
that we receive, we always use
those opportunities to
reinforce to them [the crew]
that this is why you are
excellent. You are the ones
who made this ship and this is
proof o f that, and, oh by the
way, you have a responsibility
in that because your
excellence is inculcated and
injected into your next
command. So this is the point,
this is the key thing: we start
transitioning from focusing on
the unit so much and focusing
more on their careers and their
larger contributions to the
Navy. At that point they
really want to foster a Navy
team spirit with the next layer
in the organization vice [i.e.,
instead of] the unit layer.”
[The focus, in other words,
was on being a Navy sailor

rather than just VALDES
sailor.]

“It's important to...make sure
folks are focused on what they
need to do [for the
decommissioning] and
hopefully, that positive energy
gets transferred to them.. .even
though the process can be
tedious.. .troops know what they
are doing is important.”
“And I think it is important that
they [the crew] have that
message conveyed to them so
that they realize that they still
have a mission, they still have a
goal, there's still a focus that they
need to obtain. And they realize
that they are not spending the
last couple o f weeks onboard
with no focus.”
“Where originally when it [the
disposition o f VALDES] was
going to be just a SINKEX, there
was talk o f cannibalizing and
removing major systems and
pieces of equipment and that
focus changed kind of midstream
to the fact that we would only let
pieces o f equipment that would
degrade our ship go to forward
deployed ships. I think in a way
that shifted the mindset a little
bit; Hey, this ship needs to be
put away and brought up to
Bremerton. If we had to come
back within 120 days and get
this ship underway, what
condition would we want it in? I
think people took that onboard
and you can tell by the w ay
they continue to clean the
ship and paint and preserve
the ship that they take that
seriously.”

“Keeping everyone
focused on the
deployment was our
number one priority.”
“So, as far as starting
a material
decommissioning
process.... We knew
that we needed to
focus on what we
were doing and what
our tasks were at the
time.”
“Our mission right
now is what we need
to focus on, and all
that decommissioning
stuff will take care of
itself.”
“I think the challenge
was in keeping
everyone focused on
the fact that it was the
end o f the ship’s life
and not the end of
their career.”
‘That is what kept
them focused. .. was
what got them to buy
into the fact that the
ship was just a piece
o f metal, it was us
that that was making
it the living breathing
thing that it w as...”
“Getting ready to go
on deployment and
getting everyone to
fo c u s on the
various m issions
that w e w ere going
to be tasked
w it h ...”
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VALDES Theme 3: Pride
The third major theme that emerged, albeit only from the XO and CO, was pride,
meaning finding satisfaction in one’s accomplishments and having self-respect, no matter
what one’s rank may be, or what situation a person might find himself/herself in (e.g.,
even a decommissioning situation). The XO, for example, said about his crew: “I can
still feel their pride from their service from that six month deployment.” And the CO
also spoke of pride. For instance, at one point he compared and contrasted the
decommissioning of a ship with the demise of any organization:
To see that organization vanish, to go away so the disappointment lies in the fact
that you lose the thing that you have worked for. Particularly when it is a good
thing, it’s like losing a possession, in effect. A ship, unlike a factory, has the
additional emotional connection of being a home.... It is the place where you
live; it’s the place where you connect to, like with any job, the people you’ve
shared the time together with.... I think that there’s the other side of it, as far as
the emotional realm is pride. Because what you do in your line of work is in fact
focused on accomplishing certain missions. So when you put your labor to use to
accomplish a variety of missions, that’s a pride no one can ever take away from
you. And that’s a good thing. And that’s the kind of thing that you put forth to
the crew to remind them as they go through the sad scut work of disassembling
the ship.
The CO’s emphasis on pride is intriguing. One cannot help but wonder whether
there is a certain amount of projection in his statement that “When (you) put your labor to
use to accomplish a variety of missions, that’s pride no one can take away from you.” He
certainly was proud of having been the CO of VALDES. Being the CO of a ship is
usually the high point of a naval officer’s career. This may be his only command, and he
may never again hear the name of his ship announced when they bring him aboard.13

It is a Navy tradition to strike bells commensurate with the rank o f a senior officer as he arrives
and departs a commissioned ship (i.e., four bells for a Commander and Captain). A CO will also have the
name o f the ship he commands announced immediately after the bells (i.e., bong bong, bong bong,
VALDES arriving).
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Interestingly, the CMC did not say anything that could be classified under the
pride theme. As noted above, he took a much more pragmatic tack with his crew,
preferring to emphasize their career achievement and their professional life after the
demise of the USS VALDES. Additional VALDES Triad quotes about the pride theme
are contained in Table 3.
Table 3. Major theme of pride as used bv USS VALDES’ triad
Theme
Pride

CO
“And I think you do that [remain
upbeat] by viewing the ceremony
and the other artifacts and trappings
of the process with a sense of
dignity but also with pride and with
positive overtones vice [i.e., versus]
negative overtones of, “Oh, well,
the ship is going away,” and that
kind of stuff. You really need to try
to stay on the positive side.... It is
hard work to make something go
away, particularly when you've put
a lot of hard work to keep it in great
shape. Let that [i.e., the ship going
away] be the only negative stuff,
and that can remain unspoken. As
far as the leadership is concerned, I
think it is absolutely important that
you try to, without BS-ing
things.. .end on a positive note, and
you can do that by just simply
making an aura of dignity and
importance to the work at hand up
until the very last moments of that
command's existence.”

XO
“I can still feel their
[the crew’s] pride
from their service
from that six month
deployment.”

CMC
No mention of this
theme

“I think they [the
crew] are proud of
what they did in July
[VALDES came back
from a six month
deployment in July]
and I think they
understand their
mission and the need
to put this ship away
to modernize the
fleet.”

VALDES Theme 4: Emotions
The fourth major theme was emotions. This term will be used to describe the
comments made by the interviewees (contained in Table 4) that referred to the feelings
(either theirs or those of their crew) associated with the decommissioning. The CO said:
“So it’s a mixture of conflicted emotions of happy and sad.”

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

46
The CO of VALDES also said: “It is important not to perceive a
decommissioning with too much sullenness.” Although the CMC did not specifically
mention emotion, sullenness, or any other related term, the quotes recorded in Table 4
indicate that he came close to this theme when he spoke about the unique feeling that
walking through the empty ship evoked in him. Additionally, I wrote in my field notes
Table 4. Major theme of emotions as used bv USS VALDES’ triad
Theme
Emotion

CO
“We are fortunate because the
ship will actually remain a
ship, intact, all the way until
the moment of
decommissioning. That's
because we have to operate it
and deliver it to its eventual
storage location in a different
state. So it's a mixture of
conflicted emotions of happy
and sad but I think the
difference between say
decommissioning a Navy ship
and closing down a factory is
that a factory involves the
potential loss of jobs. A
factory involves the potential
loss of accumulated seniority
of positions within an
organization. There's no such
loss for our sailors.”
“It is important not to
perceive a decommissioning
with too much sullenness. I
think it is tempting to
gravitate towards a more
somber tone.”

XO
CMC
“I think the impact [how
“I think the
the decommissioning
realization that you
process has affected him] is are seeing the death
at several different
of a ship, is the
levels.. .an emotional level
only way you can
as far as the ending of the
put it. Each day...
service life of a platform, in every morning... I
my case, that I have been
was always over
on for 22 months and so
there first and I
bringing some closure to
would walk in all
that emotionally; obviously the passageways
serving on this ship with
and go into all the
two Commanding Officers berthings, and walk
and a lot of the same
all the decks before
shipmates for that period,
anyone got over
there is some sullenness
there... and
associated with that
everyday you could
[decommissioning] to bring just feel the life
around that closure.”
being sucked out of
the ship. It is a
“I'd say I've had
unique feeling.”
motivational issues. I mean
there's days that you know
bringing a closure to a
ship.. .does have some
emotional impact as far as
closure and ending a ships
life.”

that the CMC sounded sad when stating “Everyday you could just feel the life being
sucked out of the ship. It is a unique feeling,” yet he never came out and said he was sad.
The CMC’s apparent stoicism relative to the CO’s and XO’s explicit references to their
emotions during their respective interviews may be attributed to the fact that he was
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interviewed over the phone and I couldn’t see his expressions and body language.
Another reason for the CMC not explicitly mentioning any sadness or related emotions
may have been that, since the interview took place after the decommissioning, time had
already begun to help him forget.
VALDES Theme 5: Rumors
The fifth theme that emerged, rumors, was a theme in the other triad interviews as
well. Indeed at the aggregate level it is the second most frequently mentioned theme in
the interview data. Interestingly, in the VALDES case, the theme of rumors was only
mentioned by the CMC. These quotes are contained in Table 5. The rumors he refers to
were started by people on and off the ship, possibly because the crew wanted to get on
with the decommissioning process but the CO and XO were perceived as not providing a
clear plan and timely direction. Without this direction, the sort of direction that most
Navy personnel are accustomed to, rumors flourish. The CMC said: “It was again at the
saturation point that we were so saturated with rumors and things that hadn’t actually
happened that it was like everybody was taking a wait-and-see attitude.”
Table 5. Major theme of rumors as used bv USS VALDES’ triad
Theme
CO
Rumors No
mention
of this
theme

XO
No
mention
of this
theme

CMC
“We still weren’t getting all the firm answers on when we
actually were going to decomm and.. .there were rumors that
we were still going to sail to Hawaii and there were rumors
that we might end up doing it [decommission] there in San
Diego.”
“It [the type and amount of information given to the ship]
was again at the saturation point that we were so saturated
with rumors and things that hadn’t actually happened that it
was like everybody [officers and crew on VALDES] was
taking a wait-and-see attitude.”
“We knew the [military] buildup was happening over the in
the [Persian] Gulf again and the rumors started to fly, hey,
you’re not really going to decommission and by then
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Table 5. (cont’d)
Theme
Rumors

CO

XO

CMC
obviously we had stopped the flow of people coming in, so
our numbers as far as crew had dwindled down and then we
were also transferring people out without replacement, so
obviously we were concerned, hey, you know if we do end
up getting told, hey you’re not going to decomm, and
getting a lot of bodies back to us on a short notice would
have been tough.”
“Everything was changing so rapidly that it was almost like
saturation point where if somebody would say something it
was like, okay, we’ll believe it when we see it.”

VALDES Theme 6: Recapitalization
On VALDES the CO and XO seemed aligned in their attempts to convey the sixth
major theme, recapitalization, to the crew. In the corporate financial context, Trudeau
(2004, p. 1) defines recapitalization as “A transaction in which a company reallocates the
equity and debt on its balance sheet.” This term has a similar meaning in the Navy.
More specifically, the term was used by both the CO and XO to describe the Navy’s
process of using the money saved by decommissioning older ships to make and maintain
newer, more capable warships like the ARLEIGH BURKE class.14
Recapitalization in fact, was the reason given for the VALDES decommissioning
by both the CO and XO. They both referred to it several times in their respective
interviews and all of the quotes are contained in Table 6. One noteworthy quote from the
XO is: “I think that those people understand that bringing closure to this ship allows
recapitalization of the money and manpower that was on this ship to go to more modem

The Navy considers the newest ARLEIGH BURKE-class destroyer to be its most capable and
survivable surface combatant. The FY 1999-2003 (the years just prior to the interviews being conducted)
shipbuilding program included funds for 15 destroyers, achieving the procurement objective o f 57 o f these
ships (Military, 2003).
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ships to support the mission of our nation and that could be war against Iraq or whatever
that mission is determined to be.”
From my experience in the Navy, many sailors transferring from
decommissioning ships have orders to newer ships and can relate well to the
recapitalization concept that the CO and XO described. Interestingly, however, the logic
of recapitalization was never alluded to by the CMC. Whether the crew, in fact,
responded to the recapitalization argument as the CO and XO believed they did, could
not be determined from this study, but it may be significant that the member of the Triad
who was closest to the crew never invoked the recapitalization logic.
Table 6. Major theme of recapitalization as used bv USS VALDES’ triad
Theme
Recapitalization

CO

XO

CMC

“I'd say [a] 50 to 60 day
period [after the last
maintenance period and
up to the actual
decommissioning],
there were some pretty
significant leadership
challenges that we had
to get crew buy-in to.
For example: we sold
them [the crew] on the
idea o f recapitalization.
That everything they
pulled off o f here
Would somehow benefit
the fleet. It would save
money fo r taxpayers. ”

“I think that those people [the crew]
understand that bringing closure to this ship
allows recapitalization o f the money and
manpower that was on this ship to go to more
modern ships to support the mission o f our
nation and that could be war against Iraq or
whatever that mission is determined to be. I
think that they understand that this ship has
served its nation well for 22 years, that the
nation needs to recapitalize and take the
money and the manpower and equipment from
this ship and provide it to other ships that are
newer with technology and I think they [the
crew] understand that.
And a lot o f these individuals are going to
ships that are deployed or who are being
deployed so they will have an opportunity to
continue to serve their country in a deployed
status.”

No
mention
o f this
theme

“We had a Commodore’s call,15 the Captain’s
boss.. .came over and .. .explained the same
issues to the entire crew on the importance of
their mission to decommission the ship and
how it's important to the nation to redistribute
these assets to other platforms.”

A Commodore is usually a Navy Captain who is in charge o f a squadron o f five to seven ships.
VALDES assembled all o f the offices and crew for the Commodore’s call.
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VALDES Theme 7: Upbeat/Positive Attitude
The seventh major theme that emerged was upbeat/positive attitude. The term
positive was used and could be seen as a synonym for upbeat. Sasson (2004, p. 1)
suggests the relationship between these two terms when he writes: “When the attitude is
positive.. ..We walk tall and the voice is more powerful. Our body language shows the
way you feel inside.” In other words, an upbeat appearance is the manifestation of the
internal positive attitude.
Although the CMC neither mentioned the need to remain upbeat or attempts to
remain positive, these themes were very much a part of the data gathered from both the
CO and the XO. The upbeat/positive attitude theme was especially strong in the data
from the XO interview. When asked about his morning meetings with the ship’s khaki,16
for instance, the XO said: “Every morning it’s important to be upbeat.” This statement
suggests that he was conscious of his attitude on a daily basis and made a daily effort to
be positive. He said, “Hopefully, that positive energy gets transferred to them [officers
and chiefs] and it gets transferred to their divisions.” In short, he seemed to believe that
positive energy would trickle down from him and eventually permeate the rest of the
crew throughout the workday.
Table 7. Major theme of upbeat/ positive attitude as used bv USS VALDES’ triad
Theme
Upbeat/
Positive
Attitude

CO
“It is really best to try to be
upbeat without being
flippant.”
“You really need to try to
stay on the positive side....
It is hard work to make

XO
“So I am always upbeat.”
“Every morning it’s important to be
upbeat.”

CMC
No
mention
of this
theme

“I think the key thing is and what I try
to do every morning is to keep a very

Khaki is the color uniform that officers and chief petty officers wear. The morning meeting is
chaired by the XO and is often referred to as khaki call. This meeting is used to promulgate the plan o f the
day and to allow all o f the leaders to coordinate the day’s activities and make pertinent announcements.
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Table 7. (cont’d)
Theme
Upbeat/
Positive
Attitude

CO
something go away, in
particular when you've put
a lot of hard work to keep it
in great shape. Let that be
the only negative stuff and
that can remain unspoken.
As far as the leadership [is]
concerned I think it is
absolutely important that
you try to.. .end on a
positive note, and you can
do that by just simply
making an aura of dignity
and importance to the work
at hand up until the very
last moments of that
command's existence.”

XO
p o sitiv e

CMC

outlook.”

“Hopefully, that p o sitiv e energy gets
transferred to them [officers and chiefs]
and it gets transferred to their divisions
so.. .that the troops that are actually
doing the work have some p o sitiv e
energy that what they are doing is
important.”
“It's [decommissioning] not what
people join the military and the Navy
for. But I think because the message
was clear on the mission and how
important it is and that there is a good
command environment here, where
p e o p le en joy com ing to work, an d
p e o p le en joy being w ith th eir shipm ates,

our retention numbers have actually
increased over the last two quarters, and
it's been very p o sitiv e .”

The tone that VALDES’ CO set during my interview with him was more formal
than any of the other interviews I conducted during this study, and this formality was
reflected in the way he discussed the upbeat/positive attitude theme. Nevertheless, the
topic was very much a part of his comments to me. At one point, for instance, he said, “It
is really best to try to be upbeat without being flippant.” This balance is reflected in a
statement quoted earlier: “Let that [the ship decommissioning] be the only negative stuff
and that can remain unspoken” (emphasis added).
VALDES Theme 8: Buy-in
The eighth major theme that emerged was buy-in. This concept will be defined as
the voluntary agreement from the crew to focus on, and to participate in, achieving the
goals of the command. In this situation, of course, the major goal was to prepare the ship
for decommissioning. Pertinent comments from the Triad on buy-in are listed in Table 8.
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These quotes suggest that the Triad was very concerned with getting the crew to
participate with them in the decommissioning, a duty that many sailors view as
undesirable. Two comments from the CO and CMC suggest a connection between the
buy-in theme and the focus theme. The CO said, “So to get that buy-in you have to
continue focusing on mission”; the CMC, the person closest in both rank and
responsibility to the ship’s sailors, also talked about buy-in as a component of focus, but
his emphasis was on a more expanded mission;
I think the challenge was in keeping everybody focused on the fact that it was the
end of the ship’s life and not the end of their careers, and then make them
understand that we still needed to continue with the training and they needed to
continue to pursue professional goals and personal goals, i.e., the ESWS
program,17 that sort of thing, which we kept going all the way to the end. That is
what kept them focused.. .what got them to buy-in to the fact that the ship was
just a piece of metal, it was us that that was making it the living breathing thing
that it was and us were going on to other waters and could continue to take our
expertise to other ships.
It is interesting to note that the XO suggests that he had to first buy-in to the
decommissioning process himself before he could persuade others to join him. He
recognized that the decommissioning was an enormous feat that had to be broken down
into smaller projects to make it manageable. He then used open communication to
facilitate buy-in for the next echelon, the officers and the chiefs. They in turn were
expected to get the rest of the crew to buy-in as well.
For the CMC, focusing on training that developed necessary skills required to
accomplish longer-term professional goals was a method used to motivate sailors. The
message being conveyed here, of course, was that sailors needed to recognize their
individual career goals as more important than the ship that would soon be gone.
The program on board a Navy ship led by the CMC to guide enlisted sailors in becoming Enlisted
Surface Warfare Specialists. This qualification is a prestigious achievement that is also a requirement
needed to advance at higher enlisted ranks.
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Table 8. Major theme of buv-in as used bv USS VALDES’ triad
Theme
Buy-In

CO
XO
“We began making that change from
“So you know the ship
being an operational unit to starting to will be put away.. .and
focus the crew towards the activity of you start working
decommissioning. I'd say [for] a 50
back.... In my case I
to 60 day period, there was some
started buying into this
pretty significant leadership
process. So you take
challenges that we had to get crew
the big enormous thing
buy-in to. For example... we sold
of decommissioning a
them on the idea of recapitalization.” ship and start breaking
it down into little
“It was noble that how we.. .had a
projects and you realize
responsibility to execute our final
that it is a pretty
mission which was to deliver this ship enormous feat that
to the fleet inactive reserve force
needs to be done, and
intact, ready to be reactivated. That
then eventually you
means we had to keep it up. That
start putting that sort of
justified the maintenance activities.
stuff done on paper and
That's really the hardest thing. A
try to come up with a
sailor might find it difficult to
plan a vision on how to
understand and be inclined to just
advise the CO.”
ignore his routine responsibilities of
house cleaning and maybe routine
“I think what I learned
devotion [to] equipment maintenance. so far is to
So to get that buy-in you have to
communicate,
continue focusing on mission. Our
communication of
mission is to deliver an immaculate,
everything that starts
and intact ship to the inactive reserve from the time you are
fleet and that's how we did it. And
notified to the time the
then everything that was
ship is actually
accomplished along the way, whether decommissioned. It
it be personal achievement like
starts with the top. It
warfare qualifications which we have starts with the
in the Navy, or unit accolades that we Commanding Officer
receive we always use those
and through myself and
opportunities.. .to reinforce to them
the Department Heads.
You need open
[the crew] this is why you are
excellent.”
communication with
the crew so they feel
that they have buy-in
and feel they are part of

CMC
“We still
needed to
continue with
the training and
they [the crew]
needed to
continue to
pursue
professional
goals and
personal goals,
i.e., the ESWS
program, that
sort of thing,
which we kept
going all the
way to the end.
That is what
kept them
focused... what
got them to
buy-in to the
fact that the
ship was just a
piece of metal;
it was us that
that was
making it the
living breathing
thing that it
was.”

the process.”
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VALDES Theme 9: Regret
The ninth theme, regret, was also not mentioned by either the CO or XO but was
brought up several times by the CMC. This theme was about regrets that the leadership
onboard did not permit certain individuals to transfer from the ship early, a typical
practice on decommissioning ships. Although information on this theme was not
solicited, the CMC mentioned it five separate times. I wrote in my field notes that “the
CMC had a remorseful, almost bitter, tone when discussing his inability to let sailors
transfer early.” This attitude is understandable, given the CMC’s role.
Among the many duties that the CMC performs onboard, two of the primary roles
are acting as the senior enlisted advocate for the crew and serving as the CO’s primary
advisor for all matters regarding the well being of the enlisted personnel. The CMC
reported, “We weren’t given the flexibility of letting more people go when we could
have.” This comment and the other quotes listed in Table 9 suggest that the CMC not
only disagreed with the decision to hold crew on the decommissioning ship longer than
would normally have been done, but also resented the negative effects that it had on the
crew.
In this regard, it is important to note that individuals’ requests were denied even
though it would have benefited these sailors by allowing them to attend certain schools
for their particular job specialties. The reason given was that they (the sailors) might be
needed should there be an emergency during the four to five-day transit to the final port.
The CMC seemed to take it personally, almost as if he felt he had not taken proper care
of his sailors; he seemed to view his inability to move crew members who requested early
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transfer to new commands and had solid reasons to support their requests, as a failure in
his role as the crew’s advocate.
In fairness, it is also important to note the likelihood that the CO’s decision not to
allow transfers that were in the best interest of individual sailors was linked to the rumor
that the decommissioning order might be rescinded due to the impending war. As was
noted above, the CO seemed to believe—and, almost certainly, had an incentive to
believe, this rumor. Allowing people to transfer would not be a prudent move if the ship
were not going to be decommissioned because of a wartime situation. In that sort of
situation, the ship would need every sailor they could muster. Thus, the bottom-line
story, here, may be the failure of the CO to communicate his real reasons for denying the
CMC’s requests to accommodate the needs of crew members and/or the inability (or
possibly the unwillingness) of the CMC to hear the rationale behind the CO’s actions.
There is one other point that should be made before ending the discussion of this
theme. Because he is a dedicated professional, the CMC probably would not have
mentioned the issue that has become the final theme in this case, at least not in the same
direct fashion, or with the same frequency, had he still been stationed on the ship. Doing
so may almost certainly have been viewed as inappropriate while he was still stationed on
the ship and serving under the same chain of command that had countered his decision.
In addition, the CMC would not have seen the full effects of keeping everyone on
board until after the decommissioning. Perhaps after the decommissioning, while en
route to his own specialty schools, the CMC had time to further reflect on the decisions
that he had been involved with and he was able to solidify his position against them.
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Thus, in this case, at least, the timing of the CMC’s interview may have had a positive
impact on the data collection process.
Table 9. Major theme of regret as used bv USS VALDES’ triad
Theme
Regret

CO
No mention
of this theme

XO
No mention
of this theme

CMC
“We [The chain of command] didn’t know how
many people you could actually let go early.... A
lot of people were saying, ‘Hey, you know as we
are being decommissioned, why can’t I transfer
this day, that will give me a chance to get this
extra school?’ that sort of thing... we weren’t
given the flexibility of letting more people go
when we could have.”
“I feel we [The chain of command] could have left
more people behind, and we could have started to
fly more people out earlier than we did.”
“I think we [The chain of command] could have
loosened up a bit and gotten more people out of
there [Bremerton, the shipyard decommissioning
site] earlier.”
“Looking at it from the crew’s perspective, some
of them had things they needed to get taken care
of in San Diego.”
“I knew that we [The chain of command] could
have gotten more of them [the crew] out of there
[Bremerton] earlier and back to San Diego.”
Summary

On VALDES the CO and XO were pretty much aligned with regard to the major
themes they discussed as evidenced by the fact that they brought up the same themes, the
frequency with which they mentioned each theme, and the similar ideas they expressed
about each theme. Specifically, both the CO and the XO expounded on pride (one of the
Navy’s core values) and being upbeat/positive attitude. Neither of these themes was
found in the data from the CMC interview. In fact, the CMC did not mention any themes
that could be considered positive. The CMC only mentioned four of the nine major
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themes that the CO and XO, did and he was alone in discussing two of the major themes
that could be considered negative: rumors and regret. Thus, there was a distinct
difference in the data obtained from the CO and XO, on the one hand, and the data
obtained from the CMC, on the other. The CMC, in fact, was quite candid during the
interview, and he revealed information that did not paint as positive a picture of the ship
or the command environment as his superiors had.
One can speculate why there was such a variation in data obtained from the CMC,
who is enlisted, and the CO and XO, who are officers. To explore the officer/enlisted
difference further one can consider that the CO and XO both have graduate level degrees
and have completed a different training track that includes exposure to more extensive
public affairs education. This education, which had a clear public relations valance, may
have made the officers more polished while conducting interviews and may have better
prepared them to project all issues about their ship in a positive light. Conversely, the
CMC, who does not have a graduate level education and whose public affairs training is
arguably more abbreviated, seemed more down-to-earth and less guarded with
information that may have been considered by some to be private and best shared only
within the lifelines of the ship.
The variation in candidness might also be the result of the fact that the CMC was
interviewed via telephone and the CO and XO interviews were conducted in person. The
lack of interpersonal interaction may have sufficiently removed the CMC from a naval
environment so he felt more relaxed and willing to share information that the CO and XO
were not inclined to share.
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Another consideration as to why the data obtained from the CMC was so different
from that obtained from the CO and XO is that the interview with the CMC occurred
after the decommissioning, at a time when he was no longer part of VALDES’ chain of
command, and, therefore, no longer constrained by any perceived pressure from the CO
or XO to not discuss potentially unflattering information.
Finally, the differences might be attributable to the different roles the officers and
chief enlisted person on the ship play. It is the job of the CMC to look out for the welfare
of the crew, but often, officers are expected to put naval concerns (the mission) ahead of
the needs of individual sailors. Whether the rumors about the VALDES being put back
in service because of the country going to war were ever really viable (or merely the
wishful thinking of a CO whose command was being terminated prematurely) or,
whether, even if the rumors were true, it was really necessary to hold onto the existing
crew well beyond what other ships, in a similar situation, did, could be debated.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that the CO believed both in the possibility of the
decommissioning process being halted and the need to have a nearly complete crew if
this occurred. What seems most significant here is the fact that the CO either did not
communicate his thinking to the CMC or the CMC was unable to hear the rationale.
What we have here is, in other words, a failure to communicate.
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CHAPTER FIVE: USS JOHN ADAMS
History and Background
The USS JOHN ADAMS was the same class, or type, of ship as USS VALDES,
and, like the VALDES, it had an all male crew. JOHN ADAMS was commissioned in
1980 at Todd Shipyard in San Pedro, CA.
Like the VALDES, the JOHN ADAMS made several deployments to the Persian
Gulf from 1982 thru 1985 in support of U.S. interests in that region. Also, like
VALDES, JOHN ADAMS transitioned to the NRF. This transition, which occurred in
1985, brought with it a new primary mission: the training and readiness of Selected
Reservists. During this transition the normal process of replacing personnel that are
transferring was modified. Forty percent of the regular active duty replacements of
transferring crewmembers were now going to be filled with part time Selected Reservists.
From 1987 through 1989, JOHN ADAMS received major upgrades in AntiSubmarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities. The ship was fitted with state of the art
equipment used for submarine detection and spent the next four years participating in
extensive anti-submarine equipment testing as well as ASW operations.
In 1992 JOHN ADAMS began a series of three deployments designed to counter
drug traffic from South America to the United States. One accomplishment that became
a part of waterfront lore was the JOHN ADAMS’ drug bust in 2001. During this
deployment, JOHN ADAMS pursued two high-speed boats heading west from Colombia.
Coordinating the pursuit of the first speedboat with its helicopters, JOHN ADAMS
maneuvered at flank speed causing the smugglers to jettison their illegal cargo. The first
pursuit lasted approximately eight hours but the perpetrators escaped when the boat
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entered Colombian territorial waters after dark. JOHN ADAMS did, however, recover
most of the illegal cargo that had been thrown overboard. Less than one week later,
JOHN ADAMS again pursued drug traffickers who also jettisoned their illegal cargo
while trying to escape. Although the second speedboat eventually eluded capture, too,
JOHN ADAMS once again retrieved the illegal cargo from the water. At the end of the
deployment the crew had confiscated more than 7,000 pounds of raw, uncut cocaine,
successfully preventing these illegal drugs from reaching the United States.
During JOHN ADAMS’ last deployment, the ship participated in the Cooperation
Afloat Readiness And Training (CARAT) Exercise during the spring and summer of
2002. During this exercise, JOHN ADAMS operated as part of a four-ship U.S. Task
Group sailing to numerous Southwest Asian ports working with the navies of six
Southeast Asian countries. This annual exercise strengthens U.S. ties with these
countries as well as fulfills the mission of showing the U.S. flag abroad. After the
CARAT portion of the deployment, JOHN ADAMS conducted two separate
humanitarian missions rebuilding schools in the war tom island of East Timor.
Description o f Interview Contexts
USS JOHN ADAMS Commanding Officer Interview
The interview with the CO of JOHN ADAMS took place in the CO’s cabin,
which was the same size and had almost the same layout and equipment as the CO’s
cabin on VALDES. Instead of the L-shaped couch that was on VALDES, however, there
was a small entertainment center whose TV had been removed and a nylon tie-down strap
was lying in its place. On either side of the entertainment center were beige cushioned
chairs where the CO and I sat during the interview.
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USS JOHN ADAMS Executive Officer Interview
As previously mentioned, since I served as XO of JOHN ADAMS during the
decommissioning process, the excerpts from my professional journal were analyzed in
lieu of analyzing formal interview notes. I began mentioning the decommissioning
process in my journal shortly after reporting onboard in October 2001 and continued the
entries through the decommissioning in March of 2003. Journal entries regarding
decommissioning became more frequent and detailed as the decommissioning date drew
nearer.
USS JOHN ADAMS Command Senior Chief Interview
The interview with JOHN ADAMS’ CSC was conducted two months after the
decommissioning so that the Senior Chief was no longer in my chain of command. If
there would have been any perceived pressure to respond one way or another due to a
senior/subordinate relationship, holding the interview after the decommissioning
removed that pressure. Additionally, scheduling the interview after the decommissioning
satisfied any Institutional Review Board concerns that might have arisen from
interviewing a subordinate in the chain of command. Of course, the later interview date
also helped to ensure that more accurate data could be obtained from the interview. The
interview took place in the evening at my home where the CSC and I sat facing one
another at my dining room table.
Discussion o f Major Themes
Seven major themes emerged from the analysis of the interview data gathered
from the JOHN ADAMS’ Triad. Each theme is discussed below with an accompanying
table that lists exemplary quotes from members of the triad that relate to the particular
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theme. In each of the tables, the word or words that are especially significant in
signifying the particular theme are printed in italics. Some, though not all, of the themes
are common to all three ships’ Triads. To the extent possible, I have presented the
themes from JOHN ADAMS’ Triad in essentially the same order as the themes from
VALDES. This will facilitate easier analysis across all three Triads presented in
Chapter 7.
JOHN ADAMS Theme 1: Creating a Meaningful Mission
The theme of creating a meaningful mission is related to the operational vs. nonoperational theme that was central in VALDES’ Triad’s data. As with the VALDES
Triad and crew, the JOHN ADAMS’ Triad and crew had difficulty seeing their work
during the decommissioning process as meaningful. The operational vs. non-operational
language was never used by any member of the JOHN ADAMS’ Triad, and consequently
operational vs. non-operational is not listed as a separate theme in this case. Rather, I
am using the label creating a meaningful mission to characterize a JOHN ADAMS
phenomenon that bore a close family resemblance to the operational vs. non-operational
theme in the VALDES case. The creating a meaningful mission theme refers to a ship’s
crew searching for a purpose or mission that they could understand, agree with, and move
toward. The quotes in Table 10 capture the Triad’s views on this theme.
Although, as noted above, the operational vs. non-operational distinction was
never invoked by any member of the JOHN ADAMS’ Triad, it is clear that the need to
search for meaning was prompted by the ship’s non-operational status. This becomes
obvious in my journal entries:
We are almost incommunicado (one of our officers has a short wave radio that he
receives small news snippets [about the war in Iraq] from NPR; eleven U.S.
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soldiers captured, three aircraft mishaps, etc.). Our world is so far from that right
now, it's almost like we are in another time. If ships on deployment are on the tip
of the spear, we must be on the blunt end of the shaft at the other end.
This journal entry demonstrates my feeling that JOHN ADAMS’ mission of
decommissioning was insignificant relative to that of other ships at that time (i.e.,
participating in the war). I was also frustrated with having to pretend that I believed
decommissioning was an important mission so that the crew would not be able to say,
“Hey, the XO has given up; why should we care.” Despite this frustration, pretending
was a necessity: The other members of the Triad and I agreed that this was our mission,
whether we liked it or not, and we would do it to the best of our ability and finish it as
quickly as possible.
Many similar ideas were brought up by JOHN ADAMS’ Triad even though the
operational vs. non-operational language was never used in any of the JOHN ADAMS
interviews. In fact, during the interviews, interviewees put considerable emphasis on the
fact that ship decommissioning was not a central task in Navy operations, especially in
the context of discussing the need to define a mission that was meaningful to the crew
and to the Triad members themselves. The following quote from the interview with the
CO during JOHN ADAMS’ final transit captures the essence of this theme:
I think we have tried to say, and I said this at the decom ceremony, and I’ve said
this [stating the mission of the ship] informally to a lot of people on the smoke
deck, or whenever I’m talking to them, because it comes up a fair amount:
There ’s a mission and this is our mission.
The CO’s reference to the smoke deck relates to the fact that the CO was a
smoker and, consequently, he would spend a fair amount of time at the ship’s designated
smoking area, which was frequented by the other smokers on the ship regardless of rank.
While on the smoke deck, sailors would often approach the CO with questions about the
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ship and its policies. The CO was careful to only answer questions that would not be
construed as “jumping the chain of command.” He would politely defer to the
appropriate person if he felt he should not answer the question. One issue that he said
came up a lot from sailors was the topic of the ship’s mission. The CO, in fact, indicated
that he used the smoke deck conversations to attempt to make the decommissioning
process seem meaningful to the crew.
Interestingly, one way he did this was to use the recapitalization idea that was a
major theme in the VALDES data. The CO said that he would say the following to
crewmembers on the smoking deck: “There’s a reason why we are doing this. [It] is an
instant money savings on paper the day we go over to inactive ships.”
The CO obviously believed this to be a viable reason; he and I, in fact, discussed
recapitalization in our conversations on a number of occasions during the
decommissioning process. The recapitalization concept was not used in the same
fashion, with the same frequency, or to the same extent that the Triad on VALDES had
used the notion; therefore, I have not designated it as a major theme in the analysis of the
JOHN ADAMS data.
The crew of the JOHN ADAMS appears to have had a somewhat different view
of what was necessary to find meaning in a mission. While the operational vs. nonoperational distinction is clearly implicit in much of what the Triad members said and
wrote, the following journal entry about bridge watchstanders suggests that at least some
of the crew members viewed this issue quite differently: “I asked the bridge team
yesterday if they were going to miss this [being at sea]? They initially had a look of

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

65
yes...but the senior guy said, ‘No way, can't wait for shore duty.’ After that, they all
seemed to agree.”
Although the sailors were initially reticent about sharing what might be perceived
as negative comments, they eventually indicated that they not only did not want to be
operational anymore, but also that they wanted to be back in San Diego on shore duty.
Interestingly, this is arguably the least operational type of duty station available to sailors.
Perhaps the desire to be operational was expressed mostly by those of higher rank like the
CO, i.e., the Triad members interviewed for this study.
Table 10. Maior theme of creating a meaningful mission as used bv USS JOHN
ADAMS’ triad
Theme
Creating a
Meaningful
Mission

CO
[Referring to his
speech on the 1MC
about the JOHN
ADAMS being sunk
after
decommissioning]
“That was an effort to
dispel [the rumor],
that was an effort to
say ‘hey, we’re still
an asset of the U.S.
Navy. ’ Actually I
tried to point out that
we were still an asset
of the U.S. Navy up
until the day we
decommission. I
mean we had been on
the decomm list since
95 and things have
changed quite a bit.
We still had JTFEX
to do, we still had

XO
24 MAR 200318-We are steaming
000 at 18 kts. Seas are calm. I
thought the motivational issues
would be a problem but I didn't
know that we would be actively
engaged with a war on Iraq at the
time [and we would have that to
contend with as well]. We are
almost incommunicado (one of
our officers has a short wave
radio that he receives small news
snippets [about the war in Iraq]
from NPR. Eleven U.S. soldiers
captured, three aircraft mishaps,
etc.) Our world is so far from that
right now it's almost like we are
in another time. If ships on
deployment are on the tip of the
spear we must be on the blunt end
of the shaft at the other end. I
asked the bridge team yesterday if
they were going to miss this?

CSC
“We still had to do
that one OPFOR19
between the post
deployment standdown, which we
did to ensure that
we were going to
be able to do that
safely, effectively,
[and] efficiently as
we had been
trained throughout
the whole
enchilada, and
deployment, and
the training cycle
and the whole
thing. [We need to]
be able to do our
job safely, and then
go on another 30
days of non
operation, and then
start up again to

When I recorded the date o f the journal entry I included it in the quote to help the reader to
develop a sense o f the timeline before the decommissioning on 28 March, 2003.
19
A reminder from Chapter 4: During training and certification exercises the Opposition Force or
OPFOR can be a ship or several ships that play the role of the enemy preparing the deploying ships for
combat.
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Table 10. (cont’d)
Theme
Creating a
Meaningful
Mission

CO
COMPTUEX20 to
do.”

XO
They initially had a look of
yes.. .but the senior guy said ‘No
way, can't wait for shore duty.’
After that they all seemed to
agree. No nostalgia there, at least
none that will be admitted to.”

CSC
work with
the.. .battlegroup...
meanwhile, we
“I think we have tried
were having our
to say, and I said this
talent leak out the
at the decom
door, going to their
ceremony, and I’ve
next duty stations,
said this [stating the
“21 MAR 03 - The conversation
and we were still
mission of the ship]
between the CO the OPS boss and getting some new
informally to a lot of the CSO on the bridge wing was
guys that didn’t
people on the smoke concerning the usefulness of this
know which end
deck, or whenever
class of ships. Also, the CSC
went forward, had
I’m talking to them,
commented that ‘it didn't matter
never been
because it comes up a how much firepower a ship had to underway before.”
fair amount; There’s do humanitarian Operations in
a mission and this is
East Timor’ (a mission that this
our mission. There’s ship had recently completed). For
a reason why we are every three ships they
doing this. [It] is an
decommission they produce one
instant money
flight IIARLEIGH BURKE.
savings on paper the
One could not deny that a new
day we go over to
ARLEIGH BURKE class
inactive ships.”
destroyer had more firepower but
it had a deeper draft than this ship
and therefore could not go into as
many ports to show the flag [one
of the U.S. Navy’s missions].”

JOHN ADAMS Theme 2: Focus
As in the discussion of the VALDES data, the theme of focus is defined as the
unified direction that an organization proceeds toward in an effort to achieve certain
goals and/or the process of moving toward that goal. The theme is related to the creating
a meaningful mission theme that was discussed earlier and the motivation theme
(discussed later in this chapter) in that the crew cannot focus unless the mission is clearly
defined and they will not display motivation without both of these factors being present.
The quotes in Table 11 reveal that the focus theme played out in somewhat different
JTFEX and COMPTUEX are naval exercises where JOHN ADAMS was designated to participate
as an opposing Force or OPFOR.
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ways in different interviews. The following quote captures the CO’s response to the
issue of focus:
If there is a lackadaisical attitude towards something [by the crew] it was
probably because of my attitude which was [that] we had worked so hard for the
first eight months, we made a conscious effort to have as relaxed a deployment as
we could. We had a stand down and obviously the focus was on getting home
and not necessarily working hard on the ship. I’m not sure it was relative to
decommissioning. I think it was more relative to just our general attitude, you
know.
It is interesting to note that the CO acknowledged a lack of focus (lackadaisical
attitude) and essentially takes credit for this condition. This may have been because, as
Commanding Officer, he recognized a weakness in his crew (the attitude). Rather than
harangue the crew about being lazy, he took the blame, essentially saying that they were
following his example. One can only speculate about whether he would have answered
the same if he had been interviewed by someone who did not possess a first hand
knowledge of the state of affairs on the ship.
The CSC approached the focus issue in a somewhat different way. He
emphasized the procedures he used to help the other Chief Petty Officers regain and
maintain their focus. The procedures involved encouraging the Chief Petty Officers to
write out the steps required to achieve the final goal of decommissioning. The following
quote describes this process:
We [the Chiefs] had like a laundry list prioritized of all the things that we needed
to do and we did that, I want to say, probably three times after deployment until
the end of decomm. We kept going through our list. We would all get back
together. What I gained from that is basically a reemphasis on our goals, a re
focus for some guys that were kind of drifting back, to bring them back up to the
forefront and be able to focus on our goals as a group. It worked out pretty well.
Nobody died.
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The CSC’s statement that “Nobody died” at first glance might come across as a
facetious comment. Actually, it was not; he was very serious. Even though we were not
participating in the war, everyday life on a Navy ship can be quite dangerous. We have
all known people who have been killed in peacetime operations and training and we were
very aware of the dangers associated with something as simple as our final transit and the
offload.
Table 11. Major theme of focus as used by USS JOHN ADAMS’ triad
Theme
Focus

CO
“We suspected that we were
going to decommission
officially even prior to the
INSURV which was in
December but we weren’t
focused on that-we had a
different focus. I think we
really started focusing on the
decommissioning process, I
think we were working on our
timeline prior to deploymentwhich was April 2002-but we
didn’t look at it again until we
got back [from deployment] in
October 2002.”
“And I think the focus on it [the
decommissioning] really started
in November 2002. Well I
think we were making
preparations [so] that we didn’t
come back from the stand-down
disorganized.”
“If there is a lackadaisical
attitude towards something [by
the crew] it was probably
because of m y attitude which
was [that] we had worked so
hard for the first 8 months, we
made a conscious effort to have

XO
No
mention of
this theme

CSC
“For the first year we didn’t focus
on decomm. It was barely a rumor.
It was more we might decomm; we
don’t know when we’re
decomming.”
[Referring to the upcoming OPFOR
underway period after several nonoperational periods and leave
periods] “Okay, let’s get back on
the bus [a metaphor used to
describe staying on track] and try to
stay focused.”
“The last thing we wanted to be
able to do as a crew, as a ship,
[was] to be able to protect
ourselves, and that was [to] fight a
fire underway. That was our goal,
to be able to maintain that ability,
and maintain the stability of the
ship no matter what. That was our
bottom line. And.. .that was our
.. .focus. In the chiefs mess,211
kind of made it theirfocus .. .and let
them do it. Fortunately, they were
on the same plane, [the] same line
of thinking that the command level
was.”

The c h ie fs mess is a term used to describe both the collective group o f Chief Petty Officers on a
ship and the actual spaces or rooms where the Chiefs reside. On a typical ship these rooms consist o f a
berthing area, an eating area, and a lounge/meeting area.
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Table 11. (cont’d)
Theme
Focus

CO
as relaxed a deployment as we
could. We had a stand down
and obviously the foe us was on
getting home and not
necessarily working hard on the
ship. I’m not sure it was
relative to decommissioning. I
think it was more relative to
just our general attitude, you
know.”
[Responding to the question:
Right now [during the final
days of the decommissioning
process] what do you think
motivates the crew?] “Finish
and get home, to get home. I
think the biggest danger right
now... well, I think it is making
sure that we arefocused on
doing efficiently what we need
to do to finish in three days.”

XO

CSC
“We [The Chiefs] had like a
laundry list prioritized of all the
things that we needed to do and we
did that, I want to say, probably
three times after deployment until
the end of decomm. We kept going
through our list. We would all get
back together. What I gained from
that is basically a reemphasis on our
goals, a re-focus for some guys that
were kind of drifting back, to bring
them back up to the forefront and
be able to focus on our goals as a
group. It worked out pretty well.
Nobody died.”

“I think you can see, if you just
look on the bridge, the number
of times you have to say “calm
down, stay focused on what you
are doing.’ I think that’s
[excited attitude] going to get
gradually worse.”
JOHN ADAMS Theme 3: Pride
The third major theme that emerged was pride, which here, as in the VALDES
case, is defined as “finding satisfaction in one’s accomplishments and having self-respect
no matter what one’s rank may be or what situation a person might find himself/herself
in.” As mentioned in the VALDES section, there are many active duty sailors on NRF
ships that are proud of the fact that they have to do more with less. The following quote
from the CSC alludes to the underdog mindset that some of the NRF sailors on JOHN
ADAMS adopted:
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From the first indication that the ship was to be decommissioned eight years
earlier, the [decommissioning] stigma was associated with the ship. The normal
upgrades [material improvements] that other ships received as a matter of course
were no longer available to the ship slated for decommissioning. Essentially the
ship had to perform the same mission as other ships that were continually being
modernized through the regular modernization program. Some crewmembers saw
this as the underdog syndrome and a challenge to overcome. We have a Ford
Pinto and they have a Mercedes.
When presented to the crew correctly, the underdog mindset could be developed
and used very effectively to motivate sailors to far exceed expectations. The other quotes
listed in Table 12 indicate that, from the Triad’s perspective, the sailors on JOHN
ADAMS were so motivated, and the pride they had in the ship reflected this.
Table 12. The major theme of pride as used by USS JOHN ADAMS’ triad
Theme
Pride

CO
“There w a s trem endous p rid e
in the ship fr o m the crew
m em bers. They would tell
you that [our sh ip ] is the b e st
sh ip in the sq u a d ro n .”

“I think their p e rso n a l p rid e
and their career motivation
also contributes to still trying
to do a good job.”
“As egotistical as it may
sound, I think that we have
engendered an atmosphere of
p e o p le [w h o ] a re p r o u d o f the
ship. I think people like the

command. I think they like
the fact that they know their
jobs, that their equipment
works, that they’ve worked
hard and have gotten rewards
for it.”
“The thing about the
SINKEX was, when you are
going to put it in ready stow,
for me internally there is
more motivation to maintain
the equipment. We don’t

xo
“JOHN ADAMS is by far the
cleanest ship on the
waterfront. It m akes m e f e e l
p ro u d when we get the
frequent compliments from
both civilian and military
guests, remarking how clean
she is.”
“Since the HS2 helicopter
squadrons have all been
disestablished, JOHN
ADAMS converted the
starboard helo hanger into a
weight room. It was modeled
after a 24-hour Fitness Center
complete with TV’s and
stereos. It is b y f a r the b e st
w eig h t room on the
w aterfront. We may be NRF

but we’ll be in shape.”
“During CARAT the JO H N
A D A M S ’ 5-m an Tug o f W ar
Team w a s undefeated. Even
a team comprised of the best
[contestants] from all other
ships in the Task Group, the
Marines, and the Singaporean

CSC
“From the first
indication that the
ship was to be
decommissioned
eight years earlier,
the
[decommissioning]
stigma was
associated with the
ship. The normal
upgrades [material
improvements] that
other ships received
as a matter of
course were no
longer available to
the ship slated for
decommissioning.
Essentially the ship
had to perform the
same mission as
other ships that
were continually
being modernized
through the regular
modernization
program. Some
crewmembers saw
this as the
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Table 12. (cont’d)
Theme
Pride

CO
want to turn over a ship that
is crappy. I think it has a lo t
to d o w ith how p e o p le view
th eir jo b s a n d th eir
equ ipm en t th a t is a reflection
o f th eir j o b s . ... I mean if you

xo
Navy was easily beaten.
This raised eyebrows since
we are one of the smallest
ships and in the NRF.”

CSC
u n derdog syn drom e
a n d a ch allen ge to
overco m e. ‘We have

a Ford Pinto and
they have a
Mercedes.’”

have the hackneyed phrase
p r id e a n d p ro fessio n a lism in
y o u r equipm ent, then I think

that carries over and you will
turn it over in good shape.”
JOHN ADAMS Theme 4: Emotions
The fourth major theme was emotions. This term will be used to describe the
comments made by the interviewees that referred to the feelings (either theirs or those of
their crew) associated with the decommissioning. An interesting dichotomy exists
between the CO on one hand, and the CSC and myself on the other. The CO made only
one very brief reference to his emotions: “I myself am a little giddy about getting out of
here.” As seen in the quotes in Table 13, the CSC and I expressed what might be
considered sad emotions about the decommissioning process. Perhaps the most telling
quote from the table is from the CSC who said:
I miss the ship a lot and I never thought I’d say that. I miss the ship, but more
importantly I miss the crew, and I miss the camaraderie that we had in the C hiefs
Mess, that you and I and the Captain had. That was a very special relationship to
me and that I had with the crew... I could go out and... say, “’Hey, how are ya
doing?’ I miss that a lot. I don’t know if I’ll ever get the opportunity to do that
again. It’s kind of weird.
My field notes indicate that the CSC’s tone became very somber during this part
of the interview and, as the CSC was reflecting on his sad emotions, I began to empathize
with him as my own memories flooded back into my head. The emotions the CSC and I
experienced were typical for a decommissioning; the emotions the CO reported were not.
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I suspect that the CO experienced more emotions than he indicated in the
interview process. The emotion of being “giddy” seems very unusual to be associated
with a decommissioning process unless it was associated with behaviors like a nervous
laugh. As a matter of fact, no other person interviewed for this study reported that they
experienced anything close to that emotion. I’m not sure of the reason for the CO’s
response, but I can speculate that the CO may have been exhibiting a type of self defense
mechanism to soften the blow of losing his command. It is also quite possible that the
CO was in denial (but I have no other indications of this) or, perhaps, he just wanted to
project a stoic image to me and to the rest of the crew to show us “how it should be
done.” In any case it is difficult to believe that the only emotion experienced by the
Commanding Officer of a ship that is being decommissioned was giddiness.
Table 13. Major theme of emotions as used by USS JOHN ADAMS’ triad
Theme

CO

xo

CSC

Emotions

“I myself
am a little
giddy
about
getting out
o f here.”

“After SEPT 11th a [rumor about a] memo changing our
decommissioning date from 2003 to 2011 changed the
tone of all I encountered. I personally felt better - like the
tumor was no longer visible in the x rays.”

“I miss the ship a lot
and I never thought
I ’d say that. I miss
the ship, but more
importantly I miss
the crew, and I miss
the camaraderie that
we had in the ch iefs
mess, that you and I
and the Captain had.
That was a very
special relationship
to me and that I had
with the crew.... I
could go out and...
say “’Hey, how are
ya doing?’ I miss
that a lot. I don’t
know if I’ll ever get
the opportunity to do
that again. It’s kind
o f weird.”

“15 MAR 2003. The decommissioning ceremony was
abysmal. An hour before the ceremony, it started to
drizzle. The rain lasted the entire ceremony.... It made
for a much more somber mood cast upon the ceremony.”
“23 MAR 2003. [Five days left] The crew is subdued,
resting before the long hours start when we get into port.
I still need to interview the CO; I hesitate, I think
partially because that is another event that signifies the
end. I keep thinking about smoking that last cigar; the
last one on board and all that. Will I go through all the
spaces? Who will be with m e...? I will miss this
stateroom and this ship. 1 may even miss some o f the
people. Isn't that who a ship is after all, people, the crew?
As the CO said in his speech the lifeblood o f a ship is her
crew. We have been bleeding for a while [and] no
transfusion [is] planned, just a gushing in a few days. We
will start convulsing soon, the last efforts, then the steady
flow until just me left never to see another like it [I knew
I would not be stationed on a ship like this again.] Am I
getting melancholy on myself?”
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JOHN ADAMS Theme 5: Rumors
Rumors, defined as information of uncertain origin and accuracy, were also a
large part of the decommissioning process for JOHN ADAMS’ Triad. Table 14 details
examples of the Triad’s ideas regarding the rumors that proliferated throughout their
decommissioning process. The one rumor that had the most impact dealt with the core
concept of this study and affected both the VALDES and the JOHN ADAMS. This was
the rumor that both ships were to be sunk soon after their respective decommissionings.
The CO of JOHN ADAMS said: “I didn’t like that rumor because that makes people
wonder why are we doing maintenance? Why are we maintaining this?.. .1 discounted
it.” It is interesting to note that, although the CO said he personally discounted the
rumor, he felt that it was potentially damaging enough to warrant using the ship-wide
announcing system to downplay and discount it. This was something that he rarely did.
Table 14. Maior theme of rumors as used by USS JOHN ADAMS’ triad
Theme
Rumors

CO
“I didn’t like that rumor [the
rumor that the ship would be
sunk after decommissioning]
because that makes people
wonder why are we doing
maintenance? Why are we
maintaining this?... I
discounted it.”
“The biggest thing that
disturbs morale is the
uncertainty. You overcome
that by trying to dispel
rumors, trying to have a plan.
If you have a plan and
everyone knows what the
plan is I think that improves
morale because I think
uncertainty is what confuses

XO
“DEC 12th 2002 - At
the Decommissioning
meeting ...the
COMNAVSURFPAC
rep made a rather
flippant remark that the
ship was to be sunk
after the
decommissioning
process.”

CSC
It was barely a rumor.
It was more we might
decomm, we don’t
know when we’re
decomming. Several
different entities,
...would tell us, well
you’re going to
decomm here.... You
know, it was like
nobody could really
“DEC 17th 2002 - The
give us a straight
CO got on thelMC22
answer. So, we really
and basically refuted
didn’t pay any attention
the idea that we were
because, as you know,
going to be sunk. He
on the ship we have
didn't go as far as some plenty of other things to
of the other ship’s CO’s focus on.”
and think we were

A reminder from Chapter 2: The 1MC is the shipboard announcing system. Depending on their
personality or the importance o f the message, CO’s sometimes use it to update the crew on various issues.
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Table 14. (cont’d)
Theme
Rumors

CO
people.”
“You have to avoid the
rumors that are created. That
didn’t bother me. That was
just another thing that
somebody off the ship was
talking about, [the rumor that
the ship was not going to
decommission due to the war]
I was very confident that we
were going to
decommission.”
[When asked if he ever had a
hope that the ship wouldn’t
decommission] “No, no, I
was absolutely confident [of]
that from day one, when they
said that this is the day that
we were going to
decommission. So in contrast
to the VALDES that took the
attitude that ‘hey we might
get called back to active
service and still live as a
ship,’ I never thought that,
never thought that for one
second.”

XO
going to be reassigned to
the [Persian] Gulf, but he
had to extinguish that
rumor.”

CSC
“There was a lot
more discussion
coming out of
SURFPAC,23 and
none of it, of course,
on any message
traffic. No official...
anchor, official
message. So,
around, I want to say
March-April
timeframe in 2001
there [were] more
and more rumors
coming out of
SURFPAC and
THIRD FLEET as
far as what the plan
was.”

JOHN ADAMS Theme 6: Motivation
The theme of motivation is defined as the will and incentive, whether individually
or as a group, to accomplish the defined mission of the ship. Of course this was an issue
on each of the three ships in the study and it is central to the thesis of this dissertation, but
the data from the JOHN ADAMS’ Triad interviews contained numerous mentions of
motivational techniques and several explicit examples of techniques that Triad members

COMNAVSURFPAC and THIRD FLEET are three star admiral staffs that ultimately determine
the schedule o f ships and were expected to provide ground truth regarding the actual decommissioning
date.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

75
had employed. Table 15 contains all of the quotes on the motivation theme but the
following quote from the CO best encapsulates this theme:
I think you [the XO] were on leave when we came up with this idea with getting
up there [Bremerton] as soon as we could. We, on the ship, came up with the idea
of getting up there three days sooner.. .to get out of there early. I think there’s a
lot of discussion about it. I think that everyone is confident that we can do it.
There are issues that may be beyond our control. I’m not sure the challenge
motivates them to do it [but] I think people are motivated to finish on time.
Compressing the timeline [the time the crew spent in the Bremerton shipyard]
from ten days to three days was a means to give the crew a high goal to achieve, and thus
be able to give the crew additional bragging rights. It also provided them less time to
dwell on the final days of the ship’s life. The compressed timeline also served to
motivate the crew because it allowed them to spend more time with their families after
the decommissioning and before they had to report to their next assignments.
Table 15. Major theme of motivation as used by USS JOHN ADAMS’ triad
Theme

CO

XO

CSC

Motivation

“I think you [the XO] were on leave when we came
up with this idea with getting up there [Bremerton] as
soon as we could. We, on the ship, came up with the
idea of getting up there three days sooner .. .to get out
of there early. I think there’s a lot of discussion about
it. I think that everyone is confident that we can do it.
There are issues that may be beyond our control. I ’m

24 MAR
200324-W e
are steaming
000 at 18 kts.
Seas are calm.

“I could feel when a few
of them [other chiefs] start
to say, ‘Well, I ’m done,’
and then I would [say]
‘Hey, what’s going on
with Timmy? He
doesn’t have orders yet,’
and then, ‘Hey guys, let’s
have a meeting,’ and we
would have these
meetings.... And, we
would start to write things
down on the white boards.
We just kind of
brainstormed things, what
we wanted to make sure
[that] timeline-wise, what
was our most important
thing we wanted to do.”

not sure the challenge motivates them to do it [hut] I
think people are motivated to finish on time.”
“Liberty [time off work] does not keep morale high.”

“/ think if you have people who are motivated and
engaged to do one thing well, and then they succeed
a t that and then they are motivated and engaged to do
the next thing well. The decommissioning just

becomes another mission that you have to do. It’s
another thing in the line o f accomplishments or goals
you have to reach.”

1 thought the
motivational
issues would
be a problem

[in the
decommission
ing process]
but I didn't
know that we
would be
actively
engaged with
a war on.”

“Timmy” was a term used to refer to any junior sailor, e.g., Seaman Timmy is going to sleep in if
he can.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

76
JOHN ADAMS Theme 7: Denial
The denial theme is unique to this Triad, and only the CO and CSC mentioned it.
I was keenly aware of the situations that they described and I even participated in
conversations about the incidents described in the Table 16 quotes. However, I did not
make any journal entries about this theme. The following quote encapsulates the denial
theme:
Even when there were reams of people from other ships coming onboard saying
“Can we have this” and “Can we have that?”-even at that point-I think we tried
to say, “No, don’t give away the farm.” I think people still had in their minds,
“Well maybe, we’re doing this [not giving equipment away] because we might
stick around.” But once we got the berthing cleaned out, I think a lot of people
went “Oh, Wow,” and it personally affected them.
The cleaning out of the berthing, or crew living area, occurred after the sailors
who lived there had been moved to one of the other two berthing areas. The crew size had
shrunk as a result of the decommissioning process, and this consolidation of the crew was
designed to expedite the final decommissioning process in Bremerton. It had the ancillary
effect of making the decommissioning process very real to the crew, basically removing
the denial aspect from the scenario. Prior to this, the CSC perceived that the crew
exhibited more signs of denial than anyone else.
I recall the incident the CSC was referring to regarding the berthing compartment
and the discussions that the CO, CSC and I had about the fact that it was a good decision
to close out one of the three berthing compartments early while still in San Diego. This
had the effect of shifting the crew’s collective mindset towards the final stages of the
decommissioning; this was something that was definitely needed in light of the truncated
timeline in Bremerton.
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Table 16. Major theme of denial as used bv USS JOHN ADAMS’ triad
Theme
Denial

CO

XO

CSC

“I think up until probably about
three weeks ago a lot o f people
didn’t have the realization. Until
we closed out that first berthing.
When we closed out the very
first berthing I think people on
the ship starting going ‘Wow,
hey we are going to
decommission. ’ Until we started
moving DC [Damage Control]
gear off, when we started closing
and draining systems, I think
that was the point where we
were kind o f like wow, we
actually are decommissioning....
even when there were reams of
people from other ships coming
onboard saying ‘can we have
this’ and ‘can we have that?’even at that point-I think we
tried to say, ‘No, don’t give
away the farm.’ I think people
still had in their minds, ‘Well
maybe, w e ’re doing this [not
giving equipment away] because
we might stick around.’ But
once we got the berthing cleaned
out, I think a lot of people went
‘Oh, W ow,’ and it personally
affected them.”

No mention of
this theme

“If we would have said in January.
‘Okay, we are going to inspect
everybody’s lockers and y ’all have to
be cleaned out except for three pairs of
skivvies, two shirts and a pair o f
socks,’ then that might have acted
against us negatively by [the crew]
“saying,” You know what, if I’m
keeping three pairs o f skivvies, a towel
and a pair o f socks in my locker, then
what am I wiping this diesel down
for?... What am I replacing this light
bulb for? Why am I making sure that
this is wrapped up like it is supposed to
be? Why am I putting this in lay up
like it’s supposed to be?...” I thought
that in the end it worked out better than
I could have ever imagined, because
when we walked off we knew in our
hearts and in our minds that it was done
... the best way it could be done.”
“After the first berthing compartment
was emptied out prior to leaving San
Diego, the crew suddenly realized that
it [the decommissioning] was real. ”
“They [the crew] had a stark
realization that they needed to make
plans to decomm.”

Summary
On JOHN ADAMS all three Triad members were pretty much aligned in terms of
the major themes they discussed. The only outlier in this regard was the emotions theme
where the CO had a single, very different response as compared to the multiple responses
of the XO and CSC. Even though I (the XO) did not comment in my journal on two of
the seven themes (denial and focus), this is not to say that I did not consider these themes
during the decommissioning process. In fact, I participated in numerous conversations
with the other Triad members about them, and I did agree with the comments made by
the other two Triad members about the denial and focus themes. For whatever reason, I
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simply did not record ideas about these themes in my professional journal; therefore, I
have indicated in the table “no mention of this theme.”
Like the CO and the XO on VALDES, the Triad on JOHN ADAMS expounded
on pride (one of the Navy’s core values). It is noteworthy that comments about pride
were in response to the Navy’s core value question. This is probably due to the culture in
which the Triad members exist and have existed for many years.

The military climate

cultivates pride in individual service and accomplishment, and it also cultivates pride in
the accomplishments of the command to which an individual is assigned. One of the
ways this is accomplished is by awarding medals and ribbons that are displayed on a
person’s uniform, and also on the side of the ship (usually below the bridge). The more
time the person or ship has served, the more rows of awards are displayed.27
The CSC recognized lapses in the motivation of his peers, and his comments
about his method of dealing with this facet of the decommissioning process suggest an
approach that was very mechanical. The CSC focused on motivating his peers through
discussion and verbal engagement while the CO and I seemed to focus more on
attempting to inspire the crew for the long-term mission, including the next assignment.
One can speculate why this variation in techniques existed. Perhaps the dynamic of the
enlisted verses officer differences came into play as it did on the VALDES.
Variation in Triad responses to the emotion theme were also noted in this case.
The CSC and I were more sullen than the CO. The fact that the CSC was interviewed two
months after the decommissioning may have caused him to be more melancholy than he

26
Each o f the JOHN ADAMS triad members has been in the Navy for over 18 years.
27
These awards tell a whole story o f where the ship (or person) has deployed to, how many
deployments were made, and they highlight exemplary performance in a variety o f competitive categories.
It has been said that, “A sailor wears his biography on his chest.”
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might have been during the decommissioning process when he was much busier and
focused on the task at hand. As for me, I often recorded very personal issues about onthe-job challenges in my professional journal; this included the emotions I was
experiencing, which accounts for the presence of more data from me on the emotions
theme than from either of the other two Triad members.
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CHAPTER SIX: USS KODIAK
History and Background
The USS KODIAK was the lead ship of a class of amphibious ships.28 These
ships transport and launch amphibious craft and vehicles with their crews and embarked
personnel in amphibious assault operations. KODIAK was the only mixed gender ship in
this study, and the crew size was almost double that of the JOHN ADAMS and the
VALDES. During KODIAK’s career the ship completed 19 Western Pacific
deployments and was one of the most decorated ships on the West Coast. KODIAK had
served notable roles in military operations and humanitarian efforts since it was
commissioned at Norfolk Naval Shipyard in Portsmouth, VA in 1969.
During the end of the Vietnam War, KODIAK carried Marines back to the United States
as part of Operation Keystone Blue Jay, a planned withdrawal of American troops from
Vietnam. In 1991 during Operation Desert Storm, KODIAK controlled the largest
offload of landing craft in support of combat operations.
KODIAK was called upon in 2000 to provide support for the crew of USS COLE
after a small boat laden with explosives blew up alongside the destroyer as it refueled in
Aden, Yemen, tearing a hole in its side and killing 17 sailors.
KODIAK participated with JOHN ADAMS in the Cooperation Afloat Readiness
And Training (CARAT) Exercise during the spring and summer of 2002. This was
supposed to be her last deployment; however, she was tasked to participate in a surge, or

28
When a ship type, or class, is designed to support a certain naval mission the first ship built in the
class traditionally bears the same name as the class (i.e., the KODIAK is the first ship o f the KODIAK
class of ships). This class was designed as part of a mobile and modem amphibious strike force. The ship’s
parts involved transporting pre-loaded heavy landing craft to the shore and discharge them rapidly along
with the accompanying Marines.
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emergency, deployment to support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF).
During that last deployment, KODIAK disembarked Marines and supplies during
the opening stages of OIF. Later, the ship provided logistic support to U.S. forces
stationed on captured offshore gas and oil platforms near the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr.
KODIAK also conducted operation Desert Tortoise during OIF. This task involved
loading up 100,000 lbs of mail, 232 pallets of cargo and 71 Sailors from Bahrain and
delivering them to the other amphibious ships in the task force patrolling the Persian
Gulf.
KODIAK was the only non-reserve ship in this study and the only ship to
participate in the Iraq War. These facts may be significant and will be addressed later in
this chapter. KODIAK returned home in July 2003; she was last home ported in San
Diego, CA. In an ironic twist, KODIAK was the first ship of the class to be
commissioned and was also the last to be decommissioned.
Description o f Interview Contexts
The San Diego Union Tribune newspaper article Crawley wrote about the
decommissioning process that was mentioned in Chapter 1 was written after the
decommissioning of VALDES and JOHN ADAMS. The article, however, appeared prior
to the decommissioning of KODIAK so I chose to read an excerpt from this article to
each of the three interviewees prior to their respective interviews. My hope was that
reading this article would convey to the interviewees the type of problems and behaviors
that Crawley discussed and that also may have been present on their ship as well.
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USS KODIAK Commanding Officer Interview
The interview with KODIAK’s CO took place on the berthing barge that was
moored just forward of the now abandoned ship. This large, white barge provided a stark
contrast to the haze grey ship next to it. The barge was three decks high and was
designed to house the crew of a ship during times that their ship was uninhabitable. The
barge had office spaces, areas to cook food and feed the crew, and a limited sleeping area
for the duty section

to remain overnight. The CO and I sat across from each other at a

rectangular table in a relatively barren conference room on the top deck.
USS KODIAK Executive Officer Interview
The interview with KODIAK’s XO took place in the same conference room that
the interview with the CO had taken place. The XO on the KODIAK was a friend of
mine, and he had shared many experiences on the recent CARAT deployment with me
prior to the formal interviews. We also had informally discussed the decommissioning
process that we both were engaged in on a number of occasions.
USS KODIAK Command Master Chief Interview
The interview with the CMC took place in his office across the hall from the
conference room. The room was cluttered and the CMC initially seemed preoccupied,
but he became very involved in the interview after it began. He came across as a very
gruff, no-nonsense person and, as the interview progressed, it became evident that the
CMC probably adhered to an “X” viewpoint from McGregor’s X-Y theory of motivation.

The duty section is comprised of approximately one third o f the crew o f a decommissioning ship. These
personnel are charged with guarding the ship and standing by in case of an emergency (i.e., fire or flooding).
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Discussion o f Major Themes
Six major themes emerged from the analysis of the interview data gathered from
KODIAK’s triad. Each theme is discussed below with an accompanying table that lists
exemplary quotes from members of the Triad about the particular theme. In each of the
tables, the word or words that signify the theme are printed in italics.
KODIAK Theme 1: The Illusion o f Being Operational
Just as with VALDES data and, less explicitly, the JOHN ADAMS data, the
KODIAK data invokes the operational vs. non-operational distinction, though, once
again, the terms themselves are not often used. As was noted in discussing the VALDES
data, operational refers to a ship having a tangible purpose or mission that is aligned with
the Navy’s central mission. The most significant mission or purposes are combat related.
Since KODIAK was the only ship in the study to actually participate in the Gulf War, it
was also the most operational ship of the three. Of course, when the ship’s crew began
the decommissioning process, there was a shift to a non-operational status. The Triad
seemed to deal with the ship’s non-operational status somewhat differently. For example,
in an attempt to keep the crew in a quasi-operational mindset, the CO attempted to
construct an operational environment similar to the environment on the ship when
KODIAK had been at sea. This, in effect, created an illusion o f being operational. The
XO and CMC were participants in this plan, if not because of agreement then due to their
subordinate status, and they did not comment explicitly on the creation of operational
illusion in their respective interviews. The following quote details the CO’s plan:
I am trying to keep the running of the ship as best I can, the same as if we were at
sea. You know, trying to keep the normal operations the same [and] as best I can
for the kids, so the kids are in the routine that they are used to. And then when we
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zig on that routine [my job] is to let them know, “Hey, the zig is coming, here is
when it is going to happen.. . Okay, so that there are no surprises.
This plan to act as if the ship was operational, even though it was non-operational,
was intended to communicate the seriousness of the decommissioning process to the
crew. Many ships adopt a different work schedule and subsequent mindset when they are
in port. Undoubtedly, the CO’s plan to keep the same schedule that was used when the
ship was underway was a unique approach that some crewmembers may have perceived
as too rigorous. The CMC spent much of the interview discussing his techniques for
enforcing regulations and standards. It is interesting to note that the CMC reported that
enforcing regulations and standards was required in the operational as well as the nonoperational phases. The CMC described what happened on the ship while KODIAK was
en route to the Gulf War:
They [the crew] go, “Hey, we’re going to war. Let us grow our hair out.” That
was the first thing the Captain said, “No way.” You know, we were going to
shoot across the pond [transit to the Persian Gulf] and [the crew was] say [ing]
“Let’s just have a beard growing contest.” Kind of grow beards for crossing the
line ceremony.30 Nope, it was a standard.
In short, the CMC perceived that the crew wanted to let the standards slip
regardless of their situation. This may have had more to do with the CMC’s perception
of people in general than with the actual condition of the crew. At any rate the CO and
the CMC seem to have been on the same page with regard to this theme: Both seemed to
blur the line between operational and non-operational.
Although the XO wrote the Plan of the Day and was integral in enacting the CO’s
plan, he focused on the difference between being operational and non-operational and not
so much on the illusion o f being operational. When comparing the decommissioning
30
Crossing the line refers to the ceremony that all Navy ships have when they cross the equator.
Generally, the crew is allowed to relax some standards in conjunction with this ceremony.
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process with participating in the war the XO said: “I am more stressed now, here with the
decomm than I was during the war.” This statement may be surprising to some but the
rest of the quote explains his reasoning, which makes sense:
I mean you are stressed but you feel more confident because you actually have
been preparing your whole naval career to execute some kind of war plan. There
is no preparation for you to .. .decommission a ship. I’m not a professional
decommissioning ship kind of guy.
Table 17. Major theme of the illusion of being operational as used by USS KODIAK triad
Theme

CO

XO

CMC

The Illusion
o f Being
Operational

“The mission w as...w e now
have to decommission the
ship and the fact is that we
have to compress cycle
because when we got home
decommissioning was put
on hold because we were
informed that Turkey was
interested in buying the
ship. So, we were told we
can’t do anything with the
exception of cleaning,
painting, and fixing the
lagging. So I couldn’t start
taking systems down or
putting stuff in lay-up until
we got an idea o f what the
Turks were going to do,
because they were talking
hot swap. So, hot swap was
that we had to keep the ship
operational, send a Turkish
crew over, train the crew
and then turn the ship over.”

“I am more stressed now, here
with the decomm than I was
during the war. I mean you
are stressed but you feel more
confident because you actually
have been preparing your
whole naval career to execute
some kind o f war plan. There
is no preparation for you to ...
decommission a ship. I’m not
a professional
decommissioning ship kind of
guy.”

“We basically sat
around for three months
doing circles at 2 ,4
knots. That was a lot of
time to just sit and
think. We weren’t
allowed to do drills.
We couldn’t keep the
guys busy because we
had to be watching fo r
mines, this, that and the
other stuff. The guys,
they wanted to just
mellow out and let
standards slip. We
wouldn’t let that
happen onboard the
KODIAK.”

“I am trying to keep the
running o f the ship as best I
can, the same as if we were
a t sea. You know, trying to
keep the normal operations
the same [and] as best I can
for the kids, so the kids are
in the routine that they are
used to. And then when we
zig on that routine [my job]
is to let them know, hey, the
zig is coming, here is when
it is going to happen....
Okay, so that there are no
surprises.”

“Normally a ship is taken out
o f the deployment mode, be
ready to go to sea status,
anywhere from three to six
months before you decomm.
We got the word we could
stand down [stop] from being
ready to get underway.. .the
last week in August. So,
during that whole time we are
doing PMS. If they told us
‘get underway tomorrow, ’ we
could have done it. So, to get
from that point to .. .removing
all the equipment, it takes a
lot. Today is the 26th of
September and w e’re
decomming in five days, w e’re
taking CIWS off today” [a
major gun system that should
have been removed much
earlier].

“They [the crew] go,
‘hey, we're going to
war. Let us grow our
hair out.’ That was the
first thing the Captain
said, ‘No way.’ You
know, we were going to
shoot across the pond
[transit to the Persian
Gulf] and say [the crew
says] ‘let’s just have a
beard growing contest.’
Kind o f grow beards for
crossing the line
ceremony. Nope, it was
a standard.”
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KODIAK Theme 2: Focus
Focus, here, has the same definition that was used in discussing the focus theme
for VALDES and JOHN ADAMS: the direction that an organization proceeds toward in
an effort to achieve certain goals and/or the process of moving toward that goal. As
before, the term focus can be used as both a noun and a verb. The following quote from
the CMC best encapsulates the focus theme:
We are going over there [Persian Gulf] and even though we are going to war and I
was trying to maintain the focus for the crew on that, in the back of their minds
they were already starting to think, hey, we’re decomming in October, why do we
need to worry about PMS?31 Why do we need to clean the ship? They were
willing to let standards slip.
Table 18 includes exemplary quotes related to the theme of focus from the CMC.
Although the CO and XO did not specifically mention the focus theme the CMC’s
emphasis on focus was centered on countering the same type of attitude (i.e., lack of
motivation) that was described in the Crawley article. In fact, among all of the
interviewees in the study, the CMC on KODIAK reported experiencing leadership
challenges more closely aligned with what I expected (e.g., major decline in motivation, a
search for purpose, lethargy, and a decline in professionalism).
Table 18. Major theme of focus as used by USS KODIAK’ triad
Theme
Focus

CO
No mention of
this theme.

XO
No mention of
this theme.

CMC
“We are going over there [Persian Gulf] and even
though we are going to war and I was trying to
maintain the focus for the crew on that, in the back
o f their minds they were already starting to think,
hey, w e’re decomming in October, why do we need
to worry about PMS? Why do we need to clean the
ship? They were willing to let standards slip. ”
“We aren’t going to let that happen [let the standards
slip]. And that has always been my philosophy from
day one. It is because o f the exposure I have seen

PMS stands for Planned Maintenance System. This is the system used to schedule periodic
maintenance checks and tune ups to almost all equipment on naval ships.
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Table 18. (cont’d)
Theme

CO

XO

Focus

CMC
from other decomm ships. The sailors that I have
watched walk around the base with their painted up
coveralls and the holes tom in and their long hair,
[that].. .are part of decomming crews. The sailors I
have received...from decommed ships, their
professionalism was lacking. Their military bearing,
their appearance was kind o f poor. And that was
one thing I was going to make sure didn ’t happen to
KODIAK. I didn’t want any other command that
received one of my sailors to say, ‘damn KODIAK
let it slip.’ I didn’t want any o f my guys to be
walking around this base and be stopped by [a] CMC
somewhere for being out o f uniform or needing a
haircut, or whatever....”
“We will do divisional training...three training
topics at a minimum on a weekly basis. They know
that is the standard and they know I ’m not going to
deviate from it.... So, it has been a tool for me and it
has assisted me in refocusing the crew during this
cruise when we had really nothing else to do once we
dumped the Marines o ff.... The full decomm
mentality went into effect for the crew.”
“Trying to make a positive out o f a negative, and that
is why I said I went back to the basics and I tried to
keep the guys focused on something... cause w e’re all
still going to be sailors and w e ’re moving on, and I
a t least tried to give them a focus fo r a few minutes
in the morning on how to look and show up on time,
and being respectful.”
“/ took the focus off o f KODIAK and that destroying
KODIAK or ripping it apart was ju st a daily task fo r
us fo r a month or two... I wanted to focus on the
Sailor and the Navy itself. That is how I went to the
instructions and the standards in other areas. It
seems to be working.”

KODIAK Theme 3: Pride
The third major theme that emerged, albeit only from the CO and CMC, was
pride, meaning finding satisfaction in one’s accomplishments and having self-respect no
matter what one’s rank may be or what situation a person might find himself/herself in
(e.g., even a decommissioning situation).
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The CO and CMC on KODIAK expressed pride in their ship, as did the other
Triad members interviewed, but this Triad seemed to demonstrate more pride than the
previous two Triads (Table 19 records all of the Triad’s quotes). This may be due in part
to the fact that KODIAK was arguably more operational than either of the other two ships
in this study, immediately prior to decommissioning: KODIAK was the only non NRF
ship and the only ship to participate in the war in Iraq. The failure of the XO to mention
anything that could be cited as relating to the pride theme might be attributable to the
drowning-in-paperwork explanation that was offered by the XO and subsequently
recorded in my field notes.
Table 19. Maior theme of pride as used by USS KODIAK’ triad
Theme
Pride

CO
“You know, we were the only ones
to go to the Gulf and come back
without any problem [s]. She [the
KODIAK] went through all the
wickets, did everything we asked
her to do. [KODIAK] was the most
reliable o f the four.”32
“She [KODIAK] was the most
reliable and I think [ the]
Commodore...would agree with
that.”
“But some kids feel when they
have projects, this is my ship. /
mean the biggest boasting rights
about this; we did a deployment
without sustaining any major
casualties that prevented us from
doing our mission. That was a big
prize for a ship.”

XO
No mention of
this theme.

CMC
“We were all very proud to be
part o f this. ..endeavor to go free
Iraq, but in the back o f our
minds we were still being told
October 2003 is when w e’re
supposed to decomm...”
“It would be a personal
embarrassment [to allow sailors
to appear slovenly], not only to
m yself but to KODIAK and the
CO, and I wasn ’t going to let
that happen. So, basically we
haven’t been running ram shot
on the guys, but we have been
doing sea bag inspections. Guys
that are showing up looking like
crap in uniform, we break out
the sea bag inspection
checklist.”33

KODIAK deployed with three other ships to bring Marines to Iraq.
33
A sea bag inspection is when a superior, usually a Chief Petty Officer, ensures that a sailor has
every item that was issued to him or her at basic training. If the sailor does not have all o f these items he or
she is escorted to the uniform shop and must immediately acquire all of these items at their own expense. It
can be very expensive, sometimes costing hundreds of dollars depending on the completeness o f the sea
bag.
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Table 19. (cont’d)
Theme
Pride

CO
“Yeah. And w e’d come home
[from deployment] and like we are
the only ship [that did this
mission]. You know, [sailors
would say] where were you [when
we did that mission].. .that’s
bragging rights, I ’m off KODIAK,
you know. And everybody knows
that. So, it was everybody [the
other three ships in company] was
having problems on the transit over
and here’s KODIAK. We were
just steaming along smartly and
doing our thing. Everybody was
like, yeah! So, when something
would come up, [our superiors
would say] oh, let’s send
KODIAK. Yeah, it’s good. That’s
a good feeling."

XO

CMC
“I think for a year straight, every
time I put my anchors on the hair
stood up on the back o f my neck
because I was so proud of
m yself and being part o f that
organization [being a Chief Petty
Officer], and over time things
slid.”
“Becoming Command Master
Chief and getting my ship kind
o f brought some o f those same
feelings [the initial feelings of
pride that he felt when he
became a Chief] back again.”
“My c h ie fs mess took this crew
after only four months being
hom e...[we] turned around and
we went to war, and we were the
only amphib ...that didn’t break
down. All the way over and all
the way back. Yeah, we had a
few little glitches down the plant
[the engineering plant], but we
were always steaming, 24/7.”
“We were very proud o f that [the
fact that KODIAK did not break
down] and I am proud o f the fact
that our ch ie fs mess kept that
going. I have had guys staying
up 24/7 keeping this baby
steaming.”

KODIAK Theme 4: Emotions
The fourth major theme was emotions. This term will be used to describe the
comments made by the interviewees referring to the feelings (either theirs or those of
their crew) associated with the decommissioning process. Table 20 contains quotes from
all three Triad members regarding the emotions theme. The following quote from the CO
is very candid and reveals interesting insight about his future as well as the future of his
ship:
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It is also a personal realization that, hey, you’re not going to be in command
anymore, you’re just going to be a commander at large. I mean, here you were
responsible for so much and now it is all going away, and it’s hard.... When
somebody retires from the Navy, you know we have this big ceremony and we
wish them well, and we give them kudos and that type of thing. Here, this ship
that served her country for 34 years, we strip her, and we paint her, and we rig her
for tow, and then tow her to wherever, and then she just sits there.
My field notes indicated that the CO’s tone became melancholy and somewhat
distant during this part of the interview. The ceremony he referred to is a person’s
retirement ceremony. Another ceremony that he, because of circumstance, would not be
given an opportunity to participate in is the change of command ceremony. This is where
a CO passes the baton of command to a new CO. For KODIAK, and every other
decommissioning ship for that matter, the decommissioning ceremony serves as a
replacement for the change of command ceremony.
Table 20. Major theme of emotions as used bv USS KODIAK’ triad
Theme
Emotions

CO
“It always has been kind of
somber because the ship has
done so well.”
“It is also a personal
realization that, hey, you’re
not going to be in command
anymore, you’re just going to
be a commander at large. I
mean, here you were
responsible for so much and
now it is all going away, and
it’s hard.... When somebody
retires from the Navy, you
know we have this big
ceremony and we wish them
well, and we give them kudos
and that type o f thing. Here,
this ship who served her
country for 34 years, we strip
her, and we paint her, and we
rig her for tow, and then tow
her to wherever... and then
she just sits there.”

XO

CMC

“I mean you can see it. I
mean, you walk on the ship
and it is sad to see this
vibrant ship and you walk
on it now and you can hear
your footsteps it is so quiet.”

“Well, that’s the sad part.
My ch ie f s mess and I
really are a tight knit
group o f chiefs. We went
through some tough times
the first year or so and
this past year, since
CARAT and the war, we
have really gotten close
together. I mean w e’re
friends. Some o f us have
our attitudes with each
other, but we are all a
very tight knit group. We
work hard together, we
play hard together, and
we get together with our
families and I haven’t had
that feeling since I made
chief over a decade ago.
Having that feeling, being
part o f this c h ie fs mess,
and then slowly tearing
the ship apart has been
very depressing.”

“No one has really come
and said, you know, I ’m
disappointed or anything
like that, but you can tell it
in their faces and their
expressions. Guys have
asked... ‘I want to stay until
we decomm.’”
“I think if you leave it up to
them to get the job
accomplished and you really
don’t care how it gets
accomplished as long as its
safe and nobody gets hurt,
and it’s within all o f the
Navy legal parameters,
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Table 20. (cont’d)
Theme

CO

XO

CMC

Emotions

Responding to the comment:
“It kind o f seems like it is
almost an undignified end. ”
“Yeah, kinda, it kinda does,
and all the blood, sweat and
tears that have gone into her
and to see her like this, just
being stricken from the record,
it is kind o f a hard p ill to
swallow.”

they’re happy, cause they
are controlling their own
destiny then.”

“I work at keeping the
chiefs together. I call the
guys up on the weekends,
hey what are you doing. I
call them up if I’ve got
computer problems or a
car problem, or I just want
a piece o f advice.... I ju st
try staying close with
them because the decomm
process has split
everybody up. I mean,
w e’re all over the place
trying to take care o f a
thousand projects on a
daily basis.”

“You deal with as you would
any other event in your naval
career. It’s a part o f the job
and the orders have been given
and you say, ‘Aye, aye,’ and
you carry them out smartly
and then you look forward to
what lies beyond, like after
KODIAK. Sometimes it
doesn’t make a pill any
smaller, but sometimes it helps
make it easier to swallow.
You have a fondness fo r the
ship. I t’s ju st like you are
losing a friend. I am sorry to
see her go, and I understand
the reasons that she has to go,
so you carry on smartly, but
it’s been.. ..it has been a thrill.
Being commander of the
ship.. .is an experience that,
you know .. .unless you have
been there it is hard to
describe. I mean, we have
heard all the stuff o f command
at sea, but if you are actually
sitting in the chair it is a whole
new dynamic. It’s just things
that you wouldn’t even
imagine, they just come your
way. It’s fun. It’s fun and
you know the ship becomes a
part o f you. And like I said,
it’s like seeing a friend go
away.”

“Yea. It has been
depressing. I t’s sad. We
try to go to lunch
everyday as the c h ie fs
mess.”

KODIAK Theme 5: Rumors
The sixth theme that emerged, rumors, was also a major theme in the other Triad
interviews. Table 21 contains several quotes from the XO and CMC about their
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experiences with rumors during the decommissioning process. The failure of the CO to
comment on the rumors theme may be due to his above-the-fray leadership style.
An interesting event occurred on KODIAK that resulted in reducing the number
of rumors. For whatever reason, the authorities that decide what type of
decommissioning KODIAK was to proceed with were not forthcoming about the final
disposition of the ship. Would it be mothballed, sold to another country, or sunk?
Nobody was saying. Although the CO of KODIAK did not directly comment on the
rumors theme, the following quote from him describes an action that he took that, in
effect, greatly reduced a major source of rumors:
We [KODIAK’s decision makers] sat down and they said, “Okay, if we are to
meet a 1 October decomm date, what is the final day that I can be notified and
still accomplish that goal?” And we decided it was like the 20th or 21st August.
And we sent that to the higher ups saying, “Okay, if you don’t give us a decision
we are going to decommission the ship for cold turnover....” We felt, hey, you
need to let us know by this date so that we can plan one way or the other. If we
don’t hear from you we will decomm the ship and we will put her in a cold swap
condition.
The CO of KODIAK was understandably frustrated with this situation and he
developed two sets of timelines, one corresponding to a hot swap type of
decommissioning and the other timeline corresponding to a decommissioning ending in a
cold swap condition or mothballs. He then counted back from the decommissioning date
using both timelines and determined the earliest point of no return where the ship could
not deviate from the chosen plan without extending the decommissioning date. The CO
presented this information to his superiors. This in function almost certainly would have
been interpreted as an ultimatum. The CO’s intent was to force the decision makers to
provide direction to the ship. This plan evidently worked and the CO was provided the
direction he sought as to the type of decommissioning KODIAK should proceed with.
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This action resulted in greatly mitigating at least one source of rumors, i.e., rumors that
related to the fate of the ship after the decommissioning.
Another interesting handling of an incident on KODIAK also helped the Triad
control rumors. The XO reported that “the Captain, myself and a few key people knew
[about the postponement of a ship-wide inspection in August], but the crew did not know
about it until probably November or so.” This delay was intentional. In my field notes I
recorded that the XO indicated that the delay in promulgating the schedule change was
instituted, in part, to capitalize on the crew’s motivation preparing for the inspection. If
the Triad were to reveal that the major inspection had been rescheduled to a much later
date, the crew’s enthusiasm to repair equipment and clean the ship would greatly
diminish. The XO also indicated that there was a second purpose: to wait until the
information became more solid so as not to distribute information that was no longer
valid. This latter purpose, of course, was directly linked to one goal of minimizing
rumors. Basically, the triad made the best use of the situation to achieve the overall good
of the ship.
Table 21. Maior theme of rumors as used by USS KODIAK’ triad
Theme

CO

XO

CMC

Rumors

No mention
of this
theme

“A year ago when we were first... well, we
have been decommissioning for five years
now. I think that is the last cycle o f the rumor
about decommissioning.”

“Since last July timeframe
we have been on a roller
coaster ride. ‘You’re
decomming’ and ‘You’re
not decomming’, then
‘You’re decomming, yo u ’re
not decomming. ’ So, the
crew has been up and down

“Before I got here there were rumors the ship
was going to decomm, and the rumor was that
it was going to decomm in fiscal year ’05....
D uring the tim e th at I have been here that
changed to ’04 and then when in ’04 kept on
changing and now we are decommissioning
the first day o f fiscal year ’04.”

as far as apprehension.”

“We are going to war, when
are we going to come home.
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Table 21. (cont’d)
Theme

XO

CMC

“One message comes out and says the
following ships are decommissioning on a
date. Look for a message that has our name
on it. You won’t find one. “So, that is just
the decommissioning part. Let’s say April or
May we finally realize that we are going to
decomm October 1st. From then until now we
flipped-flopped. from being a hot swap...[to],
what you did on JOHN ADAMS.”

We [are] going to be gone
six months, eight months.
How much time will we
have to do a decomm and
get our families taken care
of, plus just try to get back
to a normal life?”

CO

Rumors

“We had to act like we were going to do a hot
swap even though there was no authorization,
and that authorization has to come from
Congress. So everybody was, [saying] ‘Man,
it ain ’t happening, ’ but nobody wanted to
make the decision to say do foreign military
sale, so everybody said, nope, just keep
everything up.... From the time we knew until
now, all we could do was what that kid [the
sailor mentioned in the Crawley article who
was not motivated] is complaining about:
paint, lag, clean.”

KODIAK Theme 6: Motivation
As with the JOHN ADAMS, the theme of motivation is defined as the will and
incentive, whether individually or as a group, to accomplish the defined mission of the
ship. Quotes from all three Triad members discussing motivation are contained in Table
22. An interesting dichotomy existed on KODIAK regarding the perceived motivation of
the crew. The CO and XO, on the one hand, did not believe there were any motivation
problems. On the other hand, the CMC spoke almost exclusively about sailors with
motivation problems and his methods of dealing with these problems. This stark contrast
in perspectives is evident in the following quotes: The XO said, “I don’t think there is a
lack of motivation”; the CMC, on the other hand, said, “It kind of seems hard to motivate
a bunch of guys to tear something apart, especially since we spend so much time trying to
build this command.”
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The data from the KODIAK Triad interviews contained numerous references to
motivational techniques used, but KODIAK’s CMC provided the most interesting-and
most concrete and candid-information on this theme. The motivational techniques
employed by the CMC may be viewed by some, especially those in the civilian sector, as
archaic and even Neanderthal. The two motivational techniques I will discuss are his
“back-to-basics” approach and the favoritism that he demonstrated towards good sailors.
(The latter may have actually de-motivated portions of the crew).
The back-to-basics theme could almost be discussed as a separate, major theme
but since the CMC was the only one to mention it and since it deals directly with
motivation, I included it in the motivation theme discussion. As seen in the following
quote, the CMC repeatedly mentioned how he returned to the basics (e.g., enforcing the
uniform regulations) to re-motivate sailors that he perceived needed such motivation.
I went back to the basics. I went back to the very basics and.. .1 run business like
that.. .there is nobody babysitting you like they did in boot camp.... So, because
of that, our guys were slipping. They’d go, “Hey, we’re going to war. Let us
grow our hair out.” The Captain said, “No way.” We were going to enforce [the
standard] and the Captain said, “We’re not going to deviate off that.” It’s a good
plan.
The second motivational technique that the CMC used involved favoritism
towards top performing sailors (i.e., getting their orders to their next command earlier
than others). The following series of quotes describe how the CMC worked to get orders
for sailors he perceived to be good performers and did not do the same for poor
performers. “There was only a handful of guys.. .the most outstanding junior sailors that
... I’d say ‘make this one guy available’ [to get orders to his/her next command].... It
opened up a can of worms.” The rest of the crew eventually found out about the CMC’s
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preferential treatment and the CMC had to justify his actions to the crew. The following
quote details the CMC’s justification of his actions:
I told them [the sailors who got orders early] not to say anything, but you know
word gets out or the orders came in.... But it was okay because these were
outstanding sailors. All I had to do was compare the complainer who was
substandard to this guy going don’t come crying to me.”
When asked if he thought this tact was a de-motivator the CMC replied:
I don’t know if it de-motivated the junior guys, it pissed them off, I’m sure. At a
minimum, I’d go, “Here’s the standard you guys should be striving for. If you
were like this guy [the good sailor] I’d pull a few strings for you too, but you’re
not.”
This quote is very much aligned with the CMC’s hard-core approach to leadership and
his no-nonsense demeanor that he demonstrated repeatedly during the interview.
Table 22. Major theme of motivation as used by USS KODIAK triad
Theme
Motivation

CO

XO

CMC

“I think the biggest
motivator
is...getting this
done. Getting the
job done. I think
that is the biggest
motivator.”

“I don’t think
there is a lack o f
motivation.”

“Quarters is for muster, instruction and
inspection.34 You know, they say that phrase
for a reason. There were times when my guys
would come out there and they would talk to
their people and they would turn around and
walk away. And I ’d watch a half dozen
sailors walk by me that had hair touching
their ears or down to their collars or their
uniforms looked like crap. I’d get the chief
and then I’d get a hold o f First Classes and I’d
say, look, we have quarters for a reason. My
philosophy has always been with standards, is
hold the sailor to the standard, and I began
with uniform regs. Uniform regs are one of
the very few instructions guidelines in the
Navy that you can’t dispute. If it’s not
written, you can’t do it. Every other
instruction is negotiable, interpretable. You
can kind o f read between the lines with every
other instruction, for the most part, but not
uniform regs.”

“Well a year ago
we were gearing up
to go to war.”
“It is funny. As
ironic as it is, war
in itself was a
motivator, because
... w e’re going to
do what we trained
for. You are
actually going to
do yourjob__
Okay, now this is
what that is all

‘T he guys are
more
disappointed
seeing the ship
go away. As fa r
as getting the jo b
done, I don’t
think that we
have any
problems.”
In response to
the question
what motivates
the crew now?:
“Going to a new
command, going
through school.”

“I went back to the basics. I went back to the

“Quarters” is the morning meeting where supervisors inspect their sailors, take attendance, and
give out daily tasking.
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Table 22. (cont’d)
Theme
Motivation

CO

XO

CMC

about. So, now
you are actually
going to get to put
into practice what
you go through all
the training and
inspections for.”

“I think that
guys were
looking forward
to a change....
this ship has
made three
deployments in
three years.”

very basics and.. .1 run business like that....
there is nobody babysitting you like they did in
boot camp.... So, because o f that our guys were
slipping. They’d go, ‘hey, w e’re going to war.
Let us grow our hair out.’ The Captain said, ‘No
way.’ We were going to enforce [the standard]
and the Captain said w e’re not going to deviate
off that. It’s a good plan.”

“I don’t think it
[a motivation
problem] has
existed here. I
mean, I may be
blind to it, but I
don’t think that
we have
motivation
problems.”

“Well, any good leader has to modify his style
incident to incident, scenario to scenario.... I
have done this my entire career and I have
always gone back to the basics o f uniform regs,
no matter what command I go to. Because I
always see that is the first thing that is lacking.
If that is lacking, if a guy can’t dress himself
properly, can’t show up on time for work, and
just keep a basic do as you are told. Those are
three simple things, show up on time with a
good uniform, do as you’re told, and anything
above that, that is great. That is the bare
minimum to be successful in the N avy.... I’m
kind of tough with that. I lead by example and I
expect the crew to follow that.”

‘T he motivation
of getting it done
and going on to
where they’re
going, you know.
And, that all boils
down to, (a) you
took care o f ‘em,
(b) you kept them
informed, and
(c)...the
leadership was
engaged and
caring about what
was going on,
[and give a] pat
on the back, ‘hey,
you guys are
doing a great job,
w e ’re almost
there.”’
“The motivational
reasons why the
kids are doing
stuff [has]
probably
changed, [from
preparing for war
to the
decommissioning]
Here, I think for
some it is, as I
say, the light at
the end o f the
tunnel. I think
some o f it is the
excitement of
doing something
that we have
never done
before.... So just
going through the
decomm process
because it is

[Describing a sailor’s poor attitude] “W e’re
going to rip everything out o f the ship, and ‘who
cares if it’s dirty ? ’ ‘Who cares if 1 look like
crap in uniform?’ ‘Who cares if my hair is
long?’ “Who cares if I don ’t show up on timeV
Hell, the first day after leave when we came
back from the war, I must have had 30 guys
show up late. I sat up on the flight deck and
watched all these guys come cruising in
anywhere from 5 minutes to a half hour late.
Any excuse was, ‘Well, there was traffic.’ ‘We
weren’t expecting the traffic.’ ‘Oh, there was
this, there was that.’ The standard was already
starting to slip. They had been out on leave,
hanging out at home. They started to
demilitarize themselves, I guess, and they come
back thinking, ‘Hey, w e ’re decomming, w e ’re
ju st going to cruise and ju st kind o f do whatever
we want.’ We had to nip that right in the bud.
So right off the bat, I got the chiefs together and
we had a long talk about the standard that we
would not allow it to slip onboard KODIAK.”
‘The things that affected me the most...when
you go to war. We weren’t shooting anybody,
but we still had the same time o f building,
camaraderie that you would get in the field. The
things that affected me the m ost...when you go
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Table 22. (cont’d)
Theme

CO

Motivation

another, if you
will, old salt
thing. ‘Well, you
know
I’ve decommed a
ship. I know what
goes on.’”
“The kids feel the
same as I do.
They love the
ship and it’s their
job and they
enjoy working on
her, and they want
to see her go out
with the dignity
that she deserves
to go out with.
Having said that, I
think that plays a
lot into how these
kids are
motivated.”
“I have not seen
any downturn in
the kids. The
focus has
changed, but I
have not seen any,
you know, kids
walking around
saying ‘this
sucks’. ..”

XO

CMC
to war. We weren’t shooting anybody, but we
still had the same time o f building, camaraderie
that you would get in the field.”
“Liberty has always been about the only thing
that motivates the majority o f today’s younger
sailors. Getting that guaranteed paycheck every
two weeks whether you do 40 hours o f work or
100 hours o f work. Each sailor’s personal
motivation is different than another, but for the
most part the younger guys, they just like to
come in and collect a paycheck and would much
rather be on the beach or be at home. So it [the
decommissioning] really hasn’t changed
motivation. It just becomes more apparent now
since we are not in an operational mode and
things are so quiet, and I am ju st more aware o f
how many guys are really liberty hounds.”
‘There was only a handful o f guys that were ...
the most outstanding junior sailors th at... I’d
say make this one guy available [to get orders to
his/her next command].... It opened up a can o f
worms.”
“I told them [the sailors who got orders early]
not to say anything, but you know word gets out
or the orders came in .... But it was okay because
these were outstanding sailors. All I had to do
was compare the complainer who was
substandard to this guy going don’t come crying
to me.”
“/ don’t know if it de-motivated the junior guys,
it pissed them off, I ’m sure. At a minimum, I’d
go, here’s the standard you guys should be
striving for. If you were like this guy [the good
sailor] I’d pull a few strings for you too, but
you’re not, so it kind o f goes back to that
standard. H ey...you [have] got a big mouth and
now you are going to come crying to me about
why you haven’t been opened up for [allowed to
receive] orders.”
“It kind o f seems hard to motivate a bunch o f
guys to tear something apart, especially since
we spend so much time trying to build this
command.”
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Summary
As was the case with VALDES, the CO and the XO on KODIAK were aligned in
their perceptions about most of the major themes. The CMC had a different perspective
on some of the themes that sometimes was at variance with that of his superiors.
Specifically, when analyzing the Triad’s perceptions of the crew, an interesting
dichotomy exists between the CO and XO on the one hand, and the CMC on the other.
The CO and XO did not report any morale or motivation problems in the ranks while it
seemed that the CMC dealt with this issue very frequently. Either the CO and XO were
not aware of the issues that the CMC mentioned, or they chose not to share that
information during the interview. As seen during the analysis of the VALDES data’s
theme of regret, this may be due to the CO and XO’s desire to project only a positive
image of their ship to outsiders.
Another point that should be addressed is the CMC’s consistent referral to basic
naval regulations throughout the interview. One might deduce that the CMC associated
the basic uniform regulations with the duty of decommissioning the ship. The idea of
wearing a uniform and maintaining military grooming standards is sometimes difficult
for sailors to get used when they are new to the Navy. The idea of decommissioning a
ship is also difficult to get used to but, like adherence to uniform standards, it has to be
done.
The CO used the term “kids” to refer to the crew twelve times in the transcribed
interview data. Although he was referring to all of his sailors, many of whom were
undoubtedly older than him, it could be inferred that he felt like a father figure to them.
The traditional father figure on a Navy ship is often the CMC. This is because the CMC
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is enlisted; he/she is generally older than most of the crewmembers, and it is the CMC’s
duty to look out for the best interests of the crew. Perhaps the stem personality of the
CMC on KODIAK caused a shift of the father figure role from the CMC to the CO.
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CHAPTER 7: CROSS CASE ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY
Introduction
In the last three chapters I have presented each Triad’s data on a case-by-case
basis. In this chapter I will step back and examine the larger picture of all Triad data
collectively. The first section of this chapter will analyze connections, similarities, and
differences between the major themes common to more than one ship. The second
section, will analyze the major themes that emerged from only one ship in the study, and
the possible reasons for this phenomenon. Finally, I will discuss possible future uses of
the study and implications for further research. Table 23 shows all of the major themes
that emerged in this study and which triad members from each ship brought them up.
This table will be used as a baseline to begin the discussion.
Table 23. Cross-case analysis of triad input to maior themes
Theme
Operational vs. Non
Operational &
Related Themes
Focus
Pride
Emotions
Rumors
Motivation
Denial
Recapitalization
Upbeat/Positive
Attitude
Buy-in
Regret

VALDES
CO, XO, CMC

JOHN ADAMS
CO, XO, CSC

KODIAK
CO,XO

CO, XO, CMC
CO,XO
CO, XO, CMC
CMC

CO, CSC
CO, XO, CSC
CO, XO, CSC
CO, XO, CSC
CO, XO, CSC
CO, CSC

CMC
CO, CMC
CO, XO, CMC
XO, CMC
CO, XO, CMC

CO, XO
CO,XO
CO, XO, CMC
CMC
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Major Themes Common to More Than One Ship
Operational vs. Non-Operational, Creating a Meaningful Mission, and the Illusion o f
Being Operational
This section will discuss three major themes that are very similar but address the
concept of the ship’s operational mission in slightly different ways (i.e., VALDES:
Operational vs. Non-operational', JOHN ADAMS: In Search o f a Meaningful Mission',
and KODIAK: The Illusion o f Being Operational). In describing the operational mission
concept, only the VALDES’ Triad consistently used the terms operational and nonoperational. Regardless, the basic tenants of this theme for all of the Triads are
essentially the same: their ships were at one time engaged in the sorts of activities that
were the center of naval life (in naval practice they were operational) and at some point in
the decommissioning process they crossed a line and began engaging in activities that
were perceived to be less critical (i.e., they became non-operational). The Triad members
used different terminology to describe this phenomenon and they used different methods
to deal with the awareness that they were no longer in essence, operational.
As I alluded to earlier, the VALDES Triad made the most explicit contrast
between being operational and being non-operational, in part because the Triad members
used the Navy’s operational/non-operational language. This greater emphasis can
probably be attributed to the CO’s strong desire, and possible wishful thinking, that his
ship would not be decommissioned and that it might be an active participant in the Gulf
War.
In Chapter 5, JOHN ADAMS’ major theme creating a meaningful mission about
the operational status, is so named because that is exactly what the Triad members were
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trying to do. They tried to inject some semblance of meaning into the “mission” they had
yet to complete. From a Navy perspective, this decommissioning mission was relatively
insignificant. By purposely shortening the final stages of the decommissioning timeline,
the Triad created meaning and significance by intensifying the pressure to get done what
had to be done. This artificial deadline came complete with two very tangible rewards:
spending more time with loved ones before reporting to the next assignment, and
bragging rights about the speed and efficiency of their decommissioning.
As mentioned in Chapter 6, KODIAK was the most operational ship of the three
in the study prior to the start of the decommissioning process and the transition from
operational to non-operational status took place in the shortest amount of time, without
any conscious manipulation of the timeline. This is partly due to the manner in which
KODIAK was decommissioned. KODIAK was left in San Diego to be towed to her final
destination without any crewmembers on it. This had some positive effects: The crew
had less time to dwell on the fate of the ship and was probably much busier than the other
two ships albeit for a shorter period of time; also the leaders did not have to deal with
transporting crew members back to the homeport. On the KODIAK, the CO maintained
the “at sea” routine that his crew had become accustomed to even after the ship had
returned to port from her final voyage. Retaining this more rigorous schedule is very
unusual, but it had two advantages: First, the working hours were longer; therefore more
work could be accomplished in the compressed timeline KODIAK had been given.
Second, presumably a portion of the “at sea” mindset was retained by the crew, creating
an illusion of a mission and the perpetuation-at least for a brief period-of the motivation
that accompanies being operational.
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One final thought about the concept of operational mission. The three ships in the
study differed somewhat in their operational status in their final days. VALDES and
JOHN ADAMS had to be steamed from San Diego, CA to their final resting place in
Bremerton, WA before beginning the last phase of the decommissioning. During the
final transit, both JOHN ADAMS and VALDES were considered somewhat operational
since they were still, in fact, underway. However, at closer examination, they were not
really capable of performing in any operational capacity. (This was more true for JOHN
ADAMS than it was for VALDES.) Conversely, once KODIAK pulled into San Diego
for the last time, the debilitating final steps of the decommissioning began. These steps
included rigging the ship to be towed and laying up all of her engineering gear making it
impossible to operate the ship without going through a detailed process of recommissioning.
Focus
A theme that was discussed by at least one Triad member from each ship was the
idea of focus. This term emerged numerous times as Triad members referring to the
different missions that the crew was required to participate in. The focus was usually
being directed toward a mission or goal and away from the aspects of the
decommissioning that might cause the crew to be less productive. At a certain point,
after the Triad members realized that there was no turning back, the focus was directed to
the decommissioning and that became the mission. For instance, on each of the ship’s
last deployments, the focus was directed to the threat and the mission at hand, not to the
upcoming events associated with the decommissioning (i.e., moving families and
preparing for the next assignment). This was difficult because all of the ships had to
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conduct the preliminary negotiations for their crewmembers’ next assignments while they
were deployed.
An observation about the type of personalities that are associated with Navy
leadership positions might be useful when examining the major theme o f focus. At a
recent transition seminar for senior military officers, the facilitator indicated that when
using the Meyers-Briggs personality assessment most officers place themselves in the T
(Thinking) and J (Judgment) categories (Ruehlin, 2004, p. 28). This means, among other
things, that they are objective and come to closure quickly. This may help explain the
frequent mention of the idea of focus by the senior leadership on the three ships. Since
they presumably have a predilection to closure, they may believe that focusing on the
objectives will not only achieve this goal but also keep the attention away from more
distracting ideas, such as the sadness associated with a decommissioning and the lack of
motivation that may ensue.
Pride
Triad members from each ship expressed views that their ship was very successful
in general and with the decommissioning process in particular. The leaders on a ship are
not only expected to view their ship as a success, but it would be unusual if they did not.
After all, the leaders are ultimately responsible for the success or failure of their ships and
even if they recognize its faults, they are not likely to reveal those in a taped interview
(and possibly not even to the members completely).
An interesting data point emerged regarding the pride theme when comparing
what VALDES and KODIAK Triad members reported about the timeline for final
crewmember departures. On the one hand, VALDES sailors, who formally requested to
leave early, were prevented from doing so by the chain of command. (This led to the
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emergence of the regret theme from the VALDES CMC.) On the other hand, KODIAK
sailors, whose normal departure date was prior to the decommissioning, volunteered to
stay until the very end of the ship’s life. This was reportedly because the crewmembers
wanted to ensure KODIAK was taken care of and that the process was handled in a
dignified manner. Pride was most definitely a motivator for these KODIAK sailors who
requested extensions. This may not mean that VALDES sailors did not have the same
amount of pride; their pride, however was not displayed in the same fashion as pride was
displayed on KODIAK.
Emotions
Decommissioning a ship can be an emotional experience and the data suggest that
people on each of the ships reacted emotionally to the decommissioning process. Indeed
the emotions theme was the only one that every Triad member commented on. Though
everyone commented on the emotions stirred by the decommissioning process, the
emotions they described varied. The responses ranged from the unexpected giddiness
described by the CO of JOHN ADAMS to the dour and somber reflections of KODIAK’s
CO. The latter sort of emotional response was more the norm and what one would expect
to have reported during the decommissioning process. Other terms that Triad members
used to describe their emotional response were “excited,” “sad,” “depressing,” “sullen,”
“melancholy,” “subdued,” “quiet,” “disappointing,” “missing,” “hard,” “closure,”
“abysmal,” and “death.”
Rumors
A common theme among all three ships was the uncertainty surrounding the
actual decommissioning date. This, in turn, generated rumors that affected all three
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ships. Interestingly, even though rumors were present on each of the ships, among the
ranks, and off the ship in the various supervisory organizations, not all Triad members
reported this theme. The two primary rumors on VALDES and JOHN ADAMS involved
the actual decommissioning date and whether the ship would be sunk after the
decommissioning. The former was caused, in part by the timing of the
decommissionings; VALDES and JOHN ADAMS were scheduled to be decommissioned
before the Gulf War. In previous wars ships have been brought out of mothballs to
support the war effort.35 It is a logical line of thinking that during wartime the
decommissioning of all assets would be frozen. For whatever reason this was not the
case during our nation’s most recent war.
KODIAK was not scheduled to be decommissioned until after the war so she
could transport Marines during the early stages of the conflict. Consequently, there was
no ambiguity about whether the decommissioning would go forward. On KODIAK the
main rumor involved the type of decommissioning to be conducted. One of the reasons
for the rumors is that the people on the ships have no control over any of these factors
and speculation provides some comfort. Every Triad member who brought this theme up
revealed that a degree of uncertainty about some facet of the process existed right up to
the actual decommissioning day. This caused the rumors and misinformation to spread
and for the crew to speculate as to the actual fate of the ship and the crew. This seemed
to be one of the primary factors associated with the creation of uncertainty and anxiety in
the crews. Not knowing when you would be required to move and how long would you
have to prepare yourself and your family for this move caused significant stress for the
35
Battleships were brought out o f mothballs to support the Vietnam Conflict and numerous cargo
ships had to be brought out o f mothballs to transport equipment to the Persian Gulf during the 1991 Gulf
War.
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sailors. On two of the ships the crews developed very skeptical attitudes about their
ship’s decommissioning date and they subsequently became somewhat cynical. Not
surprisingly, rumors were rampant in this sort of environment.
Motivation
Motivation is central to the thesis of this dissertation. In fact, the primary
challenge that naval leaders face during the decommissioning process involves
motivation; their own, and that of their crews. Both the COs of KODIAK and JOHN
ADAMS had similar views of what motivated their respective crews during the final days
of their ship’s lives. KODIAK’s CO said, “I think the biggest motivator is.. .getting this
done. Getting the job done. I think that is the biggest motivator.” The CO of JOHN
ADAMS said, “I think people are motivated to finish on time.” The crews of these two
ships were arguably busier than the crew of VALDES during the final days (KODIAK
because of the schedule imposed on her, and JOHN ADAMS because of the schedule the
CO requested).
Major Themes That Emerged from Only One Ship
Interestingly, the data from VALDES produced the vast majority (four of the five
themes) of themes that emerged from only one ship, the topic of this section. Possibly
this was because the CO and XO on VALDES consciously developed a strategy to deal
with the decommissioning. At any rate, they were the only ones to make the sorts of
comments that fit comfortably under the recapitalization and upbeat/positive attitude
themes, and they, along with the VALDES’ CMC, said things that could be coded as buyin. The major theme of regret was commented on by only one person from one ship-the
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VALDES’ CMC. For the remainder of this section, I will speculate as to why each of the
themes was not mentioned by more than one Triad.
Denial
Two members of the JOHN ADAMS Triad, the CO and the CSC, were the only
ones who commented on the denial theme. It is noteworthy that the denial they were
talking about was not their own, but rather that of the crewmembers. This may be due to
the nature of denial-even if they were experiencing it, they may not have been aware of
it, and, if they were aware of it, they probably would not have wanted to admit it.
The CO of VALDES may have been experiencing denial based on the rumors
surrounding his apparent belief that his ship might not decommission but would be
reassigned to participate in the imminent war. His actions to keep VALDES operational
for as long as possible certainly support this idea, but there really are no direct comments
on his denial from the interview data. This being said, the CO of JOHN ADAMS
references the differences between his approach and the VALDES’ approach to the
decommissioning. His comment alludes to the VALDES (i.e., the CO) being in denial:
“In contrast to the VALDES that took the attitude that ‘Hey we might get called back to
active service and still live as a ship’...”
During the decommissioning process I had many conversations with the other
JOHN ADAMS’ Triad members about the VALDES and the choices that their leadership
had made regarding readiness. I remember standing on the bridge wing with the CO and
CSC looking across the pier at the VALDES moored next to us. We discussed why
certain pieces of gear that had been removed from our ship had not yet been removed
from VALDES, especially since she was decommissioning a month earlier than us. We
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concluded that the CO of VALDES was experiencing a form of denial and this denial had
manifested itself in such a way that it had slowed the pace of his ship’s decommissioning
process. Again, however, the CO of the VALDES said nothing that would support the
denial hypothesis.
Recapitalization
Although the recapitalization concept was only brought up, by name, by the CO
and XO of VALDES, it is a concept that applied to all three ships in the study and all
decommissioning ships in the Navy, for that matter. It is, after all, the primary reason for
decommissioning. Despite this fact, KODIAK’s Triad did not comment on this theme at
all, and JOHN ADAMS’ CO only spoke of this theme to sailors at the smoking area but
did not bring it up during the interview. As mentioned earlier, it almost seems that the
VALDES CO and XO had a rehearsed explanation as to why their ship was
decommissioning. If this was true, it was an excellent method for projecting a consistent
message from the chain of command, but it may have sounded artificial if it was repeated
too many times. The Triads on KODIAK and JOHN ADAMS did not appear to have
such uniformity in their message about why their ships were decommissioning.
Upbeat/Positive Attitude
The upbeat/positive attitude theme was primarily mentioned by the XO on
VALDES and it seemed to be a method by which he kept himself motivated. The XO
indicated that he had to remind himself to be upbeat; in fact, it was one of the things he
did prior to addressing his subordinates every morning. Because the upbeat/positive
attitude theme was also mentioned by the CO on VALDES, but by no other interviewees,
it may have been part of a conscious shared strategy to deal with the decommissioning
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process. Both the upbeat!positive attitude theme and the recapitalization theme were
unique to the same two individuals.
Buy-in
The buy-in theme is another idea that was only mentioned by one Triad, but it is
something that was undoubtedly present on all three ships. In fact, most Triad members
will attempt to get buy-in from the crew whenever they have a major, ship-wide task to
accomplish. The CO needs to “spin” the situation in such a way that there is a positive
aspect and that the positive aspect is predominant. A very common example of this
would be when a ship is supposed to return to port on a given day and then receives
additional tasking keeping her out to sea longer. The entire crew, including the CO,
would be disappointed, but it is the CO’s duty to maintain morale at the highest level
possible. He or she would need to convince the crew (get buy-in) that the reason for
staying out to sea longer is better than going into port. This is a tough sell but many COs
are very successful.
Regret
The CMC on VALDES was the only Triad member to comment on the regret
theme. This was due to an internal issue with his chain of command where the decisions
made by the CO, and enforced by the XO, did not allow some crewmembers to leave the
ship early. The other interviewees probably had regrets about certain aspects of the
decommissioning process and their tours of duty on their respective ships for that matter,
but it was evidently not enough to mention in the taped interviews. The frequency with
which VALDES’ CMC mentioned this theme indicated that he still had a deep-rooted
regret about they way the crew had been treated in the final days of the ship’s life. The
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CMC’s comments about his regret seemed to be a glimpse, albeit a brief one, through the
veneer that was normally presented to outsiders. When comparing the VALDES CMC’s
comments with those of KODIAK’s CMC, the data shows that KODIAK’s CMC had
many more of these candid moments, in fact, during most of his interview the KODIAK
CMC did not seem concerned about how his frank responses might be perceived. The
one area that one would think he might have regretted was the way he handled the
assignment of orders to sailors. He gave special treatment to certain sailors who he
perceived as being top performers, and those that were poor performers were not allowed
to apply for their next assignments until much later. The CMC admits that his actions
“pissed them o ff’ but there is no indication that he regretted doing this. In any case,
KODIAK’s CMC did not report any other regrets during the interview. Based on the
image he projected during the interview, and the general impression he made on me, the
CMC seemed like the type of person who does not admit to regrets very often.
Implications fo r Policy and Practice
In the development of new Navy decommissioning policies, many factors come
into play but the fiscal requirements and the mission requirements seem to be especially
significant. The fiscal requirements of the Navy involve the cost to maintain older ships,
and the coast to upgrade the capabilities of those ships to counter current world threats.
The mission requirements are requirements to fulfill the various missions as demanded by
the current world situation (e.g., a certain number of ships are required in a certain theater
of war to ensure success). Truver (2004) discusses the current effort to decommission the
first five Aegis cruisers; it reinforces the idea that fiscal belt tightening is the primary
factor that plays into the creation of the decommissioning policies:
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Greater manning requirements [on the older ships] contribute to annual operating
and support costs of about $60 million for each ship and totaling nearly $1.8
billion across the Fiscal Year 2005 Future Years Defense Plan. With a growing
need to focus increasingly scarce resources on tomorrow's fleet and modernizing
"legacy assets" only when it makes best business sense to do so, the Navy expects
the cost-avoidance generated by decommissioning these five ships and not
attempting a "cruiser conversion" program (in all, more than $3 billion) will help
offset the cost of recapitalizing the force and constructing the Navy's nextgeneration surface warships, (p. 28)
Based on the data that were generated in this study, other factors could be
incorporated into the development of the decommissioning process to make the final
outcome more beneficial for all parties, especially the personnel who are tasked with
conducting the actual decommissioning. The first policy modification would be the
shortening of the timeline from the operational phase to the non-operational phase. The
data from the JOHN ADAMS and KODIAK showed that both ships experienced
accelerated decommissioning schedules (JOHN ADAMS by request and KODIAK by
direction). This seems to have kept the crews busier, and it gave them an additional,
albeit final, goal to achieve. In the case of JOHN ADAMS, the CO requested the
shortening of the stay in Bremerton for this very reason.
Ideally, a ship would return from deployment (the most operational phase),
conduct a stand down period (one month long, to allow sailors to take leave to reunite
with loved ones), and then commence an accelerated decommissioning process of about
two months. The process can be completed in this three-month span if all parties, both on
an off the ship, focus on the final mission. Any longer than the three months in the nonoperational condition, provides opportunity for the crew to dwell on the negative aspects
of that phase and crew motivation can be adversely affected. This three-month
decommissioning policy would provide the Navy with an operational (mission capable)
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ship for a longer period of time, and it would mitigate any negative effects that the
decommissioning process has on crewmembers.
A second policy change that would positively contribute to the decommissioning
process would be the establishment of, and adherence to, an official notification timeline.
This refers to the definitive direction from the chain of command for a ship to
decommission on a certain date, the type of decommissioning to proceed with, and where
the process is to take place. Although an official notification process already exists, all
three ships in the study had problems obtaining this information. In fact, the KODIAK
XO reported that his ship never received an official notification message to
decommission his ship. Had the existing notification policy been adhered to during the
ship decommissionings in this study, the number of rumors that were generated would
have been vastly reduced. Many organizations Navy-wide use the official
decommissioning message to change the way they deal with a ship that has been slated
for decommissioning. For instance, the Navy organization that directs sailors to report to
a ship to replace those who are leaving needs an official decommissioning message to
stop the flow of personnel to that ship. Evidently, on KODIAK, enough phone calls and
e-mails from the XO stopped the flow of new personnel and rectified any other situations
created by the lack of an official notification message. This ad hoc approach is hardly
ideal, however.
The previously discussed policy changes would need to be agreed upon and
enacted by organizations well above the shipboard level. The likelihood of this actually
happening is slight, due to the dynamic nature of world events and the flexible nature of
fleet schedules. For instance, the requirement to train the deploying forces necessitates
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Opposition Forces (OPFOR) to make the series of training scenarios as realistic as
possible (both VALDES and JOHN ADAMS served as OPFOR during their
decommissioning processes). The timelines for deployments change with world events
and consequently, the need for OPFOR changes with them.
Since the previously discussed policy changes may or may not be implemented, it
is important to provide shipboard leadership practices that can be instituted by the leaders
on decommissioning ships themselves because they will have a vested interest in
improving their own decommissioning processes. As was seen from the analysis of the
three ships in this study, no two decommissionings are alike; however, the concerns of
the crew, the feelings that one might experience, and morale issues are essentially the
same for every decommissioning ship. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 detailed numerous practices
of naval leaders that could be considered beneficial, and some not so beneficial, to
completing the final decommissioning mission. I have extracted three shipboard
leadership practices from the previous chapters that future Triad members can employ to
assist them through their decommissioning processes.
The first shipboard leadership practice that could improve the decommissioning
process is to maintain clear, consistent, and frequent communication from the Triad about
the decommissioning. As mentioned earlier, the Triad on VALDES seemed to do this
well, as discussed in the sections dealing with the recapitalization, up-beat/positive
attitude, and buy-in themes. The use of the 1MC, the Plan of the Day, discussions at
officer and chief meetings, and even informal explanations offered at the smoking break
should be used to get this message out. This will keep the crew informed and help to
reduce the rumors that can become rampant.
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The second shipboard leadership practice is to create a reward system within the
decommissioning process. The Navy is replete with reward systems that tap into the
motivation and pride that is instilled into sailors and officers when they first enter the
service. A reward system that is specifically tied to the decommissioning process would
be potentially valuable. The JOHN ADAMS’ Triad used the “carrot” of more time at
home with loved ones to expedite the final days of the decommissioning process. The
KODIAK CMC used the performance of sailors as a means to determine who got to
apply for their next assignment first. Although I do not agree with the way the CMC
executed this idea, if modified somewhat, it may have merit. (The CMC seemed to use
giving priorities for new assignments as a punishment rather than a reward.) There are
not too many motivators with more influence than the sailor’s livelihood (i.e., where
he/she will be stationed next). Suggested modifications would be to publicize the criteria
to be eligible to apply for orders early, and somehow tie this to a level of contributions
toward the decommissioning process. For instance, if everyone on the ship is required to
have all of their assigned spaces painted and prepped as part of the decommissioning
process, as soon as those tasks are completed, everyone in the department or division
responsible is eligible to apply for orders early. This example is very simplistic and some
might disagree with the concept, but if this principle was enacted correctly and equitably,
the decommissioning process could be expedited and the sailors would have a viable goal
with a tangible reward.
A third shipboard leadership practice is to acknowledge the decommissioning
(i.e., check yourself for traces of denial) and allow adequate time for the expression of
emotions. I believe that acknowledgement of emotions throughout the decommissioning
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process might reduce the amount of denial that crewmembers experience and it may
allow the focus of emotions (whether the emotions are sadness or excitement) toward the
completion of the decommissioning. Surely the decommissioning ceremony provides
this in some respects but other, more informal events might provide a better forum. The
CMC on KODIAK seemed to do this well with his description of the many informal gettogethers that he and his fellow chiefs had in the final days of the ship. He explained
how they were able to experience closure, something that is required for many on
decommissioning ships.
Implications fo r Further Research
Those interested in further study of how naval leaders face the challenges of a
decommissioning process could explore several areas. The first might be by conducting a
replication study that would incorporate the use of triangulation. If conducted within the
strict requirements that the Navy and the Institutional Review Board demand, it may be
possible to construct a qualitative/quantitative study that would provide the opportunity
for triangulation. One way to achieve this might be to construct an anonymous survey to
be given to a representative sample of the officers and crew. The purpose of the survey
would be to validate the perceptions of the Triad members as reported in taped interviews
similar to the ones conducted for this study.
A second avenue of further study could be to construct a study designed to
compare and contrast two different types of decommissionings. For instance, the study
ships could consist of two ships that were being transferring to the inactive fleet and two
ships being sold to foreign navies. In this way, the differences between those two very
different types of decommissionings could be explored. The latter type of
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decommissioning involves a period of time when representatives from both the U.S.
Navy crew and the purchasing country’s naval crew navy are living onboard together
training and transferring each specific piece of gear and space. One can speculate that the
emerging themes on during this type of decommissioning might include reluctance to
give away the ship and resentment toward the other navy (toward the foreign navy for
taking away their ship, and toward the U.S. Navy for not being as cooperative as they
could be).
In a follow-on study the researcher should consider expanding the scope of the
study to include approximately 15-20 ships. A study involving this many ships would, no
doubt, extend the timeframe of the study over several years but the potential information
gleaned could be invaluable to naval leaders.
The information contained in this study can be used in the same fashion as the
Navy’s Lessons Learned messages discussed in Chapter 2, only, instead of concentrating
on procedural issues about the mechanics of decommissioning, like the Lessons Learned
messages, it can provide insight about the methods and techniques naval leaders need
during their decommissioning processes, and the successes and mistakes of nine naval
leaders as they dealt with various leadership challenges. My hope is that future leaders
tasked with decommissioning their ships can avoid, or at least mitigate, some of the
challenges discussed in this study.
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APPENDIX A
Ship Decommissioning Lessons Learned Message
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DECOMMISSIONING LESSONS LEARNED MESSAGE36
ROUTINE
R 000000Z APR 03 PSN 00000000
FM USS VALDES
TO COMDESRON ZERO ZERO
USS JOHN ADAMS
INFO COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA
UNCLAS //N03200//
MSGID/GENADMIN/VALDES//
SUBJ/USS VALDES DECOMMISSIONING LESSONS LEARNED//
REF/A/DOC/NISMO/17NO V02//
REF/B/RMG/VALDES/000000ZJ AN03//
REF/C/RMG/CNSP/00000NOV02//
REF/D/RMG/CNSP/000000NOV02//
NARR/REF A IS USS SHIP INACTIVATION PLAN. REF B IS STABILITY
WAIVER REQUEST. REFS C AND D ARE TWO PART SHIP SUPPLY
DEPARTMENT DECOMMISSIONING PROCEDURES.//
RMKS/1. THE FOLLOWING USS SHIP DECOMMISSIONING LESSONS
LEARNED ARE SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF FUTURE READY RESERVE
"SAILAWAY" SHIP DECOMMISSIONINGS:
A) ENGINEERING
1. A. ITEM: FIRE MAIN
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: AS EQUIPMENT IS SECURED AND
COOLING WATER TAGGED OUT, FIRE MAIN PRESSURE INCREASES
SIGNIFICANTLY. SHIP HAD ONLY 1 FIRE PUMP ONLINE AND REGISTERED
150 PSI WITH A 1.5 INCH OVERBOARD FROM THE PIER FIRE TREE
CONNECTION FULLY OPEN. NORMALLY, 1 FIRE PUMP WOULD PROVIDE
ABOUT 120 PSI. AS A RESULT, EXCESS FIRE MAIN PRESSURE WAS
DIVERTED OVER THE SIDE TO MAINTAIN PROPER SYSTEM PRESSURE.
C. RECOMMENDATION: THE KEY TO SHUTTING DOWN ALL SYSTEMS IS
FIRE MAIN. THE RECOMMENDED SEQUENCE TO SHUTTING DOWN FIRE
MAIN IS AS FOLLOWS:
1) CLOSE OUT BERTHING SPACES
2) PUMP CHT SYSTEM DRY
3) PUMP FUEL TANKS DRY
4) TAKE DOWN A/C'S
5) TAKE DOWN POTABLE WATER SYSTEM
6) TAKE DOWN FIRE MAIN SYSTEM
FIRE MAIN IS USED TO FLUSH THE CHT TANK AND THE MAJORITY OF THE
FIRE MAIN CAN BE DRAINED THROUGH THE CHT SYSTEM TO THE PIER

This message has been modified to remove any references to the actual names o f ships, people, and other
information in an attempt to maintain a degree o f confidentiality.
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RATHER THAN THE BILGES. THIS WILL SAVE BILGE PUMPING TIME AT THE
SHIP'S STORAGE SITE.
2. A. ITEM: DEFUELING
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: SHIP EXPERIENCED INITIAL DIFFICULTY
IN DEFUELING IN BREMERTON BECAUSE THE INSTALLED FUEL TRANSFER
SYSTEM TAKES TOO LONG TO ACHIEVE A SUCTION AND SUFFICIENT
DISCHARGE HEAD PRESSURE TO MAKE IT TO THE 02 LEVEL DISCHARGE
PIPING.
C. RECOMMENDATION: REQUEST PNEUMATIC PUMPS AND HOSES/AIR
FITTINGS, MANIFOLD AND AIR HOSES TO USE FOR DEFUELING IN
BREMERTON. IF THE FUEL BARGE IS ON THE PORT SIDE OF THE SHIP, OPEN
THE FUEL OIL SERVICE TANK TOP FOR 5-204-2-F AND DROP THE PUMP
HOSES (SHIP USED TWO. ANY MORE AND THE DRAIN ON THE AIR SYSTEM
IS GREATER THAN THE ACHIEVED PUMPING RATE AND BECOMES A
HINDRANCE TO OVERALL DEFUELING RATE). TRANSFER ALL FUEL
INTERNALLY FROM ALL TANKS TO THE SERVICE TANK VIA THE
PURIFICATION SYSTEM AND OFF THE SHIP. IF THE BARGE IS STBD SIDE TO,
USE 5-204-1-F IN THE SAME MANNER.
3. A. ITEM: BATTLE LANTERNS
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: BECAUSE THE SPACE CLOSEOUT
INSPECTOR NEEDS TO VERIFY THAT ALL BATTLE LANTERN BATTERIES
ARE REMOVED, THIS CAN BE A PROCESS THAT TAKES A LONG TIME AS
LANTERN BULB PLATES ARE UNSCREWED TO INSPECT THE LANTERN'S
INTERIOR CAVITY.
C. RECOMMENDATION: THE INSPECTION PROCESS IS EASIER IF WHEN
THE BATTERIES ARE REMOVED, THE LANTERN FACEPLATE IS
REATTACHED OFF TO THE SIDE LEAVING THE LANTERN CAVITY OPEN FOR
THE INSPECTOR TO PERFORM A QUICK VISUAL CHECK. THIS AVOIDS
REOPENING EACH CLOSED OUT BATTLE LANTERN. ONCE THE BATTERIES
ARE REMOVED, TRANSFER THEM TO ANOTHER SHIP OR TURN IN AS
HAZMAT. IF TURNED IN AS HAZMAT, THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE
TERMINALS MUST BE REMOVED TO PREVENT ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE
AND A FIRE. FOR RECHARGEABLE BATTERIES, CUT THE WIRES AS CLOSE
TO THE BATTERY AS POSSIBLE AFTER REMOVAL.
4. A. ITEM: BILGES
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: THE INACTIVATION PLAN REQUIRES THE
SHIP TO BE TURNED OVER TO THE INACTIVE FLEET WITH TANKS PUMPED
DRY OR TO LOW SUCTION. AS SYSTEMS ARE CLOSED OUT, THE
POSSIBILITY EXISTS FOR OILY WASTE OR CONTAMINATED WATER TO END
UP IN THE BILGES. SYSTEM CLOSEOUT MUST BE CAREFULLY
COORDINATED TO LIMIT THE AMOUNT OF LIQUID PUMPED TO THE BILGES
AND AVOID EXTENDED CLOSEOUT TIME IN BREMERTON.
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C. RECOMMENDATION: PUMP DOWN AS MANY "CLEAN" SYSTEMS
THROUGH THE CHT SYSTEM AND THE PEER AS POSSIBLE. THE MAJORITY
OF SYSTEMS ARE JUST WATER (POTABLE WATER, WASTE HEAT, CHILL
WATER, FIREMAIN) AND CAN ALL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE CHT SYSTEM
SAFELY.
5. A. ITEM: RHIB
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: THE WORK REQUIRED TO PREPARE THE
RHIB FOR SHIPMENT IS EXTENSIVE AND TIME CONSUMING. PRIOR TO
SHIPMENT, ALL FLUIDS MUST BE DRAINED, THE RHIB MUST BE DEFUELED,
BATTERY DISCONNECTED, BILGE PLUG REMOVED AND BILGES WIPED
CLEAN. ALL WORK MUST BE COMPLETED AFTER THE RHIB HAS BEEN
REMOVED FROM THE WATER. DUE TO THE DESIGN OF THE GRAVITY
DAVIT, THE RHIB MUST BE LOWERED INTO THE WATER FIRST AND THEN
CRANED INTO A SHIPPING CRADLE ON THE PIER.
C. RECOMMENDATION: PUT THE RHIB IN THE WATER PRIOR TO MOORING
AND TAKING ANY SWOB BARGES ALONGSIDE WHICH MAY BLOCK THE
DAVIT. GETTING THE RHIB OFF THE SHIP AND INTO THE CRADLE ON THE
PEER EARLY IS THE KEY TO GETTING THIS TASK COMPLETED QUICKLY.
6. A. ITEM: STABILITY
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: FOLLOWING THE REMOVAL OF AI T.
AMMUNITION, FOOD AND GSK STORES, SIDES WAS APPROXIMATELY 300
TONS LIGHTER AND SAT ALMOST TWO FEET HIGHER IN THE WATER.
STABILITY CALCULATION PRODUCTS AVAILABLE DID NOT SUPPORT
LIGHT-LOADED CONDITION.
C. RECOMMENDATION: AS MATERIAL IS REMOVED FROM THE SHIP,
CLOSE ATTENTION MUST BE PAID TO STABILITY. SHIP COORDINATED
WITH NAVSEA, CODE 5P, AND CNSP TYPE DESK OFFICER, FOR
RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM AND FOR WAIVER REQUEST (REF B).
NAVSEA'S SOLUTION REQUIRED THE SHIP TO BALLAST DOWN WITH
APPROXIMATELY 80 TONS OF SEAWATER IN FOUR FUEL TANKS (5-100-1, 5100-2, 5-250-2 AND 5-250-3) TO COMPENSATE FOR LIGHT LOADING. THE
ADDITION OF THIS DIRTY BALLAST REQUIRED COORDINATION WITH
NISMO FOR REMOVAL UPON ARRIVAL IN BREMERTON, AS IT WOULD HAVE
ADDED APPROXIMATELY THREE DAYS TO THE TIME REQUIRED TO
DEFUEL AND PUMP OILY WASTE IN BREMERTON. THIS ADDED TIME
WOULD HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT GIVEN THE LIMITED AMOUNT OF TIME
(APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK) AVAILABLE FOR FINAL CLOSEOUT AND
TURNOVER OF THE SHIP IN BREMERTON. SHIP FURTHER MITIGATED THIS
TIME REQUIREMENT BY PUMPING ALL CLEAN BALLAST OVER THE SIDE AT
SEA PRIOR TO ARRIVAL IN BREMERTON.
7. A. ITEM: SAFETY CHAINS/SHACKLES
B. BACKGROUND/DESCRIPTION: PRIOR TO TURNOVER TO THE INACTIVE
FLEET, ALL TEMPORARY (ROPE) LIFELINES AROUND WEATHERDECKS,
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PLATFORMS AND INTERIOR AND EXTERIOR STANCHIONS AND PLATFORMS
MUST BE REPLACED WITH CHAIN. THE SPACE CLOSEOUT INSPECTOR WILL
NOT ACCEPT SPACES WITH TEMPORARY LIFELINES OR SAFETY LINES.
C. RECOMMENDATION: ORDER ENOUGH CHAIN AND SHACKLES PRIOR TO
THE START OF THE DECOM AVAIL TO AVOID DELAYS IN SPACE CLOSEOUT.
B) SUPPLY/FINANCIAL
1. A. ITEM: MATERIAL/EQUIPMENT DISPOSITION/TURN-IN
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF THE DECOM
AVAIL, COMNAVSURFPAC WILL TRANSMIT A TWO PART MESSAGE (REFS B
AND C) OUTLINING SUPPLY DEPARTMENT DECOMMISSIONING
PROCEDURES. A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS
AND POINTS OF CONTACT AT COGNIZANT AGENCIES (SPAWAR, FTSCPAC,
NWSC CRANE, CNSP, NAVSEA, ETC.) IS IMPERATIVE TO A SMOOTH
OFFLOAD OF EQUIPMENT AND EQUIPAGE. C. RECOMMENDATION:
IDENTIFY AND ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH COGNIZANT AGENCIES AND
POC'S TO REVIEW THESE REFS IN THEIR ENTIRETY PRIOR TO THE START OF
THE DECOM AVAIL. CLEAR UP ANY DISCREPANCIES OR QUESTIONS AS
EARLY AS POSSIBLE.
2. A. ITEM: DECOM/XFER UPDATE MEETINGS
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: DECOMMISSIONING A SHIP REQUIRES AN
ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF WORK AT ALL LEVELS OF THE CHAIN OF
COMMAND. DUE TO THE INCREASED ACTIVITY ACROSS A TIGHT
TIMELINE, THE PROBABILITY OF REDUNDANT OR DUPLICATIVE WORK
INCREASES, LOWERING EFFICIENCY OF THE OVERALL WORK EFFORT. IT IS
IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE INFORMATION FLOWING UP CENTRALLY TO THE
DECOM COORDINATOR AT ALL TIMES.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS: SHIP CONDUCTED DAILY "WORKING" DECOM
MEETINGS WITH DECKPLATE LEVEL LEADERSHIP (DH AND BELOW) TO
COORDINATE POA&M COMPLETION AND EQUIPMENT OFFLOADS. A
FORMAL MEETING WAS HELD ONCE EACH WEEK WITH MAJOR PLAYERS
(CO, XO, DH'S, DECOM COORDINATOR, ISIC REP, CONTRACTORS, PORT
ENGINEERS AND CNSP TYPE DESK OFFICER) TO KEEP SUPPORTING
COMMANDS, SHIP’S’ CHAIN OF COMMAND AND THE SHIP’S INTERNAL
LEADERSHIP INFORMED OF MAJOR ISSUES. THIS MEETING ALSO SERVED
AS A CLEARING HOUSE FOR ANY ISSUES REQUIRING SPECIAL MENTION IN
THE WEEKLY DECOM SITREP.
3. A. ITEM: BUS DRIVERS
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: SHIPS WILL REQUIRE BUSES IN
BREMERTON TO MOVE LARGE NUMBERS OF THE CREW TO THE AIRPORT
IN THE LAST FEW DAYS OF THE DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS AND TO
MOVE PERSONNEL TO BEQ/BOQ ROOMS. CONTRACT BUS DRIVERS ARE
EXPENSIVE AND MUST BE SCHEDULED IN ADVANCE.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS: LICENSING SHIP'S FORCE TO DRIVE BUSES
PROVIDES THE MOST FLEXIBILITY AND COST SAVINGS FOR THIS ISSUE.
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THERE IS ONE AUTHORIZED BUS DRIVER LICENSING OFFICIAL IN SAN
DIEGO AND CLASSES FILL UP QUICKLY. CONTACT THE BUS LICENSER AS
EARLY AS POSSIBLE TO ENSURE CLASS AVAILABILITY.
4. A. ITEM: DRMO TURN-INS
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: DRMO IN BOTH SAN DIEGO AND
BREMERTON PLACES RESTRICTIONS ON THE ITEMS THAT THEY WILL
ACCEPT. FOR EXAMPLE, MATTRESSES AND PILLOWS MUST BE CLEAN (NO
STAINS) AND IN GOOD SHAPE, AND EQUIPMENT MUST BE IN WORKING
CONDITION. CERTAIN DAYS ARE DESIGNATED FOR TURN-IN OF CERTAIN
ITEMS, E.G., ON FRIDAYS DRMO ONLY ACCEPTS FURNITURE. FINALLY,
TURN-IN OF EQUIPMENT MUST BE COORDINATED WITH DRMO AT LEAST
ONE DAY IN ADVANCE.
C. RECOMMENDATION: ARRANGE FOR A DRMO REP TO MEET WITH
DIVISIONAL REPS ON THE SHIP BEFORE THE DECOM AVAIL BEGINS TO
DISCUSS TURN-IN REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES.
5. A. ITEM: AFLOAT PURCHASE PROGRAM
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: PER REF B, SHIPS ARE REQUIRED TO
TERMINATE SMALL PURCHASING CAPABILITY 30 DAYS PRIOR TO
DECOMMISSIONING DATE TO ALLOW SUFFICIENT TIME FOR ACCOUNT
CLOSEOUTTHE SHIP WILL STILL REQUIRE THE ABILITY TO PURCHASE
REQUIRED SUPPLIES THROUGHOUT THE DECOM AVAIL.
C. RECOMMENDATION: WORK WITH ISIC AND TYCOM TO TRANSFER A
PURCHASING FUND TO A SISTER SHIP IN THE SQUADRON TO PROCESS
SMALL, EMERGENT PURCHASES DURING THE DECOM AVAIL.
6. A. ITEM: FOOD SERVICE INVENTORY
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: BALANCING NUTRITIONAL NEEDS AND
VARIETY WITH IMPENDING GALLEY CLOSURE IS DIFFICULT. ONCE A FIRM
DATE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR GALLEY CLOSURE, TWO OPTIONS
EXIST FOR FEEDING THE CREW DURING THE DECOM AVAIL. THE FIRST IS
TO CONTINUE TO COOK MEALS IN THE GALLEY UP TO CLOSURE DATE.
THE SECOND IS TO SERVE PRE-PACKAGED FROZEN MEALS IN THE FINAL
WEEKS OR DURING THE TRANSIT TO THE SHIP'S FINAL STORAGE
LOCATION. SHIP CONTINUED TO COOK MEALS UP UNTIL THE DAY THE
SHIP ARRIVED IN BREMERTON.
C. RECOMMENDATION: SHIP REDUCED ITS MENU VARIETY AS A MEANS
TO MAINTAIN FOOD INVENTORY AS LOW AS POSSIBLE AS THE GALLEY
CLOSURE DATE APPROACHED. THIS METHOD PROVIDED THE LEAST
EXPENSIVE OPTION WHILE MAINTAINING THE HIGHEST QUALITY FOOD
SERVICE. DESPITE USING THE EQUIPMENT TO COOK MEALS THROUGHOUT
THE FINAL DELIVERY TRANSIT, IT TOOK ONLY ONE DAY TO CLOSEOUT
THE GALLEY AND SCULLERY ONCE IN BREMERTON.
7. A. ITEM: RELIEF FOR SHIP'S STORE CLOSEOUT INVENTORY
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: AS THE CLOSURE DATE FOR THE SHIP'S
STORE APPROACHES, PRICES MAY BE REQUIRED TO BE DECREASED TO
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HELP SELL REMAINING INVENTORY. RELIEF FROM RESPONSIBILITY FOR
ITEMS THAT PROVE HARD TO SELL IS AVAILABLE ON A CASE BY CASE
BASIS FROM NEXCOM. C. RECOMMENDATION: APPLY EARLY IN THE
DECOM AVAIL TO NEXCOM FOR RELIEF FOR HARD TO MOVE ITEMS.
8. A. ITEM: OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION FUNDS (ORF)
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: ORF FUNDS ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO USE
FOR DECOMMISSIONING CEREMONIES UNLESS A CIVILIAN GUEST TO DOD
MEMBER RATIO OF 50 IS MET. BECAUSE DEPENDENTS OF DOD MEMBERS,
RETIRED SERVICE MEMBERS AND DOD EMPLOYEES DO NOT COUNT AS
CIVILIANS, THIS RATIO CAN BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE.
ADDITIONALLY, THE USE OF OPTAR OR MWR FUNDS FOR DECOM
CEREMONY RECEPTIONS IS ILLEGAL. DECOMMISSIONING CEREMONIES
ARE AS MUCH A PART OF NAVY TRADITION AS COMMISSIONING
CEREMONIES. THEY PRESENT A DIGNIFIED WAY TO HONOR A SHIP AND
HER CREW, BOTH PAST AND PRESENT, FOR THEIR SERVICE TO THE
NATION. WITHOUT ORF FUNDS BEING PROVIDED, SHIPS FACE A STRUGGLE
IN PAYING FOR AN APPROPRIATE CEREMONY AND RECEPTION TO HONOR
THE SHIP WITHOUT THE HELP OF PRIVATE PURCHASES.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS: RECOMMEND ORF FUNDS BE PROVIDED TO
DECOMMISSIONING SHIPS IN THE SAME MANNER AS FOR COMMISSIONING
SHIPS TO ALLOW FOR PURCHASES OF RECEPTION ITEMS.
9. A. ITEM: ADVANCE TRAVEL/DLA/PAY
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: THE TRANSFER OF THE ENTIRE CREW IS
AN EVENT UNIQUE TO A DECOMMISSIONING SHIP. COORDINATING THE
PAYMENT OF ADVANCED TRAVEL, DLA AND PAY REQUESTS IS DIFFICULT
AND REQUIRES SIGNIFICANT PRIOR PLANNING. EARLY ACTION ON THESE
REQUESTS IS ESSENTIAL TO COMPLETING THEM ALL ON TIME.
C. RECOMMENDATION: SHIP' DISBURSING OFFICE BEGAN EXECUTING
ADVANCE PAYMENTS FOR DETACHING/TRANSFERRING CREW ONCE
IMMEDIATELY INSIDE OF THE 30 DAY WINDOW PRIOR TO DECOM. AT A
MINIMUM, ALL PAYMENTS SHOULD BE EXECUTED PRIOR TO CLOSEOUT
OF THE DISBURSING OFFICE AND TRANSFER OF THE OPERATION TO BASE
PSA/PSD. IF PROPERLY ORGANIZED, THIS WILL ECONOMIZE PROCESSING
TIME, REMOVING THE DIFFICULTY OF TRYING TO EXECUTE AT THE SHIP'S
STORAGE LOCATION PORT.
11. A. ITEM: HAZMAT DISPOSAL
B.
BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: PER REF A, SHIPS ARE REQUIRED TO BE
TURNED OVER TO NISMO FREE OF ALL HAZMAT. WHILE THE BULK OF ALL
HAZMAT CAN BE DISPOSED OF IN SAN DIEGO, "SAILAWAY" SHIPS WILL
REQUIRE SMALL QUANTITIES OF CERTAIN TYPES OF HAZMAT NEEDED TO
MAKE THE VOYAGE TO BREMERTON HAZMAT DISPOSAL REQUIREMENTS
IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST ARE MUCH MORE COSTLY THAN IN SAN
DIEGO, IN THAT THE DISPOSAL COST PER POUND OF HAZWASTE IS
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SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER. THIS REQUIRES CAREFUL PLANNING AND
COORDINATION WITH THE HAZMAT CENTER IN THE SHIP’S STORAGE
LOCATION.
C.
RECOMMENDATION: REMOVE AS MUCH HAZMAT FROM THE SHIP AS
POSSIBLE PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. IDENTIFY HAZMAT REQUIRED FOR THE
TRANSIT EARLY ON AND ESTABLISH LIAISON WITH THE HAZMAT CENTER
IN THE INACTSHIPS STORAGE LOCATION TO DETERMINE DISPOSITION OF
THESE ITEMS UPON ARRIVAL. SHIP CLOSED ALL SEVEN DAY LOCKERS
AND OFFLOADED EXCESS HAZMAT BY THE SECOND WEEK OF THE DECOM
AVAIL. EVEN SO, THOROUGH INSPECTIONS OF WORKSPACES WERE
REQUIRED SEVERAL TIMES A WEEK TO IDENTIFY AND REMOVE ANY
HAZMAT THAT MANAGED TO FIND ITS WAY BACK INTO WORKSPACES.
ARRIVING AT THE STORAGE LOCATION WITH AS LITTLE HAZMAT AS
POSSIBLE IS KEY TO ELIMINATING DELAYS IN SPACE CLOSEOUT.
12. A. ITEM: POST OFFICE
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: POSTAL SERVICES IN SAN DIEGO ARE
CENTRALLY FUNDED BY COMNAVSURFPAC FOR ALL SHIPS. POSTAL
SERVICES IN BREMERTON ARE FUNDED BY INDIVIDUAL SHIPS. SHIPS WILL
NEED TO MAIL EVALS/FITREPS, PROFESSIONAL MATERIALS, REPORTS,
DECK/ENGINEERING LOGS, ETC., DURING THE FINAL WEEK OF THE DECOM
AVAIL TO CLOSE OUT ALL REQUIREMENTS. FUNDING FOR POSTAL
SERVICES MUST BE IN PLACE TO ACCOMMODATE THESE REQUIREMENTS.
C. RECOMMENDATION: ENSURE SUFFICIENT FUNDS ARE RETAINED BY
THE SHIP TO PAY FOR FINAL SHIPPING COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE
DECOMMISSIONING AT THE STORAGE LOCATION. A DD 1149 FUNDING
DOCUMENT SHOULD BE COMPLETED IN ADVANCE.
C) OPERATIONS
1. A. ITEM: CLASSIFIED MATERIAL
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: THE SHIP MUST BE TURNED OVER TO THE
INACTIVE FLEET WITH NO CLASSIFIED MATERIAL REMAINING ONBOARD.
ALL CLASSIFIED MATERIAL CAN BE DESTROYED. THERE IS NO
REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN CLASSIFIED TECH MANUALS ONBOARD.
FACILITIES FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL IN
BREMERTON ARE LIMITED. SHIP SCHEDULED WEEKLY BURN RUNS
THROUGHOUT THE DECOM AVAIL, AND TWICE WEEKLY RUNS THE FINAL
WEEK.
C. RECOMMENDATION: REMOVE AS MUCH CLASSIFIED MATERIAL FROM
THE SHIP AS POSSIBLE PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. THOROUGHLY SCRUB
REQUIREMENTS FOR KEYMAT, CRYPTO EQUIPMENT, PUBS, ETC., PRIOR TO
THE TRANSIT. SHIP’ COMMPLAN DID NOT REQUIRE ANY CRYPTO EXCEPT
FOR THAT NEEDED TO PROCESS CUDIXS AND SATHICOM.
2. A. ITEM: REMOVING ADP ASSETS FROM THE SHIP
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: THE SHIP WILL REQUIRE THE USE OF
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COMPUTERS TO COMPLETE ADMIN WORK THROUGHOUT THE DECOM
AVAIL. REF C REQUIRES SUBMISSION OF ADP ASSET INVENTORY FOR
REDISTRIBUTION TO CNSP THREE MONTHS PRIOR TO DECOMMISSIONING.
C. RECOMMENDATION: CONDUCT A THOROUGH INVENTORY OF ALL
LEASED ADP ASSETS AND STANDALONE ASSETS PRIOR TO THE DECOM
AVAIL, AND RECONCILE THE INVENTORY WITH CNSP. DETERMINE
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR ADP ASSETS THROUGHOUT THE
DECOM AVAIL. CONSOLIDATE COMPUTERS FOR USE AS MUCH AS
POSSIBLE. SHIP DEVELOPED A PLAN TO REMOVE APPROXIMATELY A
THIRD OF ALL ADP ASSETS EACH WEEK OVER A PERIOD OF THREE WEEKS.
SHIP TRANSITED TO BREMERTON WITH THE SIPRNET LAN WORKING AT 4
NODES (CO, XO, OPS, RADIO) AND THE NIPRNET LAN AT 7 NODES (CO, XO,
OPS, SUPPO, RADIO, ADMIN, ADP). THESE REMAINING ASSETS WERE
REQUIRED TO ALLOW SHIP'S FORCE PERSONNEL TO COMPLETE
EVALUATIONS, AWARDS, DRAFT AND REVIEW MESSAGE TRAFFIC, ETC.,
THROUGHOUT THE TRANSIT. THE REMAINING ADP ASSETS WERE
REDISTRIBUTED TO PACNORWEST SURFPAC UNITS UPON ARRIVAL IN
BREMERTON.
3. A. ITEM: OFFICE SPACE REQUIREMENTS IN BREMERTON
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: DUE TO THE NEED TO SHUT DOWN
POTABLE WATER, CHT AND VENTILATION TO ALLOW ENGINEERING
SPACE CLOSEOUTS, SHIP BECAME VIRTUALLY UNINHABITABLE UPON
ARRIVAL IN BREMERTON. THIS CONDITION MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO
RETAIN ADMIN OFFICES ONBOARD.
C. RECOMMENDATION: SHIP ARRANGED FOR OFFICE SPACE AT THE FISC
PUGET SOUND BUILDING. THIS SPACE CONSISTED OF SEVEN CUBICLE
AREAS EQUIPPED WITH PHONES AND UNCLAS COMPUTERS AND WAS
ADEQUATE. NO SIPRNET ACCESS WAS PROVIDED AS THE FISC BUILDING IS
NOT A SECURE SITE. EARLY COORDINATION WITH FISC BUILDING
MANAGER AND FISC HELP DESK IS VITAL TO AVOID DELAYS IN OFFICE
SPACE SET UP AND LAN ACCOUNT ESTABLISHMENT. IN ADDITION, MAKE
ARRANGEMENTS EARLY TO SUPPORT ANY ANTICIPATED WEEKEND WORK
IN THE OFFICES. THE FISC BUILDING IS LOCKED ON THE WEEKENDS AND
REQUIRES SECURITY BADGE ACCESS. BADGES CAN BE OBTAINED FROM
THE BASE SECURITY OFFICE WITH SUFFICIENT ADVANCE WARNING.
4. A. ITEM: MESSAGE TRAFFIC
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: WITH THE REMOVAL OR LAYUP OF
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND COMPUTERS, TRANSMITTING AND
RECEIVING MESSAGE TRAFFIC DURING THE FINAL DAYS OF THE
INACTIVATION REQUIRES PRIOR COORDINATION WITH LOCAL
COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES.
C. RECOMMENDATION: SHIP COORDINATED WITH NCTS PUGET SOUND
TO GUARD SHIP TRAFFIC INPORT. SCRUB COMMAND GUARD LIST PRIOR
TO LEAVING HOMEPORT TO ELIMINATE ALL UNNECESSARY MESSAGE
TRAFFIC. IN ADDITION, CONTACT MANAGERS OF AIGS/CADS TO HAVE
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THE COMMAND REMOVED FROM THE LIST. BE PREPARED FOR SLOWER
THAN USUAL RECEIPT AND TRANSMISSION OF TRAFFIC. SHIP' IT'S
DOWNLOADED TRAFFIC TO DISK THREE TIMES DAILY AT NCTS PUGET
SOUND. TRAFFIC WAS LOADED INTO MDS ONBOARD, AND LATER ON A
STAND-ALONE COMPUTER IN THE FISC OFFICE SPACE ONCE RADIO WAS
CLOSED OUT. A HARD COPY READ BOARD WAS ROUTED TO CO, XO, DH’S,
CMC AND CDO. OUTGOING TRAFFIC WAS HAND-CARRIED ON DISK TO
NCTS PUGET SOUND ON THE FINAL RUN EACH DAY FOR TRANSMISSION.
D) CMS/CRYPTO
1. A. ITEM: CMS ACCOUNT DISESTABLISHMENT
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: PRIOR TO DECOMMISSIONING, THE SHIP’S
CMS ACCOUNT MUST BE DISESTABLISHED AND ALL TRANSACTIONS
RECONCILED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THROUGH MORE THAN TWENTY
YEARS OF TRANSACTIONS, DCMS MAY HAVE INCOMPLETE RECORDS FOR
RECEIPTS AND DESTRUCTION. ALL TRANSACTIONS MUST BE RECONCILED
PRIOR TO ACCOUNT DISESTABLISHMENT. THE KEY TO SUCCESSFUL
COMPLETION OF THIS PROCESS IS ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH DCMS
WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE START OF THE DECOM AVAIL TO ENSURE A
THOROUGH INVENTORY AND SUFFICIENT TIME TO DETERMINE THE
STATUS OF ANY OUTSTANDING TRANSACTIONS.
C. RECOMMENDATION: REQUEST ACCOUNT DISESTABLISHMENT
INSTRUCTIONS FROM DCMS AT LEAST 90 DAYS PRIOR TO THE START OF
THE DECOM AVAIL. THIS SHOULD ALLOW SUFFICIENT TIME TO
RECONCILE ANY OUTSTANDINGTRANSACTIONS THAT WOULD DELAY
DISESTABLISHMENT OF THE ACCOUNT.
2. A. ITEM: CRYPTO AND KEYMAT INVENTORY
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: DECOMMISSIONING SHIPS WILL LIKELY
CONTINUE TO OPERATE UNTIL THE START OF THE DECOM AVAIL. CRYPTO
AND KEYMAT MAINTAINED IN THE CMS INVENTORY TO SUPPORT THESE
OPERATIONS AS WELL AS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS MUST BE
CAREFULLY MANAGED DURING THE FINAL MONTHS OF A SHIP'S LIFE.
AUTOMATIC DISTRIBUTION OF CRYPTO AND KEYING MATERIAL MUST BE
CAREFULLY MANAGED TO ENSURE REQUIRED MATERIAL IS HELD
ONBOARD WITHOUT ACQUIRING A LARGE EXCESS OF MATERIAL THAT
MUST LATER BE DESTROYED. SOME CRYPTO AND KEYMAT WILL BE
REQUIRED DEPENDING ON COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS DURING
THE TRANSIT TO THE STORAGE LOCATION.
C. RECOMMENDATION: CONTACT DCMS AT LEAST 90 DAYS IN ADVANCE
OF DECOM AVAIL START DATE TO DETERMINE FINAL SHIPMENTS OF
CRYPTO AND KEYMAT. THOROUGHLY SCRUB REQUIREMENTS FOR
COMMUNICATIONS CIRCUITS AND HARDCOPY KEYING MATERIAL NEEDED
DURING THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE SHIP'S LIFE AND THE COMMPLAN
SUPPORTING THE TRANSIT TO THE STORAGE LOCATION. MAKE GOOD USE
OF OTATS/OTARS WHEREVER POSSIBLE TO LIMIT REQUIREMENTS FOR
HARDCOPY MATERIAL.
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E) COMBAT SYSTEMS
1. A. ITEM: FORCE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: THE BULK OF THE SHIP'S FP EQUIPMENT
WILL BE REDISTRIBUTED EARLY IN THE DECOM AVAILABILITY DUE TO
DEMANDS CREATED BY FLEET FP EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES. MANAGING
THE POTENTIAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE NEED TO REMOVE EQUIPMENT
VERSUS SHIPBOARD SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IS CHALLENGING.
C. RECOMMENDATION: IDENTIFY FP REQUIREMENTS AT STORAGE
LOCATION EARLY AND DEVELOP PLANS FOR EACH FPCON. COORDINATE
WITH BASE SECURITY TO ALLEVIATE WATCHSTANDING REQUIREMENTS,
ESPECIALLY AS CREW SIZE DECREASES IN THE FINAL DAYS OF THE AVAIL.
SHIP COORDINATED WITH NAVSTA BREMERTON BASE SECURITY OFFICE
TO PROVIDE SENTRIES AT THE HEAD OF THE PIER AND PROVIDED
REMAINING SHIPBOARD WATCHES FROM SHIP'S COMPANY. AS SOON AS
ALL CLASSIFIED MATERIAL, WEAPONS AND ORDNANCE HAVE BEEN
REMOVED FROM THE SHIP, MAINTAINING A FULL SAT/BAF ONBOARD
BECOMES OVERKILL AND A REDUCED SECURITY PRESENCE IS POSSIBLE
BY ARMING SOUNDING AND SECURITY, QUARTERDECK AND A SECURITY
ROVER.
2. A. ITEM: SMALL ARMS AND AMMUNITION
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: ALL SMALL ARMS MUST BE RETURNED
TO NSWC
CRANE, INDIANA, AND SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION TURNED IN TO A
NAVAL WEAPONS STATION PRIOR TO TURNOVER OF THE SHIP TO THE
INACTIVE FLEET. SMALL ARMS WILL BE REQUIRED THROUGHOUT THE
DECOM AVAIL TO MEET FP AND SAT/BAF REQUIREMENTS.
C. RECOMMENDATION: COORDINATE WITH STORAGE LOCATION TO
SUBCUSTODY WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION. SHIP COORDINATED WITH
NAVSTA BREMERTON TO SUBCUSTODY SMALL ARMS AND AMMUNITION
FROM THEIR ARMORY SO THE SHIP'S INVENTORY COULD BE REMOVED.
F) GENERAL DECOMMISSIONING ISSUES 1. A. ITEM: SPACE LIST
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: AN ACCURATE LIST OF ALL SPACES
ONBOARD IS ESSENTIAL TO PROPER AND EFFICIENT SPACE CLOSEOUT. AS
SHIPS GO THROUGH MODIFICATIONS DURING THEIR LIFE CYCLE, SPACES
MAY BE CREATED OR REMOVED AND DIVISIONAL RESPONSIBILITY MAY
CHANGE.
C. RECOMMENDATION: THOROUGHLY SCRUB COMPARTMENT LIST TO
REMOVE ANY DUPLICATE LISTINGS. IDENTIFY ANY SPACES WHOSE
NAMES OR RESPONSIBLE WORKCENTER HAVE CHANGED AND ADD ANY
SPACES THAT MAY HAVE BEEN CREATED AS THE RESULT OF
MODIFICATIONS TO THE INTERIOR OF THE SHIP. HAVE THIS PRODUCT
HANDY WHEN NISMO REP/LIAISON ARRIVES TO BEGIN SPACE CLOSEOUT.
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2. A. ITEM: SPACE CLOSEOUT
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: SPACE CLOSEOUT CAN BE ONE OF THE
MOST TIME CONSUMING ASPECTS OF THE DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS.
NISMO WILL PROVIDE THE SHIP WITH A GENERAL LIST OF REQUIRED
ACTIONS FOR SPACE CLOSE PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF THE DECOM
AVAIL.
C. RECOMMENDATION: ESTABLISH A GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE SPACE CLOSEOUT INSPECTOR EARLY ON. HE OR SHE IS THE
SINGLE POINT OF CONTACT AND THE SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT
REGARDING SPACETURNOVER.THE KEY IS TO START EARLY. IN ADDITION,
WORK WITH THE SPACE INSPECTOR TO DETERMINE ANY SPACES HE OR
SHE WILL NOT ACCEPT UNTIL ARRIVAL IN THE STORAGE LOCATION. THIS
WILL ALLOW SHIP'S FORCE TO FOCUS ON SPACES THAT CAN BE ACCEPTED
PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.
3. A. ITEM: DUTY SECTION REQUIREMENTS
B. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: SHIP EMPTIED MATTRESSES, RACK
CURTAINS, PILLOWS AND LINENS FROM ALL BERTHING COMPARTMENTS,
STATEROOMS AND CPO MESS SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVAL IN BREMERTON
IN PREPARATION FOR CLOSING OUT BERTHING AREAS. THE CREW MOVED
INTO ASSIGNED BOQ/BEQ ROOMS THE FIRST DAY INPORT. BERTHING
SPACE ONBOARD THE SHIP FOR WATCHSTANDERS, FIRE PARTY AND
SECURITY FORCES WAS EXTREMELY LIMITED. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO CLOSE
OUT BERTHING AREAS AND MAINTAIN A FULL DUTY SECTION ONBOARD.
SHIP COORDINATED WITH THE BASE FIRE DEPARTMENT TO RESPOND TO
ANY EMERGENCIES ON THE SHIP, ALLOWING THE SHIP TO MAINTAIN A 4
MAN RAPID RESPONSE TEAM TO CONTAIN CASUALTIES ONBOARD. IN
ADDITION, SAT AND BAF PERSONNEL REMAINED ONBOARD OVERNIGHT.
SHIP KEPT ONE OVERFLOW BERTHING COMPARTMENT (9 BUNKS) OPEN TO
ACCOMMODATE THESE PERSONNEL. ALL OTHER DUTY SECTION
PERSONNEL SLEPT IN THEIR BEQ ROOM UNLESS THEY WERE ON WATCH.
C. RECOMMENDATION: REMOVE ALL CLASSIFIED AND OTHER
MATERIALS FROM THE SHIP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ELIMINATE THE
NEED TO MAINTAIN 24 HOUR SAT/BAF ONBOARD. COORDINATE WITH
BASE FIRE DEPARTMENT TO RESPOND TO EMERGENCIES SO THAT THE BET
CAN BE REDUCED TO A RAPID RESPONSE TEAM.
G) THE FOLLOWING DECOMMISSIONING ITEMS AND PRODUCTS PRODUCED
BY SHIP ARE AVAILABLE FROM THE ISIC DECOMMISSIONING
COORDINATOR: POA&M, EQUIPMENT DISTRIBUTION LIST, APPLICABLE
DECOM MESSAGES, DECOM CEREMONY NOTICE, STABILITY WAIVER
REQUEST MSG AND LIST OF SPACES.//
BT
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APPENDIX B
Consent to Participate in a Research Study

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

135
Consent to Participate in a Research Study
CDR Darren McGlynn, a doctoral student in the Leadership Studies Program in
the School of Education at the University of San Diego, is conducting a study entitled
“Facing the Leadership Challenges on Decommissioning U.S. Navy Ships.” Below are
the conditions under which participants in the study will work:
1.

2.

3.
4.

Participants will be asked to describe what they have done during the
decommissioning process. The interviews will be tape-recorded, the tapes will be
transcribed and analyzed, and the information in the transcription will be used to
write a report and additional articles. The tapes will be destroyed after five years.
There are no physical risks associated with participation in this research outside
the general fatigue and mental discomfort associated with being interviewed for
no longer than an hour.
Participation in this research is entirely voluntary and consent to utilize all or any
part of the interview material can be withdrawn at any time.
Although pseudonyms will be used, participants in the study may be identified in
what is written and particular quotes may be attributed to particular individuals;
confidentiality, in other words, is not guaranteed

Interviewees will have an opportunity to review material from the interview transcript
that might be used in any written reports or articles based on this study; interviewees will
be given the opportunity to withdraw or change any material that is likely to be quoted.
The information collected will be used in CDR Darren McGlynn’s research paper for a
doctoral level independent study class.
If participants have questions or concerns at any point, they are encouraged to contact
CDR Darren McGlynn at (619) 524-9583 or dmcglynn@cox.net or his advisor, Dr.
Robert Donmoyer at (619) 260-7445 or donmoyer@sandiego.edu.
There is no agreement either written or verbal beyond what is contained in this consent
form.
I, the undersigned, understand the above explanations and on that basis, I give consent to
my voluntary participation in this research.
Signature of Interviewee
____________Date
Printed Nam e:________
Address:
Contact Info: Phone___________________ E-mail:___________________________
Note: Two copies o f this form will be provided, one fo r the researcher and one fo r the
participant.
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